




ARMY READINESS REPORTING SYSTEMS 1945–2003



WILLIAM M. DONNELLY

ARMY READINESS REPORTING SYSTEMS, 1945–2003

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FOREWORD

The U.S. Army before 1945 did not have a formal readiness reporting system and did not feel it needed one. After World War II, however, it found itself committed to large-scale deployments in Europe and in the Pacific, commitments that with the Cold War would continue for the next forty-five years. The demands of this great power competition, along with the wars in Korea and Vietnam, made it vital that senior service leaders had accurate information on the readiness of units in the Regular Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve. The methods for measuring readiness, however, soon became and then remained a matter of contention. Equally contentious was the use of data generated by readiness reporting systems, both within the service and by others outside the service. The end of the Cold War did not end these disputes. Indeed, the years between that victory and the start of the second Iraq War in 2003 were a time of heightened concern over military readiness and how to assess it.

This monograph is the first comprehensive account of Army readiness reporting systems between 1945 and 2003. It also is the first history of these systems based on archival research. Accurate and timely readiness data remains an essential requirement. An examination of how previous generations attempted to fulfill this requirement will be of value to those working to evaluate readiness today and in the future.

Washington, D.C.
28 September 2018

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Chief Historian

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INTRODUCTION: READINESS REPORTING BEFORE 1945

The U.S. Army before 1945 did not have a readiness reporting system that routinely provided reliable data on the status of its units. Between the world wars a regulation authorized training inspections of Regular Army units, to include evaluating whether the unit was ready for active field service. The regulation ignored personnel and equipment issues, and did not prescribe a format for the inspections or require the inspectors to forward their reports to the War Department.¹

The National Defense Act of 1916 required annual inspections of national guard units by regular officers. In response, the War Department developed a two-part policy: an annual inspection of units during a weeknight armory drill and an inspection of yearly summer field training. Although one purpose of the field training inspection was to determine the unit's readiness for active service, by the late 1930s there was considerable doubt about the validity of these evaluations. Inspectors were often regular officers serving as instructors for the same unit they evaluated. All inspectors had to check multiple units in a short period of time, and the corps area headquarters paid little attention to the program. In 1939, after several scandals involving the misuse of federal equipment and funds by guard units, the War Department directed the inspector general to assume responsibility for evaluating units both at their armory and during summer field training. (Organized Reserve Corps units consisted almost entirely of officer cadres and therefore the War Department did not assess their readiness for active field service.)²

1. *Army Regulations 265-10: Tactical and Training Inspections* (Washington, D.C.: War Department, 27 Jan 1921). The Army reissued the regulation with minor changes in 1924, 1937, and 1942. There are only scattered examples of these inspections in surviving records from this period: Commanding General 1st Inf Div to The Adjutant General, 15 Dec 1930 to Ltr, The Adjutant General to Commanding General Second Corps Area, 15 Nov 1930, sub: Readiness of the 1st Division For Immediate Field Service, Folder 330.2, Readiness of the 1st Division For Immediate Field Service, Box 18, Entry NM 93-2130, Record Group (RG) 391, National Archives, College Park, Md. (NACP); Ltr, HQ, Eighth Corps Area, 30 Mar 1933, sub: Plan for Corps Area Commander's Tactical Inspection, 1st Cav Div, Fort Bliss, Tex., 11-22 May 1933, Box NM 89-233, RG 338, NACP.

2. Memo, Maj M. D. Welty for Executive Officer, Militia Bureau, 21 Aug 1930, sub: Rating of National Guard Organizations at Armory and Field Inspections, and

World War II did not prompt implementation of a readiness reporting system that routinely provided the War Department General Staff with updates on the status of units. Instead, the Army built upon the prewar training inspection concept and tied it to readiness for deployment. Starting in July 1942, the deputy chief of staff had to certify a unit was ready to move overseas. To provide the information he needed to make that decision, the War Department required the continental army headquarters of units alerted for deployment to send an inspection team to determine the unit's status. Sent to the Operations Division (OPD) of the War Department General Staff, this report covered personnel, training, and equipment.

Complaints from theater commanders that units were arriving unready for combat brought a major change in January 1943. Seeking an impartial evaluation, the War Department now added another check on readiness by requiring that a team from the inspector general also inspect each unit alerted for deployment. These teams used a preparation for overseas movement checklist in their evaluation, along with the training directives appropriate to the type of unit. These reports also went to OPD, and the inspector general sent the chief of staff a quarterly report summarizing results and any trends. During 1943, the percentage of units found unready for combat dropped from 18 percent in the first quarter to 11 percent in the last quarter. By the second quarter of 1945, the figure had fallen to 7 percent.³

These inspections, however, were not without their frictions. Teams from continental army headquarters and the inspector general frequently had different ideas on the criteria for equipment serviceability. The pressure from Washington to ensure readiness for deployment and its demand for so many reports caused some continental army and service command headquarters to inspect units so often that they actually impeded unit readiness. Army Ground Forces (AGF), responsible for organizing and training all combat and support units, initially viewed the

Draft Ltr, Ch, National Guard Bureau to All Corps Areas and Dept Cdrs, 29 Jan 1937, sub: Field Inspection Boards, both in Folder 333.44 General, Box 356, Entry NM3-344A, RG 168, NACP; Ltr, Maj Gen I. T. Wyche to Lt. Gen. L. T. Gerow, 18 Feb 1948, Folder 333.4 General, Box 859, Entry NM3-344A, RG 168, NACP; *Annual Report of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau 1940* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940), pp. 23–24; Joseph W. A. Whitehorne, *The Inspectors General of the United States Army, 1903–1939* (Washington, D.C.: Office of The Inspector General and Center of Military History, United States Army, 1998), pp. 431–65.

3. Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, *The Army Ground Forces: The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1948), pp. 582–85, 595, 616.

inspector general's efforts as arbitrary—more interested in demonstrating the inspections' value by finding the maximum number of faults than in helping the unit. Starting in May 1944, however, officers from AGF began accompanying many of the inspector general teams. This practice allowed more rapid action on fixing faults and, through repeated personal associations, eased the frictions between the two organizations.⁴

At the end of World War II the United States was a global superpower with troops stationed around the world. The Army quickly found that it needed a system by which the General Staff could monitor the status of these far-flung units, even as demobilization greatly reduced the size of the active force. The need to track the active force's readiness for World War III against the Soviet Union prevented a return to the prewar training inspections policy. The same contingency also motivated a revision of National Guard readiness reporting and the creation of a reporting system for Organized Reserve Corps units.

The War Department General Staff therefore instituted a system of regular readiness reporting in 1946. A cyclical process began soon after: a readiness reporting system would be promulgated; dissatisfaction with its design, execution, or both, would soon arise; a review would be conducted; and either a revision or a new system would be fielded. The search for a more effective system would be shaped by competing concepts of assessing readiness; new technologies; bureaucratic infighting; frictions between the executive and legislative branches; the Army's organizational culture; and the demands of wars, both cold and hot.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 602–4, 609–10.

CHAPTER 1

FROM AN EXPANSIBLE ARMY TO AN EXPEDITIONARY ARMY, 1945–1953

From World War to Cold War, 1945–1950

The postwar active Army was the largest in history to date, but from September 1945 until mid-1949 readiness was secondary to demobilization and occupation duty. With the curtailing of occupation responsibilities in 1949, the emphasis shifted to training, but readiness remained problematic. The widespread assumption that war with the Soviet Union (seen as the only likely contingency) would be deterred or won with atomic air power left little support for robust ground forces. This assumption, and the fear that excessive military spending would harm the economy, produced budgets which left the Army chronically underfunded. Although senior service leaders wanted to maintain a combat-ready Regular Army, these budgets (and the estimate that World War III would require a multimillion soldier ground force) led them to prioritize wartime expansion capability over an immediately deployable expeditionary force.

The all-volunteer Regular Army in 1950 had seven infantry, two airborne, and one armored divisions, and a small number of nondivisional units. Inadequate budgets left units without sufficient equipment, and what they did have was mostly aging materiel produced during the last war. The personnel strengths funded by these budgets were inadequate for this structure. The service retained it, however, in order to keep a semblance of the force plans required during the first year of a war and a modicum of a mobilization base. Except for the 82d Airborne Division, units were on reduced tables of organization, but without the draft and draft-motivated enlistments even these strengths could not be attained. Personnel turbulence generated by large overseas garrisons and the continuance of racially segregated units compounded these shortages.¹

1. This section is based on Edward A. Kolodziej, *The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945–1963* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966), pp. 88–123; Brian McAllister Linn, *The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War* (Cambridge,

The institution of a formal career management system began to change the organizational culture of the officer corps. Promotions up through colonel were now by selection instead of seniority; officers who twice failed promotion to the next rank would be separated from the service. Expanding the active force during another world war would require officers ready for higher rank and more responsibilities than they held before mobilization. Therefore, a new professional development program emphasized officer preparation by moving them through a succession of increasingly difficult jobs. This would give them the widest possible experience and assess whether they were capable of assuming greater wartime responsibilities.

The system soon produced unintended effects which opened a gap between the idealized professional climate and the actual professional climate. Maximizing the number who could get experience at each job in their field's professional development program required frequent reassignments. This usually left officers insufficient time to fully master each job's duties. Equity in career development also led to officers filling positions for which they did not qualify—either by experience or proficiency. Certain jobs, most notably command of a troop unit, became gates through which one had to pass with a positive efficiency report in order to remain competitive for promotion. This

Mass: Harvard University Press, 2007), pp. 151–61; Steven T. Ross, *American War Plans, 1945–1950* (London: Frank Cass, 1996); Thomas E. Hanson, “America’s First Cold War Army: Combat Readiness in the Eighth U.S. Army, 1949–1950” (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 2006); Ltr, the adjutant general, 28 Mar 1949, sub: Effects of Reduction in Personnel Ceiling on Army Program for 1949–1950, Folder 320.2/Binder 1, Box 172, Entry NM5-55I, RG 337, NACP; Ltr, Director, Organization and Training Div, General Staff U.S. Army, 16 Sep 1949, sub: Presentation of Revised Troop Bases for 30 Jun 1950, Folder 320.2/Binder 1, Box 172, Entry NM5-55I, RG 337, NACP; SS, Director, Organization and Training Div for Ch of Staff, 22 Dec 1949, sub: Revision of AMP I, Folder 370.01/1949, Box 16, Entry UD–2A, RG 319, NACP; Encl 1 to Memo, Col. J. K. Wilson to Sec, General Staff, 18 May 1950, sub: Background Material for Gen Collins’ Speech to the National War College, Folder 352, Box 16, Entry UD-2A, RG 319, NACP; Ltr, the adjutant general, 13 Jun 1950, sub: Training Inspections, Folder 333.1/1950, Box 210, Entry A1–2A, RG 319, NACP; Rpt, HQ, 1st Inf Div, Cmd Rpt 1950, Box 2937, Entry 37042, RG 338, NACP; Rpt, HQ, 11th Abn Div, Cmd Rpt 1950, Box 931, Entry 37042, RG 338, NACP; Rpt, HQ, 2d Armd Div, Cmd Rpt 1950, Entry 429, RG 407, NACP; Hanson W. Baldwin, “Armed Strength Cuts: Budget Reduction Is Viewed as Taking Calculated Risk in Combat Effectiveness,” *New York Times*, 16 Jan 1950.

encouraged, especially among field grade offices, an overemphasis on how one's current assignment affected future career prospects.²

Efforts to monitor the readiness of the Army amid the turmoil of demobilization began soon after the surrender of Japan. Army Ground Forces (AGF) directed its three subordinate continental army headquarters in December 1945 to prepare a monthly report on units of the General Reserve that they supervised. (The General Reserve did not refer to reserve component units; rather, it was all regular units stationed in the continental United States.) Most of the report concerned various aspects of training, but it also covered personnel statistics, equipment shortages, and the current efficiency rating of the commander. Demobilization and the demands of supporting overseas forces, however, left almost all units incapable of attaining the training objectives set by AGF.³

During late 1945, the Operations Division (OPD) of the War Department needed information on the strength and disposition of forces around the Pacific. The OPD had to check various sources for there was "no integrated current report containing this information."⁴ Therefore, in March 1946, OPD requested that the major commands in the Pacific report the strength, location, and "percent combat efficiency" of their air and ground combat forces, and supply "remarks as necessary to provide the War Department with a clear picture of combat potential."⁵ These reports "revealed a surprisingly low combat

2. This discussion of the post-World War II career management system is based on *Technical Manual 20-605, Career Management for Army Officers* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1948); "Forced Attrition," *Army and Navy Journal* (19 Apr 1947): 837; Maj Gen John E. Dahlquist, "Officer Promotion Policies," *Army Information Digest* vol. 3 no. 11 (Nov 1948): 45-52; M. Wade Markel, "The Organization Man at War: Promotion Policies and Military Leadership, 1929-1992" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2000), pp. 195-205; William M. Donnelly, "Bilko's Army: A Crisis in Command?" *Journal of Military History* 75 (Oct 2011): 1188-204.

3. Ltr, Army Ground Forces to Commanding Generals First, Second, and Fourth Armies, et al., 6 Dec 1945, sub: Training Objective for the General Reserve, Box 10, Entry NM5-16, RG 337, NACP.

4. MFR, Col Gideon, Operations Division, War Department (OPD), 13 Mar 46, sub: Disposition, Strength and Combat Capabilities of Air Forces in the Pacific, Folder 320.2/Case 322 Only/1-7, Box 253, Entry NM3-153A, RG 319, NACP.

5. Msg, WARX 80451, Maj Gen H. A. Craig, OPD, to Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces, Pacific (CINCAFPAC) and Commanding General, Alaska (COMGENALASKA), 20 Mar 1946, Folder 320.2/Case 322 Only/1-7, Box 253, Entry NM3-153A, RG 319, NACP.

efficiency,” ranging from 0 to 15 percent for air units and 10 to 70 percent for ground units.⁶

After the Plans and Operations Division (P&O, which replaced OPD following a War Department reorganization) directed that this data be updated, Far East Command (FEC) recommended that the report be made a recurring quarterly requirement. The P&O, along with the other divisions of the General Staff, agreed with the FEC that such a report would be useful and that all overseas theater commanders should provide this information. The new report—assigned the reports control symbol WDGPO–6—requested the same data as before on major air and ground combat units, and added a requirement for a “percentage figure representing combat efficiency of all army forces under your command.” The first submission would use 31 March 1947 for the “as-of” date. The only major change to the WDGPO–6 before its recession in 1950 was the deletion of data on air units following creation of an independent Air Force in 1947.⁷

Looking forward to the end of demobilization, the General Staff instituted a new reporting system to monitor the readiness of the corps-sized Mobile Striking Force of the General Reserve. In December 1946, the Staff directed the combat units of the force to send monthly reports (designated WDCSO–35) to their continental army headquarters. Support units would send their reports to the chief of their technical service in Washington. The armies would in turn forward to AGF the reports for all combat units in their area, and AGF would in turn forward all reports it received to Organization and Training Division (O&T) of the General Staff. This report had far less detail than the December 1945 report: a few personnel statistics, effectiveness of the unit for combat (expressed as a percentage), and remarks by the unit commander.⁸ Wanting more data for its own uses,

6. MFR, 20 Aug 1946, sub: Disposition, Strength and Combat Capabilities of Air and Ground Forces in the Pacific, Folder 320.2/Case 322 Only/1-7, Box 253, Entry NM3-153A, RG 319, NACP.

7. MFR, Lt Col Hart, Plans and Operations Division, War Department (P&O), 13 Jan 1947, sub: Disposition, Strength and Combat Capabilities of Air and Ground Forces in the Pacific, Folder 320.2/Case 322 Only/1-7, Box 253, Entry NM3-153A, RG 319, NACP. Copies of submitted reports are in Box 253, Entry NM3-153A, RG 319, NACP, and Box 619, Entry NM3-153B, RG 319, NACP.

8. Ltr, Army Ground Forces (AGF) to Commanding Generals (CGs) Continental Armies, 7 Jan 1947, sub: Plans for Employment of General Reserve Units (Training of Checkbook Units), Folder 370.5/Checkbook, Box 4, Entry NM5-101, RG 337, NACP; Ltr, War Department General Staff to CG, Army Air Forces, et al., 25 Mar 1947, sub: Plans for Employment of General Reserve Units (Training of Mailbag Units), Folder

AGF instituted an “AGF Annex” to the WDCSO–35 in December 1947. The annex required additional statistics on various aspects of the unit’s training status and factors impeding training, to include equipment shortages. At the same time, AGF ordered units of the General Reserve not assigned to the Mobile Striking Force to submit both a WDCSO–35 and an AGF Annex monthly.⁹

In January 1948, the Army Staff ordered units of the rapid reaction force (a reinforced 82d Airborne Division) to submit an additional readiness report twice a month. This report, designated CSCSO–56, was to be discontinued once all units of the force achieved “a satisfactory level” of personnel, equipment, and training. The format was brief: actual personnel strength, current level of training, and equipment shortages. As with the WDCSO–35, a unit sent the CSCSO–56 through its higher commands to the Office of the Army Comptroller (which at this time was part of the Office of the Chief of Staff); the statistical division of that office then compiled these submissions into reports distributed within the General Staff (*Tables 1 and 2*).¹⁰

Both the General Staff and Army Field Forces (AFF)—the redesignated AGF—became dissatisfied with the WDCSO–35. The security classification was too high; it did not prescribe a uniform method for estimating combat effectiveness; and it took too long for the report to move up the chain of command to Washington. Furthermore, though AFF had required all units to submit this report, the General Staff did not have the same requirement and so it had no readiness information on units in the United States not assigned to the Mobile Striking Force. The O&T and AFF, however, disagreed over the question of estimating combat effectiveness. The latter proposed a formula for computing an effectiveness percentage whereas the former argued for eliminating the effectiveness percentage because it placed an undue administrative burden on units and higher headquarters could compute it if desired.¹¹

370.5/6 (A)(C) Binder 1, Box 784, Entry NM5-55, RG 337, NACP; Department of the Army Memo 345-50-15, 9 Dec 1947, sub: Strength and Training Status of XXX Units, Reports Control Symbol CSCSO–35 (R2).

9. Ltr, AGF to CGs Continental Armies, 26 Dec 1947, sub: Strength and Training Status of “XXX” Units (Reports Control Symbol CSCSO–35 (R2)), Folder 370.5/6 (A) (C) Binder 2, Box 784, Entry NM5-55, RG 337, NACP.

10. Department of the Army Ltr AGAO-I 322, 9 Jan 1948, CSCSO, 9 Jan 1948, sub: Status of Division Task Force Units, Reports Control Symbol CSCSO–56.

11. Ltr, Ch, Army Field Forces (AFF), to Director of Organization and Training, General Staff of the U.S. Army, 6 Apr 1948, sub: Percentage of Combat Effectiveness, and 1st Indorsement, Director of Organization and Training to Ch, AFF, 7 Jun 1948, Folder 320.2/1948 Binder 1, Box 8, Entry NM5-55H, RG 337, NACP.

TABLE 1—DIVISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, READINESS RATINGS AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1948¹²

<i>Division</i>	<i>Estimated Combat Efficiency</i>
2d Infantry	39%
3d Infantry	Not Reported ^a
82d Airborne	69%
2d Armored ^b	39%

^a Division at 11.9% of authorized strength

^b Only Combat Command A operational

TABLE 2—DIVISIONS OVERSEAS, READINESS RATINGS AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1948¹³

<i>Division</i>	<i>Estimated Combat Efficiency</i>
1st Infantry (Germany)	67%
1st Cavalry (Japan)	5–15%
6th Infantry (Korea)	3%
7th Infantry (Korea and Japan)	5–15%
11th Airborne (Japan)	35%
24th Infantry (Japan)	5–15%
25th Infantry (Japan)	5–15%

In December 1948, O&T superseded the WDCSO–35 and the CSCSO–56 with a new system that covered all units in the United States and did not require them to compute a combat effectiveness percentage. The new report, designated CSACS–66, asked for information on personnel, training, and equipment. For training, units had to estimate the percentages of personnel who had completed five levels of training: basic individual, advanced individual, basic unit, advanced unit, and field exercises. Additionally, commanders could note any deficiencies in training facilities and make amplifying remarks on any entries. Units were to mail their CSACS–66 every month directly to the comptroller of the Army; information copies from combat units were to go to their

12. Chart, Control Br, P&O, 11 Jan 1949, sub: Major Combat Units-U.S. Army, Folder 320.2/1-20, Box 610, Entry NM3-153, RG 319, NACP.

13. Ibid.



1st Infantry Division soldiers training in Germany, 1949

continental army headquarters and those from service units were to go to the chief of their service.¹⁴

As the Army focused on training and readiness during 1949, the system to measure the effectiveness of these efforts remained fragmented. In the General Staff, P&O received quarterly WDGPO-6 reports from overseas major commands and the Army Comptroller received monthly CSACS-66 reports from units in the United States. The continental army headquarters provided AFF a consolidated report for combat units in their area, as well as indication of what actions were being taken to remedy deficiencies reported by units. The AFF, in turn, analyzed the armies' reports and informed O&T of the actions it took in response. The technical services analyzed the reports received from their units in the United States and also informed O&T of actions they were taking in response.¹⁵ The Eighth Army in Japan created a reporting system for its four divisions as they undertook a training program designed to make them combat ready by the end of 1950. The Eighth Army provided its divisions with detailed guidance on how to compute their combat effectiveness percentage for the quarterly reports. Monitoring the training program was the main purpose of these reports, as shown by the instruction to use the reduced

14. Special Regulations No. 345-50-5, *Strength and Training Status Report (Reports Control Symbol CSACS-66)* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 20 Dec 1948).

15. Special Regulations No. 345-50-5, p. 4.

tables of organization instead of the full-strength tables when computing combat efficiency.¹⁶

In September 1949, the chief of staff, General J. Lawton Collins, made AFF responsible for keeping him “informed of the state of training and operational readiness of all units of the Army.”¹⁷ The AFF then revised the regulation for readiness reporting which, when published in August 1950, directed all combat units in the United States to submit a monthly report to AFF via their continental army headquarters and service units via the head of their service. Units overseas were to do so via their theater command. The main change in the new report, designated ATTN-EX-10, was the requirement of numerical totals for training data instead of percentages. These numbers, along with the strength data, permitted AFF to implement its formula for computing a training effectiveness rating (a scale of zero to one hundred) which O&T had rejected in 1948. Understanding that readiness included equipment status, AFF considered having units submit copies of the punch cards prepared for the existing monthly Equipment Status List report, but soon realized that doing so would trigger a tidal wave of cards which would overwhelm its data-processing capabilities. Instead, its logistics staff rated units’ equipment readiness by analyzing the equipment shortage section of the ATTN-EX-10 and the consolidated Equipment Status List reports prepared by major commands. Ratings for equipment status were: “A” (ready for combat), “B” (minor deficiencies), and “C” (not ready for combat). The overall rating for a unit would therefore consist of a number and a letter. The AFF would then code a punch card for each unit with this rating and use the cards to prepare printouts for itself and Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA).¹⁸

16. Ltr, Ofc of the CG, Eighth Army, to CG, I Corps, et al., 23 Jun 1949, sub: Combat Effectiveness Rpts, Folder 322 Gen, Box 697, Entry A1-133, RG 338, NACP.

17. Ltr, Ch of Staff to Ch, AFF, et al., 29 Sep 1949, sub: Changes in Responsibilities of Chief, Army Field Forces, Folder 020/AFF, Box 28, Entry A1-137D, RG 319, NACP. Seven months later, a revision of the regulation governing the organization and functions of the Department of the Army institutionalized this responsibility: Special Regulations No. 10-5-1, *Organization and Functions: Department of the Army* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 11 Apr 1950), p. 19. This regulation also eliminated the Organization and Training Division and the Plans and Operations Division; most of their functions went to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, which this regulation reestablished.

18. Special Regulations No. 345-50-5, *Strength and Training Status Report (Reports Control Symbol ATTN-EX-10)* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 17 Aug 1950); AFF Annual History 1950, vol. 1, ch. 4, copy in Historical Resources Div, U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), Washington, D.C.

As with the Regular Army, the threat of World War III prevented a return to the prewar training inspections policy for the reserve components. The postwar National Guard and Organized Reserve Corps (ORC) were the largest to date: twenty-seven guard divisions and twenty-five ORC divisions, along with numerous combat, support, and service units. And like the regulars, budgets never provided sufficient funding to fully staff, train, and equip this force structure. Although both reserve components contained many officers with World War II experience, their enlisted ranks were comprised mainly of men who had been too young to serve during the war. As had been the practice before the war, new soldiers received all their training in their unit: one night a week and two weeks in the summer. Of the two components, the Guard fared better in both funding and recruiting given its greater political influence, deeper roots in many communities, and role as the first-line combat reserve force.



General J. Lawton Collins visits summer training of the 49th Armored Division, Texas National Guard, in 1949.

Army planners forecasted that more reserve component units would have to be deployed overseas during the first months of the next war than during the same period of World War II. These units, along with the regulars, would meet the initial shock of Soviet aggression. This would buy time for the remainder of the reserve components to complete postmobilization training and to build new Army of the United States units with draftees. The units tabbed for early deployment would be given a higher priority for resources, although funding constraints meant that no units ever met the level of readiness required for active field service soon after mobilization.¹⁹

19. This and the preceding paragraph are based on: William M. Donnelly, *Under Army Orders: The Army National Guard during the Korean War* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2001), pp. 7–20; Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, *Twice the Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908–1983* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 1984), pp. 83–90; John B. Wil-

It took nearly three years for the Guard to reconstitute itself to the point that it was worth the effort to assess units, so the first postwar evaluation occurred during summer field training in 1948. General Jacob L. Devers, Chief, Army Field Forces, thought that, overall, guard units were off to a good start, but almost all units still had serious shortages of personnel and materiel, even given the reduced tables of organization and equipment the Army authorized for them. Initially, the prewar policy of the inspector general supervising the assessment of the National Guard continued. The IGD (Inspector General Department) Form 7 used during the 1948 summer field training had only two readiness questions. First, was the unit ready for “extended field service”? Second, was it “on a sound enough basis” that if provided with sufficient untrained draftees to bring it to wartime strength, would it be “ready for combat service after four months of additional training”?²⁰

The National Guard Bureau (NGB) became dissatisfied with having the inspector general evaluate units because the IGD was more concerned with administrative matters and fiscal accountability than with assessing readiness. The NGB needed a readiness assessment so it could recommend the order in which guard units should be mobilized during wartime. In response, the NGB created an operational efficiency report (designated CSNGB-26) in 1948 that would be used down to the company level. To be completed twice a year using NGB Form 114, it reported enlisted strength (measured against the reduced table of organization), the number of enlisted in intermediate and advanced levels of training, and the amount of mission-essential equipment and vehicles on hand. Using this data, Regular Army instructors would compute an “efficiency index,” add any “pertinent remarks,” and send the completed form to their state’s senior instructor. He, in turn, would send copies of the CSNGB-26 to the state’s adjutant general, the appropriate continental army headquarters, the NGB, and AFF.²¹

son, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, Army Lineage Series (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), pp. 214–222; *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army 1948* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 74–78; *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army For the Fiscal Year 1949* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 140.

20. Ltr, Gen Jacob L. Devers to Gen Omar N. Bradley, 24 Aug 1948, Case 296, Box 71, Entry NM5-56, RG 337, NACP; Ltr, Wyche to Gerow, 18 Feb 1948; Inspector General Division (IGD) Form 7, National Guard: Field Inspection Rpt, 15 Mar 1948, copy in Folder 333.4/General, Box 859, Entry NM3-344A, RG 168, NACP.

21. AFF Annual History 1949, ch. 10, pt. A, pp. 2–5, Historical Resources Div, CMH; National Guard Bureau (NGB) completed War Department (WD) Form 335,

The first set of these reports, totaling more than 4,000, were submitted in May 1949. Many instructors had not properly completed the NGB Form 114 and often the instructors for divisions, brigades, groups, and separate battalions had forwarded all the forms for their units' companies instead of preparing one form for the entire unit. Analyzing the reports, both the NGB and AFF found that this format still did not provide sufficient data for either determining units' readiness or identifying issues impeding readiness. Another consideration was that the form could not be analyzed using automatic data processing. The same month the first NGB Form 114s moved up the chain of command, the Army Staff's O&T Division responded to a recommendation from the Second Army that continental army headquarters, instead of the inspector general, be responsible for evaluating guard unit summer training and that the IGD Form 7 be revised. It agreed with these recommendations, but directed that, because the 1949 summer training period would soon commence, the form be used for that year while the NGB and AFF prepared a revision for use in 1950. The AFF, however, soon concluded that a better course of action was to scrap both the IGD Form 7 and the NGB Form 114.²²

In their place, AFF and the NGB developed the NGB Form 115. This report would be made by Regular Army instructors annually at the conclusion of the summer field training period. To better assess how long it would take units to reach readiness for deployment after mobilization, instructors now estimated readiness against a unit's full-strength table of organization and equipment instead of the reduced-strength table for authorized guard units in peacetime. The new form contained more data elements than either of the forms it replaced, especially concerning training. Units now reported percentages for individual and crew-served weapons qualification, number of soldiers who had completed one, two, or three summer training periods, and the experience and training levels for commanders and staff officers.

Application for Approval of Report, for "Operational Efficiency Report," 18 Nov 1948, Folder 319.1/NGB Recurring Rpts Part 2, Box 821, Entry NM3-344C, RG 168, NACP; Ltr, Ch, AFF, to CGs, Continental Armies, 10 Feb 1949, sub: Operational Efficiency Report for National Guard (Reports Control Symbol CSNGB 26), Folder 319.1/Binder 1, Box 279, Entry NM5-56, RG 337, NACP.

22. AFF Annual History 1949, ch. 10, pt. A, pp. 7-8; Ltr, Ch, AFF, to CGs, Continental Armies, 14 Oct 1949, sub: Instructional Notes-Operational Efficiency Report (NGB Form 114), Folder 319.1/Binder 1, Box 279, Entry NM5-56, RG 337, NACP; "Interview on National Guard Training Inspection Reports," 1 Feb 1951, Folder 353 (NG)/Binder 1, Box 519, Entry NM5-56, RG 337, NACP.

Evaluators had to compute strength, training, and equipment readiness indexes, with results expressed on a scale from 0 to 100. Instructors would forward their reports (now designated CSNGB-35) to the NGB, where the data would be transferred to keysort cards for processing. The processed data would be used by the bureau, AFF, continental army headquarters, and state adjutants general. Because the new report commenced with the 1950 summer field training, AFF terminated the CSNGB-26 after the November 1949 submissions.²³

The failure to recruit sufficient enlisted soldiers and inadequate funding so hobbled the ORC after the war that no readiness reporting system was implemented until the ATTNG-32 in November 1948. Initially, only high-priority units—those tabbed as the first from the ORC to deploy during a war—had to submit a report every quarter through their continental army headquarters to AFF. Units down to the company level completed a form which listed their strength, equipment on hand, and the total number of personnel in each phase of their prescribed unit training cycle. Five days after issuing its guidance for the ATTNG-32, AFF radically revised what it wanted from the report. Units now had to report the number of officers and enlisted men in each phase of the training cycle. They had to compute an operational efficiency index from data in the report using a formula established by AFF. Finally, because there were more ORC than guard units, machine records units at continental army headquarters were to transfer the data from these forms to punch cards, then mail one complete set of cards for each reporting period to AFF. The AFF headquarters used printouts based on these card sets and mailed copies to Army Staff offices with an interest in the ORC. In April 1949, AFF expanded the ATTNG-32 to all other ORC units, although it required later-deploying ones to report only semiannually. Implementation of the system was a work in progress for more than a year. As AFF tinkered with the format, units struggled to prepare the reports, and the continental army headquarters sought to eliminate numerous errors in preparing the punch cards.²⁴

23. AFF Annual History 1949, ch. 10, pt. A, pp. 8-9; "Interview on National Guard Training Inspection Reports;" Ltr, Ch, AFF, to CGs, Continental Armies, 31 Mar 1950, sub: Operational Efficiency Report (NGB Form 114), Folder 319.1/Binder 3, Box 280, Entry NM5-56, RG 337, NACP. Unlike punch cards, keysort cards cannot be read by a machine to compile and print out data. Instead, the sorter is set to select cards with desired data elements, such as the training index of all field artillery units in one continental army area.

24. Ltr, Ch, AFF, to CGs, Continental Armies, 8 Oct 1948, sub: Civilian Component Summer Training-1948, Case 367, Box 72, Entry NM5-56, RG 337, NACP;



General Mark W. Clark observes ORC training in June 1950.

About six weeks before implementation of the new ATTNG-EX-10 system for the Regular Army—and three days before the start of an unanticipated war—Hanson W. Baldwin, military affairs correspondent for the *New York Times*, accurately reported that the readiness of the Army had improved “considerably in the last year,” but that the “combat forces available are not large enough to provide both a strategic reserve and a base for wartime mobilization. Nor is their state of readiness adequate to the split-second demands of the atomic age.”²⁵

Ltr, Ch, AFF, to CGs, Continental Armies, 13 Nov 1948, sub: Inactive Duty Training Reports on Units of the Organized Reserve Corps, Folder 326/Binder 6, Box 72, Entry NM5-56, RG 337, NACP; AFF Annual History 1949, ch. 10, pt. B, pp. 1–4, 6–7; Ltr, Ch, AFF, to CGs, Continental Armies, 20 Apr 1949, sub: Inactive-Duty Training Reports on Units of the Organized Reserve Corps, Ltr, Ch, AFF, to CGs, Continental Armies, 30 Sep 1949, sub: Inactive-Duty Training Reports on Units of the Organized Reserve Corps, Ltr, Ch, AFF, to CG, First Army, 20 Oct 1949, sub: Inactive-Duty Training Reports on Units of the Organized Reserve Corps, and Ltr, Ch, AFF, to CGs Continental Armies, 18 Nov 1949, sub: Inactive-Duty Training Reports on Units of the Organized Reserve Corps, all in Folder 353 (ORC)/Binder 2, Box 354, Entry NM5-56, RG 337, NACP; Ltr, Ch, AFF, to CGs, Continental Armies, 6 Jun 1950, sub: Inactive-Duty Training Reports on Units of the Organized Reserve Corps, Folder 353 (ORC)/Binder 1, Box 356, Entry NM5-56, RG 337, NACP.

25. Hanson W. Baldwin, “Condition of the Army,” *New York Times*, 22 Jun 1950.

TABLE 3—DIVISIONS IN JAPAN, READINESS RATINGS AS OF
31 MARCH 1950²⁶

<i>Division</i>	<i>Estimated Combat Effectiveness</i>
1st Cavalry	84%
7th Infantry	74%
24th Infantry	65%
25th Infantry	72%

The final WDGPO-6 report from FEC before the North Korean attack both supported Baldwin's conclusions and demonstrated that the basis for this system was the concept of an expandible Army (*Table 3*). The four divisions had benefited greatly from the training program begun by the Eighth Army in 1949, but the WDGPO-6's concept of combat effectiveness was not the same as Baldwin's concept of readiness. Although FEC did remark that high personnel turbulence had limited the gains in combat effectiveness the divisions could achieve during the reporting quarter, it did not mention the widespread equipment deficiencies affecting them. Nor did it note that these divisions were on reduced tables of organization and equipment that would seriously impair their effectiveness on the battlefield and that FEC did not have the nondivisional units required for a field army.²⁷

Korea: Wartime Readiness Dilemmas, 1950-1953

The start of the Korean War in June 1950 forced an expandible army to become an expeditionary army. Decisions about which units to deploy required timely information on their readiness. Because the new reporting system would not begin providing data until September,

26. Ltr, Far East Cmd to Asst Ch of Staff, G-3, 29 Apr 1950, sub: Report on Disposition, Strengths and Combat Capabilities of the Major Army Forces in Overseas Commands, Reports Control Symbol WDGPO-6, Folder 320.2 Pacific, Box 305, Entry NM3-97A, RG 319, NACP.

27. *Ibid.*; James F. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction: The First Year, The United States Army in the Korean War* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1972), pp. 53-54. Infantry regiments in Japan (except the African American 24th Infantry) lacked one battalion. All regiments did not have their tank company. Direct-support field artillery battalions were short one firing battery. The tank battalion fielded only one company of light tanks and the antiaircraft artillery battalion fielded only one firing battery.

the AFF in July directed all units in the United States to begin airmailing weekly a modified version of the ATTNG-EX-10. Units selected for deployment received visits from AFF teams who evaluated their readiness and alerted both AFF and HQDA of actions necessary to remedy deficiencies. That same month, AFF initiated another report, the ATTNG-EX-11, which was an evaluation by continental army commanders of deploying units' readiness on the day they left home station. The FEC received a copy of this report so that it would be aware of units' operational readiness before they arrived. When the first ATTNG-EX-10 reports reached AFF in September, they showed that the dispatch of replacements and reinforcing units had destroyed the readiness of those units remaining in the United States. That same month HQDA exempted units in FEC from the readiness reporting requirement.²⁸

Eighth Army's desperate need for reinforcements during the summer of 1950 forced the deployment of units with marginal readiness ratings. In the crisis atmosphere created by Chinese intervention in Korea that autumn, the Army shipped several National Guard units even though they were not prepared. Their postmobilization training program was incomplete, they had been levied for individual replacements, were short equipment, and had readiness ratings of 50 percent. The readiness reporting system did not bring these deficiencies to the attention of Deputy Chief of Staff, Administration, Lt. Gen. John E. Hull, the HQDA approving authority for unit deployments. At Hull's direction, the Army Staff's G-3 and AFF instituted a series of procedures between January and September 1951 to ensure that units selected for deployment were fully equipped and trained before being shipped, and that HQDA was fully informed as to the units' status. These procedures would remain in effect until October 1953.²⁹

28. AFF Annual History 1950, vol. 1, ch. 4, pp. 4-5; Memo, Brig Gen D. A. D. Ogden for Gen Bolte, 19 Jul 1950, sub: Conference in General Collins' Office, 21 Jul 1950, Folder 020/AFF, Box 28, Entry A1-137D, RG 319, NACP; SS, Acting Asst Ch of Staff, G-3, to Deputy Ch of Staff for Administration, 9 Feb 1951, sub: Overseas Deployment of Units, Folder 320.2/166-Book 1, Box 286, Entry A1-137D, RG 319, NACP; Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp. 89-98

29. William M. Donnelly, "The U.S. Army During the Korean War," in Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, editors, *Raise, Train and Sustain: Delivering Land Combat Power: The 2009 Chief of Army Military History Conference* (Canberra: Australian Military History Publications, 2010), pp. 127-59; Donnelly, *Under Army Orders*, pp. 63-64, 74; MFR, Lt Col York, 8 Mar 1951, sub: Status Report of Units Scheduled for Overseas Shipment, Folder 320.2/Case 166, Box 286, Entry A1-137D, RG 319, NACP; SS, G-3 to Ch of Staff, 1 Sep 1951, sub: Procedure for

In response to the invasion, American leaders decided to avoid a wider war in Asia. They undertook a massive buildup of conventional and nuclear forces, used much of that buildup to create a credible conventional defense in Europe, and supplied allies with large amounts of military aid. And they wanted all this by 1954 without causing irreparable harm to the American economy. These objectives set the Army's four major missions during the war: sustain the Eighth Army in Korea; organize, deploy, and sustain the Seventh Army in Europe; organize and sustain Army Antiaircraft Command, the service's contribution to air defense of the continental United States; and rebuild and sustain a general reserve in the United States.³⁰

Initially, President Harry S. Truman and Congress provided sufficient funds for these missions, which the Army used to triple the size of its active force by a partial mobilization of reserve components and expanding conscription. By the summer of 1951 the service could report most of its units outside Korea were ready. At that same point, armistice negotiations began, leading Truman and Congress to conclude that whereas it would be a calculated risk to "stretch out" the military buildup, it was a risk worth taking to avoid damaging the economy. This decision meant a return to the prewar reliance on nuclear-capable bombers, with the Air Force's budget increasing whereas the Army's budget decreased. However, the decision did not adjust the Army's missions accordingly. Cuts in authorized strength, combined with decisions to institute rotation in Korea and to limit nonregulars to a maximum of two years of involuntary active duty, created massive personnel turnover in the active force. By the end of 1952, Antiaircraft Artillery Command was marginally combat-ready but almost every unit in the General Reserve was no longer fit for operational employment (by early 1953 most of the General Reserve units no longer bothered to report a numerical readiness rating). Although not crippled like the General Reserve, the readiness ratings of Seventh Army units also declined.³¹

Operational Readiness Reports, Folder 322/24-70, Box 327, Entry A1-2A, RG 319, NACP; MFR, Lt Col Schellman, 19 Jan 1953, sub: Training Tests for Operational Readiness, Folder 320.2/Case 8, Box 88, Entry A1-137C, RG 319, NACP; 1st Inf, Ch of AFF to G-3, 23 Jan 1953, sub: Determination of Operational Readiness of Units, Folder 320.2/21-40, Box 87, Entry A1-137C, RG 319, NACP; SS, G-3 to Ch of Staff, 15 Oct 1953, sub: Operational Readiness Report of 10th Special Forces Group, Folder 320.2/161-180, Box 86, Entry A1-137C, RG 319, NACP.

30. Donnelly, "The U.S. Army During the Korean War."

31. *Ibid.*

The recently unified readiness reporting system for the active force fragmented. After its reactivation, the Seventh Army soon began complaining that the ATTNG-EX-10 reports were an unnecessary administrative burden on its units. The Seventh proposed that AFF receive copies of the quarterly narrative readiness reports its major combat units had to prepare for NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) instead. The AFF staff argued that this report did not contain all necessary information and did not cover service units. The Chief, AFF, General Mark W. Clark, however, sided with the Seventh Army, and in December 1951, G-3 accepted Clark's recommendation. It instructed all overseas commands (except FEC) to begin sending AFF quarterly narrative reports by divisions and group-sized units, to include both combat and service organizations. The G-3 still required commanders to provide the AFF number-letter expressions of readiness (*Tables 4 and 5*), as well as an estimate (in weeks) of the time required to bring their unit to maximum combat effectiveness. The G-3 did not provide detailed guidance on how to calculate these ratings. This omission produced reports that neither it nor AFF believed were accurate portrayals of readiness. Despite issuing several clarifying instructions on how to prepare the reports, neither G-3 nor AFF considered them reliable for the remainder of the war.³²

The tension between AFF and G-3 over how to measure and report readiness continued during the war. The G-3, like the Seventh Army, believed the ATTNG-EX-10 was too complicated and time-consuming, and the number-letter rating was not useful to the highest levels of HQDA in visualizing the readiness of major units. In May 1951, AFF sent a letter to major commands in the United States seeking to rebut that perception by explaining its methods. Even though the letter said that readiness ratings should consider both the statistical and

32. Case 150, Folder 319.1/Binder 3, Box 19, Entry NM5-55B, RG 337, NACP; SS, G-3 to Ch of Staff, 22 May 1952, sub: Operational Readiness Major Units in Overseas Commands for Quarter Ending 31 Mar 1952, Folder 322/Cases 71 up, Box 327, Entry A1-2A, RG 319, NACP; Memo, G-3 for Deputy Ch of Staff for Opns and Administration, 29 May 1952, sub: Operational Readiness of Major Units in Overseas Commands, Folder 322/Cases 71 up, Box 327, Entry A1-2A, RG 319, NACP; SS, G-3 to Ch of Staff, 11 Sep 1952, sub: Quarterly Narrative Reports of Operational Readiness Major Units in Overseas Commands (ATTNG-EX-18), Folder 322/Cases 71 up, Box 327, Entry A1-2A, RG 319, NACP; DF, Palmer to Ch of Staff, 12 Aug 1953, sub: Quarterly Narrative Reports of Operational Readiness of Units in Overseas Commands, Except FECOM (Far East Command) (ATTNG-EX-18), Folder 370.2/1953, Box 733, Entry 56, RG 337, NACP; Case 62, Folder 320.2/61-80, Box 87, Entry A1-137C, RG 319, NACP.

the intangible, AFF continued to rely mostly on the former. Concluding that more data would lead to more accurate assessments of readiness, in early 1953 AFF began field-testing a revised report for units of the General Reserve that required more statistics. Although G-3 did not terminate these revisions, in June 1953 it directed that AFF now present to HQDA the results of the submitted data in a concise narrative paragraph for each major unit of the General Reserve instead of a number-letter figure.³³

During the war, AFF lost its role as the central point in the readiness reporting system. In July 1952, General Collins directed G-3 to revise the regulation concerning AFF's responsibilities so as to emphasize its roles in the combat-development process, doctrine development, and supervision of training, areas that Collins believed needed improvement. The G-3, which had never approved of the 1949 decision to give AFF primary responsibility for monitoring readiness worldwide, used Collins' guidance to strip AFF of this function in July 1953. Overseas commands would now send their quarterly narrative readiness reports to G-3; AFF, using its revised ATTNG-EX-10, would monitor the readiness of units in the continental United States and send HQDA both the resulting statistics and narrative summaries for major units.³⁴

Between the summer of 1950 and early 1952, the Army mobilized about one-third of guard units and one-tenth of ORC units, but it deployed only a small number of them to Korea. Most stood up Army Antiaircraft Command, joined the Seventh Army in Germany, or helped rebuild the General Reserve in the United States. Mobilized units—except for those assigned to air defense of the United States—remained on active duty until after the Korean armistice, although their guardsmen and reservists demobilized after serving a maximum of twenty-one months. Army Field Forces

33. Ltr, Ch, AFF to Chs of Technical and Administrative Services, et al., 1 May 1951, sub: Method of Determining Operational Readiness, Folder 370.2, Box 588, Entry NM5-56, RG 337, NACP; Ltr, Ch, AFF to CG, Third Army, 13 Feb 1953, sub: Determination of Unit Operational Readiness, Folder 370.2/1953, Box 733, Entry NM5-56, RG 337, NACP; SS, G-3 to Ch of Staff, 6 Mar 1953, sub: Directed Actions Arising Out of the Review of the Execution of the Primary Programs, First Half FY 1953, Folder 020 D/A/21-40, Box 8, Entry A1-137C, RG 319, NACP; Case 6, Folder 370.2/1953, Box 733, Entry NM5-56, RG 337, NACP.

34. MFR, Lt Col Cuphaver, 19 Aug 1952, and MFR, Lt Col Baker, 31 Dec 1952, both in Folder 020/Case 10, Box 81, Entry A1-137E, RG 319, NACP; SS, G-3 to Ch of Staff, 11 Jun 1953, sub: Army Field Forces Segment of Organization and Functions (SR 10-5-1) (Revision of), Folder 321/1953 Army Compt--, Box 428, Entry A1-2A, RG 319, NACP.

TABLE 4—DIVISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, READINESS RATINGS,^a DECEMBER 1951–JUNE 1953³⁵

<i>Unit</i>	<i>December 1951</i>	<i>December 1952</i>	<i>June 1953</i>
11th Airborne	60C	72D	45D
82d Airborne	88B	90B	80B
31st Infantry	84C	55D	— ^c
37th Infantry	— ^b	60D	— ^c
44th Infantry	— ^b	62D	— ^c
47th Infantry	84C	62D	— ^c
1st Armored	71C	50D	— ^c

^a Letter modifier refers to unit's equipment status: A—Permits immediate operational employment; B—Permits operational employment after minor corrective action; C—Does not permit operational deployment without correction of major deficiencies; D—Operationally ineffective because of crippling personnel and/or equipment shortages

^b National Guard division—did not enter federal service until 1952

^c Not operational—conducting initial entry training for new enlisted men

made its recommendations for mobilization using only military factors: place in mobilization plans, readiness rating, and commander's capability. Headquarters, Department of the Army made the decision on which units to select, and it sometimes chose lower-ranked units in order to spread the burden equitably across the nation. In one case, other factors intruded. When weighing which division to select from the First Army area in 1950, General Collins chose the 43d Infantry instead of the higher-rated 26th Infantry. The former's commander, Maj. Gen. Kenneth F. Cramer, was also the Chief, National Guard Bureau, and was engaged in an embarrassing public feud with the Air Staff over control of the Air National Guard. Mobilizing the 43d would get Cramer out of Washington.³⁶

35. Issues of Ofc, Ch of AFF, "Status of Training and Operational Readiness of Table of Organization and Equipment (T/O&E) Units—Continental United States," 31 Dec 1951, Box 71, Entry NM5-55B, RG 337, NACP, and 31 Dec 1952, Box 72, Entry NM5-55B, RG 337, NACP, 30 Jun 1953, Box 32, Entry NM5-55D, RG 337, NACP.

36. Donnelly, *Under Army Orders*, pp. ix, 24–26, 187–88; *Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army, 1 January–30 June 1950* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 87–88; *Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army, 1 January–30 June 1951* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 106; *Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army, 1 January–30 June 1952* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952), pp. 114–15; Schnabel, *Policy and Di-*

TABLE 5—DIVISIONS IN EUROPE, READINESS RATINGS,^a
MARCH 1952–JUNE 1953³⁷

<i>Unit</i>	<i>March 1952</i>	<i>December 1952</i>	<i>June 1953</i>
1st Infantry	90A	82A	76A
4th Infantry	90B	85B	85B
28th Infantry	99B	78A	77A
43d Infantry	96B	84B	84B
2d Armored	75B	70A	73A

^a Letter modifier refers to unit's equipment status: A—Permits immediate operational employment; B—Permits operational employment after minor corrective action; C—Does not permit operational deployment without correction of major deficiencies; D—Operationally ineffective because of crippling personnel and/or equipment shortages

Mobilization gave AFF the experience to develop a readiness criteria for guard units by 1952. If a nonprior service guard enlistee participated in all available training in his unit, after four years he would have the equivalent proficiency provided by six months continuous active duty. If a unit attained its full authorized strength (on its reduced table of organization) and had minimal personnel turnover, it could be expected to reach a maximum training efficiency index of sixty. Such a unit, after entering federal service, “could train to the desired combat efficiency within four months.”³⁸

Mobilization revealed that the post–World War II force structure had been too ambitious, particularly for the ORC. Its units had been unable to meet even their peacetime reduced-strength table of organization and they had lacked sufficient equipment for effective training. Upon entering active duty, both guard and reserve units needed lengthy periods in which

rection, pp. 122–25; Memo, Sec of the General Staff for G–3, 26 Jul 1950, sub: Policy Guidance Concerning Civilian Component Units Ordered into Active Federal Military Service, Folder 326, Box 207, Entry A1-2A, RG 319, NACP.

37. DF, AFF G3(60), 9 May 1952, sub: “Quarterly Narrative Reports of Operational Readiness of Major Units in Overseas Commands,” Box 71, Entry NM5-55B, RG 337, NACP; DF, AFF G3(60), 3 Feb 1953, sub: “Quarterly Narrative Reports of Operational Readiness of Major Units in Overseas Commands,” Box 32, Entry NM5-55D, RG 337, NACP; DF, AFF G3(60), 18 Aug 1953, sub: “Quarterly Narrative Reports of Operational Readiness of Major Units in Overseas Commands,” Box 32, Entry NM5-55D, RG 337, NACP.

38. Ltr, Col T. J. Smith to William V. Kennedy, 16 Sep 1952, Folder 326/Binder 2, Box 509, Entry NM5-56, RG 337, NACP.

to integrate the fillers that brought them to full-strength, process the many items received to rectify their equipment shortages, and undertake the appropriate training program. This last also included conducting initial entry training for draftees as the Army's training base could not be expanded fast enough to keep pace with the accessions. This experience led HQDA to inactivate fourteen of the twenty-five reserve divisions in 1952. That same year it promulgated a new concept for the reserve components, the "Ready Reserve." This concept divided the guard and reserve units between an Early Ready Force, which would mobilize first and was authorized a full table of organization strength, and a Late Ready Force, which had authorization for 100 percent of its officer strength but only 5 percent of its enlisted strength.³⁹

For reserve component units which did not mobilize, the war years brought several changes to their readiness reporting systems. During 1952, AFF began preparing a guide on evaluating guard units during annual summer field training using the NGB Form 115 in order to standardize practices throughout all the continental armies. The effort drew on input from unit commanders, inspection teams, headquarters of the armies, and the AFF staff. The guide, published in May 1953, directed that inspectors complete daily worksheets for each section of Form 115 and use them when preparing the form at the end of summer training. It stressed that inspectors provide daily briefings on their observations to unit commanders, so that they could improve the effectiveness of training during their unit's two weeks in the field. In response to complaints from units, the guide gave detailed instructions on how to evaluate the performance of staffs at battalion, regiment, and division echelons, as well as how to assess crew-served weapons proficiency.⁴⁰

In November 1950, AFF directed all ORC units to submit an ATTNG-32 report every quarter. It modified the report by removing the strength and equipment indexes, and revised the method for calculating the training index to factor in strength and equipment status, as well as the number of enlisted and officers who met the qualification standards

39. Donnelly, *Under Army Orders*, pp. 39-68; Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, pp. 254-55.

40. 1st Inf, ATTNG-17 353 (NG) (9 Dec 1952), Ch of AFF to CG, Fourth Army, 22 Dec 1952, sub: Revision of Army National Guard Inspection Report, Folder 353 (NG)/Binder 1, Box 519, Entry NM5-56, RG 337, NACP; 4th Inf, ATTNG-17 353 (R1) (25 Oct 1952), Ch of AFF to CG, First Army, 23 Mar 1953, sub: National Guard Field Training Inspections, Folder 353 (NG)/Binder 1, Box 519, Entry NM5-56, RG 337, NACP; Ltr, Ch of AFF to CGs, Continental Armies, 8 May 1953, sub: Procedures for Inspection of National Guard Units Under NGB Form 115, Folder 333 (NG), Box 696, Entry NM5-56, RG 337, NACP.

for their military occupational specialty. Nearly two years later, AFF relieved the continental armies from the responsibility for computing the training index. That would now be done by AFF, which would send the armies a list of the training indexes for the Army Reserve units in their area. The first submissions using this method in September 1952 showed that the Army Reserve still required extensive resources and time after mobilization before units would be ready for deployment. On a scale of 100, the average training index for divisions was 34.3. For nondivisional combat units, the average was 32, and for nondivisional service units it was 33. The CSNGB-35 reports submitted after the 1952 summer field training period showed the Guard in a similar state of readiness. The training index of the seventeen infantry divisions still in state status ranged from 30.14 to 43.53.⁴¹

Conclusion

By July 1953 the Army had adopted and discarded a number of readiness reporting systems for its active and the reserve components as it adapted to its new role as the ground force of a global superpower. This churning reflected the tension occasioned by competing concepts. The minimalist approach, favored by G-3 and the Seventh Army, stressed the bottom line up front—was the unit ready and if not, how long would it take to become ready? These organizations regarded AFF's maximalist approach, with its detailed statistical portrait of readiness, as unnecessary and burdensome for units. Army Field Forces countered that the minimalist approach produced a dangerously incomplete assessment, such as FEC's evaluation of its divisions in 1950, and was inadequate to the demands of evaluating deployment readiness during wartime. This struggle over readiness reporting would continue as the Army entered into a postwar environment in which the utility of land power, and thus of the service itself, would be called into question.

41. Ltr, Ch, AFF, to CGs, Continental Armies, 28 Nov 1950, sub: Inactive-Duty Training Reports on Units of the Organized Reserve Corps, Folder 353 (ORC)/Binder 14, Box 357, Entry NM5-56, RG 337, NACP; Ltr, Ch, AFF, to CGs, Continental Armies, 28 Nov 1950, sub: Inactive-Duty Training Reports on Units of the Army Reserve, Folder 353 (ORC)/Binder 6, Box 569, Entry NM5-56, RG 337, NACP; Ltr, Ch, AFF, to CGs, Continental Armies, 29 Dec 1952, sub: Training Indices of Reserve Units, Folder 353 (ORC), Box 63, Entry NM5-55B, RG 337, NACP; Ltr, Ch AFF to G-3 Department of the Army (DA), 30 Apr 1953, sub: Mobilization Readiness of National Guard Units, Folder 326/1-20, Box 108, Entry A1-137C, RG 319, NACP. The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 renamed ORC the Army Reserve.

CHAPTER 2

OUT OF THE SHADOWS AND INTO THE SPOTLIGHT, 1953–1965

In the Shadows, 1953–1961

Army readiness mattered little in President Dwight D. Eisenhower's New Look strategy given its reliance on massive nuclear retaliation. During this period, the service so emphasized nuclear weapons in doctrine, unit organization, and materiel that it compromised its capability to fight without them. The Regular Army endured major cuts in strength and its seeming irrelevance and poor public image meant it remained dependent on unenthusiastic draftees and draft-motivated volunteers for new enlisted men and junior officers. At the same time, the career management concepts adopted after World War II continued to undermine the organizational culture of career personnel.¹

Without the resources to maintain all units at the same level, the Army continued to use tiered readiness. One lesson the service drew from the Korean War was that some regular units had to be ready for immediate combat operations. These units therefore had first call on the resources needed to maintain an appropriate level of readiness for that mission. U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), now had the highest priority, followed by XVIII Airborne Corps.

In 1957, HQDA designated the corps as the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) to stress the Army's value for contingencies other than World War III. Originally comprised of two infantry and two airborne divisions along with corps troops, a cut in the service's authorized strength forced the removal of one infantry division in 1959. Army Antiaircraft Command (renamed Army Air Defense Command [ARADCOM] after it reequipped with missiles) was next in priority. The Army designated units in the United States not assigned to STRAC or to ARADCOM as the Strategic Army Force (STRAF) and kept them at a much lower state of readiness. Readiness of the two-division force in

1. Brian McAllister Linn, *Elvis's Army: Cold War GIs and the Atomic Battlefield* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2016); Donnelly, "Bilko's Army."

Korea depended on continuing the wartime practice of using Korean soldiers in American units.²

Although President Eisenhower did not think World War III would require extensive ground operations, the Army continued to orient its reserve components on that contingency. After the armistice, enlistment in these components remained a popular way to avoid conscription. But HQDA concluded that mobilization during the Korean War had been severely hindered by the prewar practice of not ordering newly enlisted soldiers and newly commissioned officers to active duty for their initial entry training. The Reserve Forces Act of 1955 created the option of enlistment in a unit to fill a vacancy with the provision that these enlistees spend six months on active duty for training in that vacancy's military occupational specialty. Starting in 1957, the Army required all guard and reserve enlistees without prior military service to spend a minimum of four months on active duty for their initial entry training. The service also directed that all new guard and reserve officers without prior service attend their branch's basic course. These policies had a major effect on STRAF readiness, as HQDA did not want to divert resources from other areas into expanding the training base. Therefore, it tasked STRAF units with conducting basic combat training and advanced individual training for many draftees and for many of the men who had enlisted in the Regular Army. Between 1959 and 1961, three of the seven divisions in the United States were nondeployable because of their commitment to the initial entry training mission. Headquarters, Department of the Army, also tasked other STRAF units with this mission on occasion.³

2. DA Ltr, 31 Dec 1957, sub: Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) Readiness Policies, Folder 322/37-, Box 185, Entry A1-2B, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Sec, Program Advisory Committee for Program Advisory Committee, 2 Sep 1959, sub: Statement of Military Implications Requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Folder 111(FY 61) Aug/Sep, Box 58, Entry A1-2B, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Secretary of the General Staff (SGS) to Gen Lemnitzer, 20 Oct 1959, sub: Comments on newspaper article "Why GYROSCOPE Failed! Army's Readiness at 1949-50 Low," Folder 370/1959 4-5, Box 298, Entry A1-2B, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Gen G. S. Meloy Jr., for Gen Decker, 25 Sep 1961, sub: Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSAs) in U.S. Units, Folder 320.2/1961 (47-60), Box 174, Entry A1-2B, RG 319, NACP.

3. SS, 12 Aug 1955, Asst Ch of Staff, G-3 for Ch of Staff, "Training Divisions in the General Reserve," Folder 322/121-140, Box 133, Entry A1-137B, RG 319, NACP; Monte Bourjaily Jr., "Training Need Saps Strength," *Army Times*, 16 Mar 1957; SS, 22 Aug 1958, Deputy Ch of Staff for Mil Opns to Ch of Staff, "Feasibility of Stabilizing Trainee Loads in Army Training Centers," Folder 353/1958 (3-46), Box 284, Entry A1-2B, RG 319, NACP; Monte Bourjaily Jr., "STRAC Cut to 3 Divs.," *Army Times*, 18 Jul 1959; Hanson W. Baldwin, "Army Is Prepared for Training Job," *New York Times*, 23 Aug 1961; Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, p. 305.

The Army's readiness reporting system remained fragmented until 1959, with overseas commands, ARADCOM, and Army Field Forces (AFF, designated Continental Army Command [CONARC] in 1955) evaluating the readiness of their active units, even as the two reserve components continued to use their own reporting systems. At HQDA, the coordination point for readiness matters was the G-3, which, after a reorganization of the Army Staff in 1956 became the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (DCSOPS). There was no element in the Army Staff dedicated solely to readiness. Both the plans and the training offices in G-3/DCSOPS worked aspects of this topic, while in 1958 the newly established DCSOPS War Room Division became responsible for maintaining current readiness data.⁴

Another measure of assessing a unit's readiness grew in importance during the New Look: its performance on the annual Army Training Test (ATT). The result of that test also became prominent as a tool to evaluate its commander. By the end of this period, however, doubts arose about the validity of test results as the career management system made time-in-command the most important consideration of promotion boards. The pressure to achieve a highly successful rating in these assignments fostered a climate to game the test in ways that were detrimental to effective training and produced results that were an inaccurate measure of the unit's readiness. The Third Army in February 1961 reported to CONARC that it often found its units "conducting special pre-test training on specific actions rated on the ATT with inadequate emphasis on other fundamental training areas necessary for maximum unit proficiency in accomplishing its assigned mission."⁵

Because units overseas and in ARADCOM had to be ready for combat immediately, they had the highest priority for resources and thus posed less of a readiness problem than other units. Concerns at HQDA over readiness therefore focused on the units in the United States struggling

4. As shown by office symbols on correspondence in RG 319 concerning readiness for these years.

5. Ltr, Lt Gen Herbert B. Powell to Lt Gen Thomas J. H. Trapnell, 30 Sep 1960, Folder Small Unit Training General 1960, Box 26, Entry P 50470, RG 338, NACP; "Seventh Army Briefing for Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe (CINCUSA-REUR), General Bruce Clarke, by Lt Gen Garrison Davidson, Commander, Seventh Army, and Major Paul Gorman, Seventh Army Staff, December 1960," in *Strategy and Tactics for Learning: The Papers of General Paul F. Gorman, USA (Ret)* (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2011); Ltr, CG, Third Army to CG, Continental Army Command (CONARC), 27 Feb 1961, sub: Army Training Test (ATT) Rating System, Folder 353.01/Binder 1, Box 21, Entry UDWW 7, RG 337, NACP.



Howitzer section from 519th Field Artillery Battalion fires during an ATT in 1956.

with funding, personnel, and equipment shortages. This attention sharpened the existing differences between AFF/CONARC and G-3/DCSOPS on how to measure readiness. The former continued to emphasize gathering numerical data for use in calculating a percentage of operational readiness. The latter, along with General Maxwell D. Taylor (a former G-3 and chief of staff from 1955 to 1959), saw readiness in terms of how many more weeks of training a unit needed before it was deployable, and considered CONARC's approach to be unnecessarily complicated and burdensome to units. In August 1955, after being briefed on CONARC's formulas for determining readiness in the active and reserve components, Taylor directed that it would report readiness to HQDA only on the basis of number of weeks of training necessary to bring a unit to deployable status. He permitted CONARC, however, to continue requiring units to report the data necessary for computing readiness using its formulas.⁶

In 1957 DCSOPS directed CONARC to stop using formulas and instead have its active Army units submit quarterly narrative reports

6. Memo, G-3 for Ch of Staff, 29 Oct 1955, sub: Combat Readiness Status of General Reserve Divisions, Folder 322/18 UP, Box 183, Entry A1-2B, RG 319, NACP; Memo, SGS for Deputy Chs of Staff, et al., 26 Oct 1956, sub: Evaluation Reports on the Readiness of Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve Units, Folder 322/21-41, Box 184, Entry A1-2B, RG 319, NACP; Brig Gen Frederick W. Gibb, MFR, 21 Mar 1956, sub: Briefing for Assistant Secretary of the Army, Maintenance and Refurbishing Facility (M&RF) on Training Readiness Evaluation System for Reserve Component Units, Folder 8-Training (March-1956), Box 11/1956, Entry A1-150, RG 319, NACP.



General Maxwell D. Taylor visits the 24th Infantry Division in Korea in 1957.

using a five-part format. The first part concerned personnel: percentage of authorized strength, percentage of personnel qualified for overseas duty, and any shortages by specialty. The second concerned the percentage of personnel who had completed unit training, usually defined as having participated in the unit's last ATT. The third part concerned major equipment shortages and major maintenance problems. The fourth concerned additional missions that affected readiness, such as post support or reserve component summer training. The fifth part provided the commander's evaluation of readiness, expressed as the number of weeks required to reach deployable status. A new program of operational readiness inspections supplemented these quarterly reports. Major units of STRAC, and a sampling of its nondivisional units, would be inspected annually by a team from HQDA and semiannually by CONARC; CONARC would inspect STRAF units annually.⁷

The Continental Army Command argued that the DCSOPS concept did not define "deployable," did not set a minimum standard of training, and did not produce an accurate depiction of readiness. As evidence, it cited the latest readiness assessment of STRAC by DCSOPS, which had

7. SS, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (DCSOPS) to Ch of Staff, 19 Jul 1957, sub: Operational Readiness Reporting, Folder 381/15-40, Box 312, Entry A1-2B, RG 319, NACP; Memo, DCSOPS for Ch of Staff, 26 Nov 1957, sub: Basis for Determining Operational Readiness, Folder 322/12-17, Box 185, Entry A1-2B, RG 319, NACP; DF, G-3 to Ch of Staff, 6 Mar 1958, sub: Operational Readiness Inspection and Reporting, Folder 333/Binder 2, Box 21, Entry UDWW 4, RG 337, NACP.

all four divisions rated as deployable. In contrast, CONARC's concept rated the two airborne divisions as needing four weeks of training before being ready to deploy, whereas the two infantry divisions would need seven and twelve weeks, respectively.⁸

The continuing dispute led Taylor in March 1958 to order a review of readiness reporting that defined "combat ready" for units overseas and in ARADCOM as able to execute assigned missions immediately; for STRAC units as deployable within times prescribed by war plans; and for STRAF units as deployable in times set in *Mobilization Troop Program of the Army*. The review resulted in a new report, introduced in February 1959 for units in all three components, and designated CSGPO-175. Major overseas commands would prepare one report assessing the overall status of all their nondivisional units and forward the reports of their divisions. The CONARC would prepare an overall report on each of its active Army division packages and missile commands, and forward the reports of its divisions. Readiness of individual active Army nondivisional units would only be reported if it materially detracted from the readiness of a division force package and CONARC did not have the resources to correct the deficiencies. Army Air Defense Command was to prepare an overall report on all its forces, and forward the reports of each of its region commands. Reports on individual units were only to be made using the same criteria as for CONARC nondivisional units. Reports would be made semiannually for overseas commands and ARADCOM. Units in the United States not assigned to STRAC would report annually. The concern over STRAC readiness led to those units initially having to make quarterly reports. After a year these units shifted to a semiannual cycle because CONARC assessed their readiness as having improved tremendously. Its principal issue became the lack of modern equipment, a situation well-known at HQDA.⁹

8. DF, G-3 to Ch of Staff, 6 Mar 1958, sub: Operational Readiness Inspection and Reporting, Folder 333/Binder 2, Box 21, Entry UDWW 4, RG 337, NACP.

9. SS, DCSOPS to Ch of Staff, 26 May 1958, sub: Readiness of Army Forces, Folder 370/1958 1-5, Box 298, Entry A1-2B, RG 319, NACP; Memo, SGS to Gen Taylor, 21 Jul 1958, sub: Definition of "Combat Ready," Folder 320.2/1958 64-89, Box 174, Entry A1-2B, RG 319, NACP; Memo, SGS to Gen Taylor, 12 Jan 1959, sub: Survey of Readiness of U.S. Army Forces, Folder 370/1959 1-3, Box 298, Entry A1-2B RG 319, NACP; DA Ltr, 5 Feb 1959, sub: Readiness of U.S. Army Forces (Reports Control Symbol CSGPO-175), Folder 370.2, Box 28, Entry UDWW 5, RG 337, NACP; Ltr, Cdr, CONARC to the adjutant general, 16 Mar 1960, sub: Readiness of United States Army Forces (RCS CSGPO-175), Folder 370.2/1-63, Box 29, Entry UDWW 6, RG 337, NACP.

There were two categories of “combat ready” for reserve component units. The first category was for those units slated for deployment under *Mobilization Troop Program of the Army*. The second category was for all other units prepared to mobilize and deploy within six months. Only the CSGPO–175 reports of divisions would be forwarded through channels to DCSOPS. A summary report on nondivisional units in each of the three priority groupings for the reserve components would be prepared by CONARC. Readiness of individual nondivisional units would only be reported to HQDA if it materially detracted from the unit’s ability to mobilize and deploy as prescribed. Data for all reports would be submitted as of the unit’s last day of annual active duty training.¹⁰

The DCSOPS approach dominated the new concept: “no numerical evaluation as such will furnish a factual measure of readiness.” Instead, it required commanders preparing the CSGPO–175 to consider both statistical indicators and “intangible factors” affecting readiness, and “to provide Department of the Army with their considered judgment as to the readiness of their commands.” Three annexes covered data regarding personnel, training, and logistical matters, respectively. The unit’s commander was to comment on the key factors affecting readiness in these three areas, and provide an overall narrative evaluation of the unit’s readiness status. For factors impeding readiness, the commander was to state whether the unit could resolve these problems on its own and if so, how many weeks would be needed. Staff prepared the reports and forwarded them through the mail to DCSOPS.¹¹ The first active Army CSGPO–175 reports were well received at HQDA, which informed the major commands that the reports “are extremely valuable” in understanding the situations facing them. The CONARC did not agree, and continued to require its units to submit ATTNG–10 reports (now on its sixth revision) in addition to preparing CSGPO–175 reports for HQDA.¹²

10. DA Ltr, 5 Feb 1959, sub: Readiness of US Army Forces (Reports Control Symbol CSGPO–175).

11. *Ibid.* For examples of completed evaluations for the Regular Army, see the Sep 1960 reports for 1st Cav Div and 7th Inf Div in Box 297, Entry A1-296, RG 338. For examples of completed evaluations of Guard and Reserve units, see the 1961 reports in Box 24, Entry UDWW 7, RG 337, NACP.

12. DA Msg 426074, 14 Sep 59, DCSOPS to major cmds, Folder 370.2/Binder 1, Box 28, Entry UDWW 5, RG 337, NACP; List of recurring reports compiled by Training Div, G–3, Third Army, 1 Jun 1959, Folder 268/4 Tng Administrative Files (Gen) (1959), Box 18, Entry P 50470, RG 338, NACP; Ltr, HQ CONARC to Distribution, 12 May 1960, sub: Preparation of Operational Readiness Reports (Reports Control Symbol ATTNG–10 (R6)) by Certain Units, Folder 370.2/1-63, Box 29, Entry UDWW 6, RG 337, NACP.

Between the end of the Korean War and adoption of the CSGPO–175 system, the major change in reserve components readiness reporting was the transition of the Reserve from a semiannual system to the same system used by the Guard: one annual report prepared at the conclusion of summer active duty training. The decision put both components on the same reporting cycle and acknowledged that readiness of these units rarely changed significantly in a six-month period. This shift rendered redundant the ATTNG–32 report for reserve units, and HQDA approved CONARC’s request in July 1956 to discontinue it. Both components continued reporting readiness at the end of annual training under the CSGPO–175 system.¹³

Army Field Forces in 1954 developed a formula for using readiness ratings to determine the length of postmobilization training for reserve component units that could be brought to their full table of organization strength with trained fillers. Those rated at less than 50 percent would have to complete the Army Training Program (ATP) for their type of unit. Those rated between 50 and 75 percent would conduct only the more advanced portion of the ATP. The next group, those rated between 75 and 84 percent, would require only a month’s refresher training. Units rated at 85 percent or better would be ready for immediate deployment after finishing the mobilization and the preparation for overseas movement processes. Mobilized units receiving untrained fillers would need to conduct initial entry training and then complete their entire ATP, as had occurred for almost all units activated during the world wars and the Korean War. Army Field Forces noted that few units would ever be ready for immediate deployment given the personnel turbulence among junior enlisted and junior officers, and that most of these men had not attended active duty initial entry training.¹⁴

This conclusion led HQDA in 1955 to direct an intensive management program by Army Staff offices and CONARC to improve the readiness of reserve component units tabbed as the first to deploy. The program established fourteen semiannual reports on the status of factors affecting readiness for early deployment, such as the role of these units in war plans, number of Regular Army advisers, equipment shortages, mobilization stations, and personnel strength. The Continental Army Command had

13. Ltr, Cdr CONARC to the adjutant general, DA, 9 Jul 1956, sub: Training Status of Reserve Units (RCS ATTNG–32), Folder 8-Training (March-1956), Box 11/1956, Entry A1-150, RG 319, NACP; DA Ltr, 5 Feb 1959, sub: Readiness of U.S. Army Forces (Reports Control Symbol CSGPO–175).

14. Ltr, Ch AFF to G–3 DA, 30 Dec 1954, sub: Required Training Times Reserve Component Units, Folder 353/Binder 3, Box 810, Entry NM5-56, RG 337, NACP.

to report on the units' training status as of 31 December and 30 June, but by early 1959 CONARC requested its requirement be terminated as the December report just repeated the units' summer field training evaluation and there were only minor changes in training readiness by June. The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components agreed with the request and further recommended to General Taylor that all fourteen reports be eliminated because the information in them was available in other reports HQDA already generated or received. Taylor approved the recommendation in March.¹⁵

Although Taylor had approved ending the special readiness report for early deploying units, CONARC felt that factors affecting these units' readiness not covered by the CSGPO-175 (such as adequacy of mobilization plans, armory training, and the quality of key personnel) still needed to be monitored. The fact that three of the guard divisions in this force would be rotated out and replaced by three other guard divisions in July 1959 accentuated the need for this monitoring. The Continental Army Command therefore directed its armies in April 1959 to include additional remarks on these factors in the CSGPO-175 reports for units in this force.¹⁶

The new rating concept reported the same results for reserve component units. Most troubling was that after the 1959 active duty training season, the ratings showed six guard divisions in the Ready Reserve force as incapable of meeting the deployment schedule set for them. Personnel and equipment shortages would necessitate a postmobilization training period longer than planned in order to integrate fillers, receive equipment, and conduct unit training. These were long-standing issues, and even before the CSGPO-175 reports arrived, CONARC had begun developing two programs to address them. The first program would progressively improve, from squad to company, the training level of all guard divisions so that by 1962 they could mobilize and meet their deployment schedules. The second program was an "intensified combat training program" that condensed postmobilization training into the essentials considered necessary to meet the minimum level of readiness

15. *Army Regulations No. 120-18: Status and Progress Report-6 x 6 Program* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 10 Oct 1956); SS, Asst Ch of Staff for Reserve Components to Ch of Staff, 17 Mar 1959, sub: Semiannual Progress and Status Report, Ready Reserve Strategic Army Force (STRAF), Folder 319.1 (STRAF) General, Box 3805, Entry NM3-344-U, RG 168, NACP.

16. Ltr, Cdr CONARC to distribution, 30 Apr 1959, sub: Inspection of Ready Reserve STRAF Divisions, Folder 333 (USAR [United States Army Reserve]), Box 19, Entry UDWW 5, RG 337, NACP.

for deployment. Neither program, however, would do anything about the personnel and equipment shortages that produced the readiness shortfall.¹⁷

The first use of the new report with the reserve components brought unanticipated problems. Because the CSGPO-175 did not use punch cards, typing up and reviewing the annexes consumed significant time and attention from administrative personnel, commanders, and unit advisers. This was especially true for the logistics annex, which included listing shortages of principal items of equipment, estimated time to repair unserviceable principal items of equipment, and shortages of critical repair parts. The continental armies complained that other reports already provided much of this statistical data to HQDA. A meeting between DCSOPS and CONARC in January 1960 agreed that much of the statistical data already reached HQDA via other reports and that future CSGPO-175s for reserve component units would contain only the commander's narrative evaluation.¹⁸

During the New Look era there was continual concern at the continental army headquarters over creating a consistent interpretation of rating forms and uniform methods of conducting reserve components evaluations. Seeking more stringent and realistic evaluations during the 1954 guard summer field training, AFF issued a revised NGB Form 115 and guidance for inspection teams. The changes worked, producing a slight decline in the number of training indexes that rated units as superior or excellent, and an increase of 6.66 percent in the number of units rated as unsatisfactory. Concern over consistent interpretation and uniform method remained, however, and in 1956 CONARC convened a meeting to ensure the continental armies understood its guidance in this area. The same year it issued detailed instructions on how to rate reserve units. But after the 1957 active duty training season, the First Army recommended another revision of NGB Form 115, believing it overemphasized total strength at the expense of training indicators, and that instructions for using it "are sufficiently general to permit different units to be rated on somewhat different standards." For the 1960 active duty training period, CONARC consolidated the separate evaluation forms for the Guard and the Reserve into one form for both components. Guidance for the new

17. The 1959 CSGPO-175 reports for these divisions, and CONARC's comments on them, are in 370.2/Binder 2, Box 28, Entry UDWW 5, RG 337, NACP. Memo, Col Wallace J. Nichols for Asst Ch of Staff for Reserve Components, 27 May 1959, sub: Meeting between CONARC and DA Staffs, Folder Briefing-General, Box 2, Entry UD 72, RG 319, NACP; CONARC Annual Historical Summary Fiscal Year 1960, v. 4, Part 4, pp. 5-6, Historical Resources Div, CMH.

18. Case 10, Folder 370.2/Binder 1, Box 28, Entry UDWW 5, RG 337, NACP.

form permitted the use of enlisted personnel on the evaluation teams, gave more emphasis to assessing the status of training, and reduced emphasis on administration in computing a unit's rating.¹⁹

The Army's increasing dependence on nuclear weapons created a new requirement: evaluating units which stored, maintained, transported, and fired these weapons. The Armed Forces Special Weapons Project initially did the technical proficiency inspections (TPI) of these units. This inspection, conducted annually, concerned only matters pertaining to the weapons; all other aspects of a unit's readiness continued to be determined by the normal readiness reporting system. In 1956 the Army assumed responsibility for conducting TPIs of its units and it established a Technical Inspection Field Office as a special field activity of the Office of the Inspector General. The rapid growth in units requiring a TPI soon outstripped the capability of the new office, and in 1959 HQDA directed major commands to establish their own TPI system in accordance with procedures established by the Technical Inspection Field Office. The reports produced by these systems would be sent to the Office of The Inspector General. Quality control would be maintained by having the Technical Inspection Field Office conduct several inspections in each major command annually. In fiscal year 1961, major commands conducted 362 TPIs.²⁰

19. Ltr, Ch AFF to CGs, Continental Armies, 23 Apr 1954, sub: Procedure for Inspection of National Guard Units Under NGB Form 115, Folder 333 (NG), Box 794, Entry NM5-56, RG 337, NACP; Chief of the National Guard Bureau Annual Report Fiscal year 1955, p. 31, Historical Resources Div, CMH; Ltr, Cdr CONARC to CGs, ZI Armies, 29 Feb 1956, sub: Inspection of National Guard Units Using NGB Form 115, Folder 333 (NG), Box 14, Entry UDWW 2, RG 337, NACP; Ltr, Cdr CONARC to CGs, ZI Armies, 3 Apr 1956, sub: Evaluation of Army Reserve Units During Annual Unit Training, Folder 353 (USAR)/Binder 1, Box 21, Entry UDWW 2, RG 337, NACP; Ltr, Cdr First Army to Cdr CONARC, 24 Dec 1957, sub: Army National Guard Field Training, Calendar Year 1957, Folder 353 (NG), Box 24, Entry UDWW 3, RG 337, NACP; CONARC Annual Historical Summary Fiscal Year 1960, v. 4, Part 4, p. 6.

20. Ofc of the Inspector General, *Summary of Major Events and Problems of the Inspector General 1957*; Ofc of the Inspector General, *Summary of Major Events and Problems of the Inspector General FY 1958*; Ofc of the Inspector General, *Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 1959, Office of the Inspector General*; Ofc of the Inspector General, *Summary of Major Events and Problems, Office of the Inspector General, 1 July 1960 to 30 June 1961*, all in Historical Resources Div, CMH; Ltr, HQ U.S. CONARC, 2 Apr 1958, sub: Compilation of Deficiencies Resulting from Technical Proficiency Inspections of Army Atomic Organizations, Folder 333/Binder 3, Box 21, Entry UDWW 4, RG 337, NACP; Ltr, CG CONARC to DCSOPS, 14 Dec 1960, sub: Technical Proficiency Inspection of Army Atomic Organizations, Folder 333/Binder 10, Box 19 Entry UDWW 6, RG 337, NACP.



The Corporal was a liquid-fueled, surface-to-surface guided missile that could carry an atomic warhead to an approximate range of seventy-five miles.

The New Look's reliance on nuclear weapons also led to the first joint readiness reporting system. The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 removed the services from the operational chain of command. To assist the secretary of defense in exercising his control over the unified commands, the act expanded the size of the Joint Staff, which served the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). In January 1959, the JCS concluded that although it could assume all conventional forces were operationally ready unless otherwise notified by one of the unified commands, it needed regular reports on the status of nuclear-armed units. The only Army units initially affected by this policy were missile units, which now had to report monthly on their readiness and when any degradation

of their readiness would last more than twenty-four hours. The JCS memorandum implementing this policy provided units no criteria for the evaluation of their readiness and no format for the report.²¹ Unsurprisingly, the Joint Staff quickly found the submissions under this guidance to be “generally deficient” in uniformity and adequacy of data. In June 1960,

21. Msg JCS 953957, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to Cdrs in Ch, 24 Jan 1959, Folder 3000 (23 Jan 1959), Box 11 Entry A1-1A, RG 218, NACP; Byron R. Fairchild and Walter S. Poole, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: Volume VII, 1957–1960* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Joint History, 2000), pp. 4–7.

the JCS provided more detailed instructions on required data and formats to use. It also directed the services to report the readiness of major units not assigned to a unified or specified command. For the Army, this meant it had to report STRAC readiness.²²

At the end of the New Look, some senior leaders were confident that the Regular Army, with the exception of the STRAF, was combat ready. Others, when considering several factors—the CSGPO–175 report only measured some of them—were not as confident. Personnel turbulence worked against cohesion and collective training. A generation of conventional weapons modernization had been postponed as the service favored atomic weapons in its acquisition budgets. Flaws in its organization and doctrine suggested that the pentomic concept would fail the test of battle. Insufficient junior officer retention was one of several indications that there were dysfunctional aspects of the service’s organizational culture that compromised the quality of leadership in units. There was no confidence that the reserve components met the readiness standards set for them, even with the post–Korean War mandate that all nonprior service accessions complete active duty initial entry training. The reduced-strength tables of organization and equipment impeded effective training above the squad/section/crew level, and meant that during mobilization units would have to integrate large amounts of fillers and equipment. Chronic personnel turbulence among junior enlisted and junior officers, most of whom left units as soon as their service obligation expired, undermined the collective proficiency necessary to meet planned postmobilization training programs.²³

22. Bfg Sheet, J–3 for Chairman, JCS, 15 Jun 1960, sub: Requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Operational Readiness and Commanders’ Situation Reports, Folder 3000 (23 Jan 1959), Box 11 Entry A1-1A, RG 218, NACP.

23. Memo, DCSOPS for Sec of the Army, 15 Oct 1959, sub: Comments on newspaper article “Why GYROSCOPE Failed! Army’s Readiness at 1949–50 Low,” Folder 370/1959 4-5, Box 298, Entry A1-2B, RG 319, NACP; Ltr, Gen Bruce C. Clarke to Gen Lyman L. Lemnitzer, 18 Feb 1960, Folder 370.2/Binder 1, Box 28, Entry UDWW 6, RG 337, NACP; Sep 1960 CSGPO–175 rpts for 1st Cav Div and 7th Inf Div, Folder 268/4-Readiness US Forces Report, Box 297, Entry A1-296, RG 338, NACP; DF, Acting Ch, Training Div to Ch of Staff, 12 Nov 1960, sub: Report of Visit, Fort Bragg, N.C. and Fort Campbell, Ky., Folder Small Unit Training General 1960, Box 26, Entry P 50470, RG 338, NACP; Donald A. Carter, *Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962*, U.S. Army in the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2015), pp. 309–13; Paul C. Jussell, “Intimidating the World: The United States Atomic Army, 1956–1960” (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 2004); Donnelly, “Bilko’s Army;” DF, G3 to Deputy Chief of Staff-Reserve Forces (DCS-RF), 20 Jun 1961, sub: Reserve Component Readiness Objectives, Folder 370.2/Binder 1, Box 24, Entry UD WW 7, RG 337, NACP.

In the Spotlight, 1961–1965

The Kennedy administration discarded the New Look for a strategy of Flexible Response, which reaffirmed the utility of the Army and the need for nonnuclear capabilities and gave Army readiness a much higher visibility outside of the service. Increased funding supported an expansion in active troop strength—still dependent on the draft—and more force structure, including activation of air mobile units. Bigger budgets also permitted the Army to begin the full fielding of new materiel for the modernization of its active force. The Army's operational tempo quickened in the new decade with the Berlin crisis, the Cuban missile crisis, major deployments to Thailand and Mississippi, and a sharp increase in the number of personnel and units assigned to Vietnam. Concern about dysfunction in the service's organizational culture continued without effective action to address it. And although its standing had improved from the low point reached in the last years of the New Look, the Army still lagged behind the other military services in the public's regard.²⁴

The Berlin crisis revealed an unexpected shortcoming in the reserve components readiness reporting system. President John F. Kennedy on 18 September 1961 directed mobilization of a two-division force (using guard divisions from the Ready Reserve) for possible use in Europe. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara insisted that the Army Staff provide him the list of nondivisional units for this force in less than a day. Once DCSOPS had determined the number and type of units required, it passed the requirement to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components. That office decided which units each of the reserve components should provide and then, working with the National Guard Bureau and the Chief, Army Reserve, selected the actual units to be mobilized. After the vice chief of staff reviewed the selections, he submitted to McNamara a list of 84 guard and 166 reserve units. Bringing these units to full-strength

24. Memo, SGS to Gen Wheeler, 3 Dec 1962, sub: Proposed Reply to Letter to the Chief of Staff from Commanding General, U.S. Continental Army Command (CGUSCONARC), dated 16 Nov 62, Folder 320.2/1962 (77-85), Box 179, Entry A1-2B, RG 319, NACP; Memo, SGS for Deputy Chs of Staff, et al., 22 Dec 1962, sub: Re-examination of Army Structure and Troop Basis, Folder 320.2/1962 (77-85), Box 179, Entry A1-2B, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Ch of Legislative Liaison for DCSOPS, 15 Apr 1965, sub: Hearings on Army Readiness by Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), Folder 322/Case 6 April 1-15, Box 269, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; Memo, SGS to Gen Abrams, 3 Aug 1965, sub: Analysis of Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee Draft Report on Army Readiness, Folder 322/Case July, Box 270, Entry 1689, RG 319 NACP.



Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, May 1966

would also require mobilizing thousands of fillers from the Ready Reserve Mobilization Reinforcement Pool.

The terribly short period McNamara demanded precluded consultation with CONARC and the continental armies concerning which units to mobilize. Instead, the Army Staff used CSGPO-175 reports, which, since 1960, no longer included the statistical annexes for the reserve components. Although the deletion of the annexes had been justified on the grounds that this data arrived at HQDA via other reports, McNamara's deadline and the state of automatic data processing in HQDA prevented the Army Staff from checking units against these reports. The result was selection of some units less ready than others of the same type.

Mobilization also demonstrated that there remained serious readiness problems across both the Guard and the Reserve. All units had equipment shortages even against their reduced peacetime authorizations, and the New Look had left the Army with little capacity to quickly fill units to their full wartime set of equipment. Although many units were at or near their authorized peacetime strength, that statistic masked serious weaknesses. Since 1959, units had been permitted to reach that authorization by assigning soldiers to positions for which they did not have the proper military occupational specialty. These two deficiencies derailed CONARC's intensified combat training program and units could not meet their planned timeline for deployment readiness.²⁵

25. This and the previous two paragraphs are based on Robert W. Coakley, Walter G. Hermes, James F. Schnabel, and Earl F. Ziemke, "U.S. Army Expansion, 1961-62,"

Even before the mobilization McNamara had concluded that the reserve components had to be cut in order to improve their readiness; the problems encountered during the mobilization reinforced that view. In December 1961 he proposed major reductions in the force structure while providing more resources to the six-division Ready Reserve force, and directed HQDA to prepare a plan for implementing this program. The idea immediately ran up against intense opposition from senior leaders in the reserve components, their professional associations, state governors, and members of Congress. A compromise reached in 1963 cut approximately 10 percent of the force structure (including four divisions each from the Guard and the Reserve), added more civilian full-time technicians, and increased the authorized peacetime strength of units. The Ready Reserve force became the Immediate Reserve and expanded to eight guard divisions.²⁶

The Berlin crisis was one of several factors that led the Army to make a dramatic change to readiness reporting with the publication in 1963 of AR 220-1, Unit Readiness. The greater role given Army forces in the Flexible Response strategy meant the readiness of those forces assumed a greater prominence. Headquarters, Department of the Army, acknowledged this importance and established its first readiness-focused office, the Plans and Readiness Branch in the DCSOPS Operations Directorate, which in 1965 it upgraded to a division in the directorate. Secretary McNamara sought ever more detail with his quantitative management methods, and was unsatisfied by what HQDA could provide. The General Accounting Office issued an embarrassing report on materiel readiness deficiencies exposed during the Berlin crisis. An Army Audit Agency report on STRAC concluded that units consistently overstated their readiness, in part because some commanders would not report data they thought reflected unfavorably upon their performance.²⁷ Headquarters,

Historical Resources Div, CMH, pp. 89-97, 219-22, 231-44, 333-36; Ltr, Gen Herbert B. Powell to Gen George H. Decker, Folder 101-100/Gen Officer Correspond (62), Box 1, Entry UDww-124, RG 546, NACP.

26. Lawrence S. Kaplan, Ronald D. Landa, and Edward J. Drea, *The McNamara Ascendancy, 1961-1965* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006), pp. 88-89, 107-14; Crossland and Currie, *Twice the Citizen*, pp. 149-60.

27. Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (ODCSOPS) Annual Historical Summaries for Fiscal Years 1963 and 1965, Historical Resources Div, CMH; Ltr, Gen Herbert B. Powell to Gen George H. Decker, 22 Aug 1962, File 381/25-53, Box 317, Entry A1-2B, RG 319, NACP; "Report on Audit: Operational Readiness of Strategic Army Corps" (Headquarters, U.S. Army Audit Agency, 1 Nov 1962), copy in Historical Resources Div, CMH.

*Super by AR 220-1
16 April 64*

HEADQUARTERS,
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., 23 August 1963

FIELD ORGANIZATIONS
UNIT READINESS

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1. Purpose. These regulations establish uniform operational readiness standards and reporting procedures for combat and combat support units of the active Army and the Army Reserve Components.

2. Definitions. For the purpose of these regulations, the following definitions apply:

a. Operational readiness. The state of preparedness of a unit to execute the normal mission reflected in the table of organization and equipment (TOE) under which the unit is organized.

b. Readiness category (REDCAT). The category of readiness indicating the state of preparedness, based on the criteria prescribed in the appendix, which has been established as the objective for a particular unit. This objective reflects the degree of readiness, measured against TOE authorization, which is considered appropriate to permit the unit to accomplish its mission. In order that unattainable objectives are not assigned to units organized and operating on reduced authorizations, the highest REDCAT available to a unit will be limited by the percent of TOE strength the unit is authorized, as outlined in the appendix.

c. Readiness condition (REDCON). A unit's actual state of preparedness to perform its mission based upon measurement against the TOE authorization.

3. General. a. The readiness objective of the Army is to maintain its combat forces in a posture which will assure mission accomplishment. Attainment of this objective requires optimum distribution of resources, training of personnel, and application of command emphasis. In view of the magnitude of worldwide Army requirements and the austere asset posture of the Army imposed by budget limitations, proper management of resources at times results in the establishment of reduced strength and materiel ceilings and curtailment of optimum training. In order that the true readiness of the Army can be measured, unit reporting must of necessity be measured against standards based on requirements for sustained combat without regard to artificial limitations established for expediency or by direction. Therefore, in the standards established herein, readiness objectives will be assigned to units based on the unit's mission importance, but tailored to reflect reduced authorizations. Thus a unit may have

*These regulations rescind the report, Readiness of Army Forces, RCS CSGPO-175; DA letter AGAM-P (M) 322 (22 Jan 59) DCSOPS, 5 February 1959, and inclosure (as amended by DA message 436074, 14 September 1959); DA letter AGAM-P (M) 322 (24 Dec 59) DCSLOG, 10 February 1960 (as amended by 1st ind, AGAO-P 322 (31 Mar 60) DCSLOG, 28 April 1960); DA letter AGAM-P (M) 322 (1 Jun 60) DCSOPS, 24 June 1960; DA letter AGAM-P (M) 322 (28 Feb 61) DCSOPS, 23 March 1961; DA message 956945, 25 March 1960 (to USAREUR); DA message 399960, 28 March 1960 (to other preparing agencies); DA message 556686, 15 May 1961; DA message 309788, 16 July 1962 (to AREADCON and o/s commands); letter NG-ABOTO 325.4, 17 June 1959, and inclosure; 1st ind, AGAO-CC 319.1 COMPT-P (SPD), 13 September 1961 (to USCONARC). Note. Pending development and extension of these regulations relating to Reserve Components, the provisions of the above superseded reports pertaining to the Army Reserves and National Guard units remain in effect.

Cover of 1963 edition of AR 220-1

Department of the Army, began another review of readiness reporting in 1962, but cut it short when CONARC, which had never accepted the CSGPO-175, proposed that a new system it had developed be adopted Army-wide. After reviewing comments from major commands and incorporating changes recommended by the under secretary of the Army, HQDA published AR 220-1 in August 1963.²⁸

28. Ltr, Cdr Continental Army Cmd to Comptroller of the Army, 27 Jul 1961, Sub: Application for Approval of Report "Readiness of U.S. Army Forces (Reports

The major innovation in AR 220–1 was accepting the Army would never have sufficient personnel and logistics resources to maintain all its units at the highest state of readiness. It therefore established a formal system of tiered readiness in the concepts of readiness condition (REDCON) and readiness category (REDCAT). Readiness condition was the unit’s actual readiness to perform its mission. The readiness category indicated the state of preparedness established as the objective for the unit. Major commands would assign a REDCAT to each of its units (subject to review and approval by HQDA), by determining the most effective allocation of programmed resources for use in the command’s mission. Headquarters, Department of the Army, reinforced REDCAT assignments by coordinating them with a revision of the Department of the Army Master Priority List.

Both REDCAT and REDCON would be described using a scale from C–1 to C–5:

- C–1 Fully combat ready
- C–2 Combat ready; some personnel and/or equipment shortages require fill for sustained operations. If shortages are filled, it can attain C–1 within five days.
- C–3 Combat ready; personnel and/or equipment shortages of sufficient magnitude limit its capability to perform its mission and permit it to do so for only a very limited period. If shortages are filled, it can attain C–1 within twenty days.
- C–4 Marginally combat ready; if shortages are filled, it can attain C–1 status within sixty days.
- C–5 Not combat ready; requires more than sixty days to attain C–1 status after shortages filled.

The regulation set criteria, in greater detail than ever before, on how to evaluate a unit. These criteria described each level of readiness from C–1 to C–4 for several areas within the categories of personnel, training, and logistics. For example, to reach C–1 in total strength, units had to have at least 90 percent of their full table of organization; to reach C–2, at least 85 percent; to reach C–3, at least 80 percent; and to reach C–4, at

Control Symbol ATTNG–),” Folder 370.2/Binder 2, Box 24, Entry UDWW 7, RG 337, NACP; Memo, SGS to Gen Hamlett, 21 Sep 1962, sub: Reply to CGUSCONARC Re His Recommendations Concerning Combat Readiness Reporting, File 381/25-53, Box 317, Entry A1-2B, RG 319, NACP; Memo, SGS to Gen Hamlett, 8 Aug 1963, sub: Unit Operational Readiness, Folder 322/11-25, Box 35, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP.

least 75 percent. (Reflecting their role as the service's General Reserve, for STRAF and STRAC units these percentages applied not to total strength but to the number of soldiers who met the Army standards for qualification to be deployed overseas.) In an effort to ensure uniformity in applying the criteria, the regulation provided definitions of key terms used to describe the criteria. The report also provided space for commanders to specify any problems impeding his unit from reaching its REDCAT. A unit's REDCON could not exceed the lowest C-level in the rated areas.

Units would enter their data on DA Form 2715 and forward it through channels to their major command headquarters. These higher commanders would provide their own narrative assessment of the unit, and could report a different REDCON for the unit by considering resources they controlled that could be used to change the readiness condition. In order to make the data easier to use at HQDA, major commands would transfer the information from their subordinate units' reports to punch cards, then send those cards to DCSOPS, along with a narrative summary evaluation of readiness in the command. Major commands were to dispatch the punch cards within thirty calendar days of the end of the report quarter and the summary evaluation within forty-five days of the end of the report quarter.²⁹

Initially, only Regular Army units would switch to AR 220-1. Headquarters, Department of the Army, wanted the reserve components to use the REDCAT/REDCON concept, but modifications had to be made in the evaluation criteria to account for the fewer training days available to reserve components and for the need to bring these units to their wartime strength in personnel and equipment postmobilization. Rather than delay implementing the AR 220-1 for the active component as these modifications for the reserve components were prepared, the regulation went into effect for the former with the expectation that the latter would be included in the first revision.³⁰

Secretary of the Army Cyrus R. Vance saw the new reporting system as a powerful tool for improving HQDA's management of Army resources. He directed the Army Staff take steps to ensure prompt and accurate reporting and that a single individual on the Army Staff be given

29. *Army Regulations 220-1: Unit Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 23 Aug 1963); ODCSOPS Annual Historical Summary for Fiscal Year 1964, Historical Resources Div, CMH.

30. Ltr, Sec of the Army to the Sec of Def, 16 Aug 1963, sub: Reserve Component Plan, Folder 326/23-, Box 41, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; Memo, DCSOPS for Ch of Staff, 19 Dec 1963, sub: Talking Paper on Management of Army Resources/Operational Readiness, Folder 322/34-, Box 36, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP.

primary responsibility for making the system work properly. Additionally, he launched a large-scale campaign to publicize AR 220-1 within the service so that all soldiers and civilian employees would understand its importance. General Earle G. Wheeler, the chief of staff, designated General Barksdale Hamlett Jr., the vice chief of staff, as the senior individual responsible for overall coordination and supervision of the readiness program.³¹ The first reporting quarter closed on 30 September (*Tables 6-8*).

Even before the Army Staff had completed its analysis of the submissions, Secretary Vance and General Wheeler agreed that AR 220-1 should be revised during 1964 to make it more useful as a management tool while keeping the system as simple as possible. Analysis of the first set of reports showed that, in general, REDCONs did not reach assigned REDCATs because of significant problems in the areas of surveillance and reconnaissance, tactical mobility, communications, firepower, and combat support. The Army Staff cautioned against taking corrective actions based on these reports because the short interval between the regulation's publication and the first report had left major commands insufficient time to bring resource allocations in-line with REDCATs. Furthermore, evidence suggested that the equipment serviceability criteria was excessively high, and therefore produced ratings lower than actual operational readiness. The second round of reports produced similar results, although there was a slight



Secretary of the Army Cyrus R. Vance at his swearing-in ceremony, 5 July 1962

31. Memo, SGS for Gen Hamlett, 11 Dec 1963, sub: Management of Army's Resources, Folder 322/34-, Box 36, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; Chief of Staff Memorandum (CSM) 63-300, 13 Dec 1963, sub: Management of Army's Resources, Folder 322/34-, Box 36, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; Memo, DCSOPS for Ch of Staff, 19 Dec 1963, sub: Talking Paper on Management of Army Resources/Operational Readiness; Memo, Ch of Information for Ch of Staff, 24 Sep 1965, sub: Army Readiness System, Folder 322/29-35, Box 434, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP.

improvement overall in the readiness of combat units and a marked improvement in the mechanics of the reporting procedure.³²

TABLE 6—DIVISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, READINESS RATINGS AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1963³³

<i>Unit</i>	<i>REDCAT</i>	<i>REDCON</i>
82d Airborne	C-1	C-2
101st Airborne	C-1	C-2
1st Infantry	C-2	C-4
2d Infantry	C-2	C-3
4th Infantry	C-3	C-4
5th Infantry	C-3	C-5
1st Armored	C-2	C-5
2d Armored	C-3	C-5

TABLE 7—DIVISIONS IN EUROPE, READINESS RATINGS AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1963³⁴

<i>Unit</i>	<i>REDCAT</i>	<i>REDCON</i>
3d Armored	C-1	C-4
4th Armored	C-1	C-4
3d Infantry	C-1	C-3
8th Infantry	C-1	C-4
24th Infantry	C-1	C-4

32. Memo, Lt Col Newman to Gen Mock, 31 Dec 1963, sub: Management of Army Resources/Operational Readiness, Folder 322/34-, Box 36, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; SGS to Gen Hamlett, 2 Jan 1964, sub: Summary Report, Operational Readiness of the Army, and Acting SGS to Gen Wheeler, 6 Mar 1964, sub: Summary Report, Operational Readiness of the Army, both in Folder 322/Case 6 JAN-AUG, Box 121, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Ch, UT&R Br for Deputy Ch of Staff, Opns and Training, 12 Dec 1963, sub: DA Operational Readiness Conference, 1st AD, 11 Dec 1963, Folder 1001-02/Operational Readiness Conference 1st AD, Box 13, Entry P-50648, RG 338, NACP; Ltr, Lt Gen Edwin J. Messinger to Lt Gen Albert Watson II, 1 Jun 1964, Folder Official Correspondence June, Box 3, Entry UDWW 124, RG 546, NACP.

33. Memo, SGS to Gen Hamlett, 2 Jan 1964, sub: Summary Report, Operational Readiness of the Army, Folder 322/11-25, Box 35, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP.

34. Ibid.

TABLE 8—DIVISIONS IN THE PACIFIC, READINESS RATINGS AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1963³⁵

<i>Unit</i>	<i>REDCAT</i>	<i>REDCON</i>
1st Cavalry ^a	C-2	C-5
7th Infantry ^a	C-2	C-5
25th Infantry	C-1	C-4

^a Units did not include South Korean soldiers serving with U.S. units in the KA-TUSA (Korean Augmentation to the United States Army) program when calculating REDCON as they filled slots specifically designated for them.³⁶

The Army published the revised AR 220-1 in April 1964. The main changes responded to critiques that evaluation criteria were overly stringent and unrealistic given that the Army lacked the personnel, both in quantity and quality, to fully staff the active force and properly maintain its equipment. To address this situation the revision institutionalized tiered readiness with the concept of readiness capability (REDCAPE). Also expressed using the C-scale, REDCAPE was the highest level of readiness for a unit that its major command could support. A unit's REDCAPE would be set by its major command, subject to HQDA review and approval. The revision now defined REDCAT as the unit's level of peacetime readiness, which was necessary for its major command to accomplish its mission. The revised regulation stressed the use of the reporting system as a management tool by pointing out that too large a difference between REDCAPE and REDCAT was a sign the Army might need to either request additional resources or recommend changes in contingency plans. Consistent discrepancies between REDCAPE and a unit's actual readiness should trigger a reexamination of how the major command allocated resources and possibly a different REDCAPE for the unit.

The revision also made changes to the C-scale ratings for readiness condition. It dropped the not-combat-ready rating (C-5). The C-1 rating still described a unit fully prepared for combat, and units at C-2 were those that would need fifteen days, as opposed to five, to attain C-1 status. Units now received a C-3 REDCON if it could attain C-1 within thirty days of its shortages being filled, rather than twenty. Those rated C-4 would now require more than thirty days, instead of more than sixty,

35. Ibid.

36. Memo, Brig Gen Frank M. Izenour for Vice Ch of Staff, 2 Mar 1965, sub: Subjects for Discussion during the Command Readiness Review-U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC), Folder 1001-13/Readiness Command Presentations, Box 17, Entry UDWW 21-G, RG 319, NACP.



Secretary of the Army Stephen Ailes at a luncheon after awarding the Medal of Honor to Capt. Roger H. Donlon, December 1964

to reach C-1 after shortages were filled. In response to critiques from the field, the criteria for training and logistics were made less stringent. Secretary of the Army Stephen Ailes, who had closely monitored the revision, directed that the personnel criteria be made more stringent in order to promote better management in this area.

The REDCAT and REDCAPE assigned to a unit would now be defined by authorized strength. Those at C-1 would have their full table of organization strength, those at C-2 would be authorized 90 percent of that strength, and C-3 units would have 80 percent. The service revised unit tables of organization to include descriptions of which positions to fill at each level. In calculating its readiness condition, however, units assigned a REDCAPE of C-2 or C-3 had to compare their actual strength to the full table of organization strength, not their lesser authorized strength. The regulation stated this method would be used in order to ensure “uniform reporting” across REDCAPE categories. Initially, in order to meet the required times to reach C-1, the regulation still authorized units assigned to C-2 and C-3 100 percent of their table of equipment. In early 1965, the service recognized the maintenance burden on units with a C-3 REDCAPE and authorized these units to delete some items.³⁷

37. *Army Regulations 220-1: Unit Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 20 May 1964); Memo, Sec of the Army for Ch of Staff, 31

The revised AR 220-1 did not include the reserve components as planned. Secretary Ailes in March 1964 had found the sections developed for the Guard and the Reserve to be “extremely complex.” He decided that the differences between active and reserve units were so great that the latter required their own regulation, and that its proponent in HQDA would be the Chief, Office of Reserve Components, not DCSOPS. As with AR 220-1, the reserve components’ system had the dual purposes of reporting unit readiness and providing data for managing resources. Secretary Ailes also decided that the new system had to be implemented immediately; the service published AR 135-8, Reserve Components: Unit Readiness in August 1964 and units were to submit their first report as of 30 September.³⁸

The regulation used a modified REDCAT/REDCAPE/REDCON concept. It expressed the REDCAT and the REDCAPE in terms of days required to initiate deployment after mobilization. There were four deployment objectives (DO): 30, 60, 90, and 90+. (Not factored into these objectives were the thirty days required for movement to mobilization station, preparation for overseas movement, and movement to a port of embarkation.) The regulation based a unit’s REDCAT on its role in contingency plans and deployment schedules. As with active units, a major command assigned its units a REDCAPE.³⁹ Reflecting the Berlin crisis mobilization experience, all units reported personnel and equipment status against their full table of organization and equipment strength, not their peacetime authorized strength. This criteria allowed HQDA to collect data on what shortfalls it would need to cover when units mobilized. Reserve component reports did not go to DCSOPS. Instead, major commands

Mar 1964, sub: Revision of AR 220-1, Unit Readiness, Folder 322/Case 6 JAN-AUG, Box 121, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; CSM 64-132, 2 Apr 1964, sub: Revision of AR 220-1, Unit Readiness, Folder 322/Case 6 JAN-AUG, Box 121, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; Memo Sec of the Army for Ch of Staff, 22 Jun 1964, sub: The Army’s Unit Readiness Reporting System, Folder 380/5-10, Box 152, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; Ltr, Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (ACSFOR) to Sec Distribution, 13 Mar 1965, sub: Unit Readiness and Optimum Utilization of Resources, Folder 1965 Chronological File Sep-Dec, Box Vice Ch of Staff 1964-66 Chronology, Abrams Papers, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center (AHEC), Carlisle, Pa.

38. Memo, Sec of the Army for Ch of Staff, 31 Mar 1964, sub: Revision of AR 220-1, Unit Readiness; Memo, Lt Gen W. H. S. Wright for Ch of Staff, U.S. Army, 7 May 1964, sub: Reserve Component Unit Readiness, Folder 322/Case 6 JAN-AUG, Box 121, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Sec of the Army for the Ch of Staff, 2 Aug 1964, sub: AR 135-() Reserve Component Unit Readiness, Folder 322/Case 6 JAN-AUG, Box 121, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP.

39. The major command for almost all reserve component units was CONARC. For units in Hawaii, it was U.S. Army, Pacific. For units in Alaska, it was U.S. Army, Alaska. For units in the Caribbean, it was U.S. Army, Southern Command.

transferred the data received from submitted forms to punch cards and sent these to the Chief, Office of Reserve Components.


Each DO category had its own table in the regulation with the criteria for determining a unit's REDCON. The regulation grouped indicators for reserve units' REDCAPE and REDCON in the same three areas as active units—personnel, training, and logistics—and an additional area measuring mobilization preparations. To highlight that these were reserve units, it expressed the four REDCON levels as RC-1 through RC-4 instead of C-1 through C-4. In each of the first three areas, there were differences from AR 220-1 in some indicators. In personnel, reserve units reported the number of fillers allocated to them by higher headquarters and what percentage of their full table of organization strength these fillers would achieve. In training, reserve units only reported the number of days after mobilization they estimated necessary to reach their deployment objective. In logistics, reserve units reported both equipment on hand and equipment serviceability, but did not report the on-hand data for various supplies required from active units. A reserve unit's overall readiness rating was designated its deployment condition, and as with active units, the worst rating among the personnel, training, and logistics areas determined it. And also as with active units, a unit's higher headquarters and its continental army headquarters appended to the unit's report their estimates of its readiness in those three areas.⁴⁰

Along with the revision of AR 220-1 and the publishing of AR 135-8, HQDA launched a campaign in 1964 to stress the importance of readiness and directed major commands to take steps to improve their units' readiness condition, particularly in regards to equipment. It also established a special board to examine materiel readiness service wide and make recommendations for improvements.⁴¹

The emphasis on readiness created friction between DCSOPS and the Comptroller of the Army when the latter began including REDCON ratings of Regular Army divisions, received at HQDA via punch cards, in its

40. *Army Regulation No. 135-8, Reserve Components: Unit Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 18 Aug 1964).

41. Ltr, Gen Earle G. Wheeler to Lt Gen Edwin J. Messinger, 25 May 1964, Folder SECY Series January, Box 2, Entry UDWW 124, RG 546, NACP; DF, Duncan for DCSUTR et al., 19 Jun 1964, sub: Ad Hoc Committee on Readiness, Folder SECY Series January, Box 2, Entry UDWW 124, RG 546, NACP; Ltr, Lt Gen Frederic J. Brown to Gen Hugh P. Harris, 14 Jul 1964, Folder Lt Gen Brown/CG 6th US Army, Box 3, Entry UDWW 124, RG 546, NACP; *Department of the Army Pamphlet 750-4: Combat Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 19 Aug 1964); Lt Col Charles F. Greer, "How Ready Is My Unit?" *Army Information Digest* 19 (Nov 1964): 12-19.



Cover of DA Pamphlet 750-4, *Combat Readiness*, part of the 1964 troop information campaign stressing readiness

quarterly program reviews for the Army Secretariat. The DCSOPS objected because it could not present its readiness briefing before receiving the later-arriving major command narrative assessments. The inclusion of REDCON ratings in the Comptroller's briefing generated "detailed discussions of readiness by members of the Secretariat" without the information found in major command analyses and without "even the appropriate DCSOPS personnel being present." The friction ended when the vice chief of staff, General Creighton W. Abrams Jr., in December 1964 directed that the quarterly program reviews no longer mention

readiness.⁴²

The Army's senior leadership briefed Secretary of Defense McNamara on the revised AR 220-1 in August 1964. Impressed with the detail provided by the system, he asked that henceforth a one-page summary chart on active divisions' readiness be provided for his personal notebook. McNamara, however, did not approve of REDCAPE, stating that there should be no gap between requirements and capabilities. Secretary Ailes and the chief of staff, General Harold K. Johnson, responded that the Army developed the REDCAPE concept primarily to track how unprogrammed requirements (such as deploying units to Vietnam and creating the 11th Air Assault Division) without provision of additional resources forced the service to transfer men and materiel out of units to meet these requirements. Although not convinced, McNamara did not direct elimination of the

42. Memo, SGS for Gen Abrams, 29 Dec 1964, sub: Readiness Briefings to Secretariat, Folder 320 Programs/1964 31, Box 118, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP.

REDCAPE. Later in the year, he commented that the Army's system was superior to the joint system, particularly as a management tool.⁴³

In the first report under the revised regulation, the REDCAPE concept highlighted the continuing gap between the service's assigned missions and the resources it received. Of the eight Regular Army divisions in the continental United States, only the two airborne ones had a REDCAPE that matched their REDCAT; for the others, CONARC had assigned them a readiness capability one level below their readiness category (*Table 9*). The five divisions in Germany also had been assigned a readiness capability one level below their readiness category, whereas the two divisions in Korea had been assigned a REDCAPE two levels below their REDCAT (*Tables 10–11*).⁴⁴ Some small improvements in readiness appeared. The revised reporting system, however, revealed that the legacy of inadequate funding during the New Look, the high personnel turbulence generated in a draft-based force with low retention among junior officers and technical specialties, and the increased operational tempo produced by the Flexible Response strategy combined to keep most units' REDCON from reaching their REDCAPE. Unit commanders singled out personnel turbulence as the most damaging of these because of its effects on maintenance, collective training, and unit cohesion.⁴⁵

43. Memo, SGS for Gen Abrams, 1 Sep 1964, sub: Unit Readiness, Folder 322/Case 6/Jan-Aug, Box 121, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Brig Gen Frank M. Iz-enour for Asst Deputy Ch of Staff for Personnel, 20 Oct 1964, sub: Readiness Reporting, Folder 1001-13, Box 21, Entry UDWW P-24, RG 319, NACP.

44. Memo, SGS to Gen Johnson, 12 Aug 1964, sub: Unit Readiness Briefing for Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), Folder 380/5-10, Box 152, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP.

45. Ltr, Maj Gen H. J. Jablonsky to Lt Gen Ben Harrell, 14 Aug 1964, Folder 1001-13/Operational Readiness Reports, Box 21, Entry UDWW P-24, RG 319, NACP; Ltr, Gen Hugh P. Harris to Gen Creighton W. Abrams, 16 Nov 1964, Folder 322/Case 6 Sep-Dec, Box 122, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; Ltr, Lt Gen L. J. Lincoln to Gen Hugh P. Harris, 6 Nov 1964, Folder SECY 100,000 Series November 1964, Box 2, Entry UDWW 124, RG 546, NACP; Ltr, Lt Gen H. H. Fischer to Gen Hugh P. Harris, 9 Nov 1964, Folder SECY 100,000 Series November 1964, Box 2, Entry UDWW 124, RG 546, NACP; Memo, DCSOPS for Ch of Staff, 27 Nov 1964, sub: Summary Report, Operational Readiness of the Army, Folder 322/Case 6 Sept-Dec, Box 122, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP.

TABLE 9—DIVISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, READINESS RATINGS AS OF 30 JUNE 1964⁴⁶

<i>Unit</i>	<i>REDCAT</i>	<i>REDCAPE</i>	<i>REDCON</i>
82d Airborne	C-1	C-1	C-4
101st Airborne	C-1	C-1	C-4
1st Infantry	C-1	C-2	C-4
2d Infantry	C-1	C-2	C-4
4th Infantry	C-1	C-2	C-4
5th Infantry	C-1	C-2	C-4
1st Armored	C-1	C-2	C-4
2d Armored	C-1	C-2	C-4

TABLE 10—DIVISIONS IN EUROPE, READINESS RATINGS AS OF 30 JUNE 1964⁴⁷

<i>Unit</i>	<i>REDCAT</i>	<i>REDCAPE</i>	<i>REDCON</i>
3d Armored	C-1	C-2	C-3
4th Armored	C-1	C-2	C-4
3d Infantry	C-1	C-2	C-4
8th Infantry	C-1	C-2	C-2
24th Infantry	C-1	C-2	C-2

TABLE 11—DIVISIONS IN THE PACIFIC, READINESS RATINGS AS OF 30 JUNE 1964⁴⁸

<i>Unit</i>	<i>REDCAT</i>	<i>REDCAPE</i>	<i>REDCON</i>
1st Cavalry	C-1	C-3	C-4
7th Infantry	C-1	C-3	C-4
25th Infantry	C-1	C-1	C-3

46. Memo, SGS to Gen Johnson, 12 Aug 1964, sub: Unit Readiness Briefing for SECDEF.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

The continuing gap between assigned missions and resources prompted an inquiry from General Johnson in October 1964 as to the resources needed to bring REDCAPE up to REDCAT Army-wide. The DCSOPS study estimated that an additional \$240 million would have to be included in the service's budget for the next two fiscal years. The extra funds would procure 83,000 more personnel in the active force, erase major equipment shortfalls, and bring all equipment up to required REDCAT serviceability criteria. Johnson did not forward the study to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), choosing instead to use it "in general terms" during his discussions of budget matters.⁴⁹

TABLE 12—IMMEDIATE RESERVE NATIONAL GUARD DIVISIONS, READINESS RATINGS AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1964⁵⁰

<i>Unit</i>	<i>REDCAT</i>	<i>REDCAPE</i>	<i>REDCON</i>
26th Infantry Division	DO-90	—	RC-4
28th Infantry Division	DO-90	—	RC-4
30th Infantry Division	DO-90+	—	RC-4
38th Infantry Division	DO-30	—	RC-4
42d Infantry Division	DO-90+	—	RC-4
47th Infantry Division	DO-30	—	RC-4
30th Armored Division	DO-90+	—	RC-4
50th Armored Division	DO-90+	—	RC-4

For the first report under AR 135-8 (*Table 12*), no units had a REDCAPE because major commands could not develop them with only a month between publication of the regulation and submission of the report. Every unit had a rating of RC-4 because every unit was RC-4 in both equipment on hand and equipment serviceability. The equipment on hand was not unexpected, given the existing policy of supplying reserve units with only enough equipment to support peacetime training and the inability to often supply even this amount because of procurement

49. Memo, SGS for Gen Johnson, 19 Dec 1964, sub: Resources Required to Bring REDCAPE (readiness capability) to REDCAT (readiness category), Folder 210.31/Case 13, Box 103, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP. The quote is from Johnson's handwritten notation on the memo.

50. DF, Chief, Office of Reserve Components (CORC) to DCSOPS et al., 25 Feb 1965, sub: Reserve Component Unit Readiness, Folder 204-33/ARNG Readiness Report, Box 10, Entry A1-5, RG 168, NACP.

decisions during the New Look era. The equipment serviceability data were suspect, as reserve units had not previously been required to report this information and therefore had not been issued publications on equipment serviceability criteria. Units calculated the ratings reported in September using field expedient criteria as there had not been time to issue the publications before the reporting date. Other problems, which were long standing in the reserve components, included insufficient full-time technicians to maintain equipment; shortages of spare parts; and a significant quantity of obsolete or worn-out equipment.⁵¹

Other factors degrading readiness were familiar from earlier reserve component reporting systems. In the personnel area, there were shortages in highly technical occupational specialties; inadequate allocation of slots at schools; and turnover of 20 to 30 percent annually. A recurring problem, but for the first time reported, was availability of trained fillers. Many units had REDCONs of RC-3 or RC-4 for this indicator because the demand for soldiers from the Ready Reserve Mobilization Reinforcement Pool exceeded the number in their continental corps area. Most units reported achieving their training criteria, but noted continuing difficulties created by personnel turbulence and equipment shortages.⁵²

During 1965, HQDA established two programs to emphasize the importance of readiness and to better understand the problems facing units in meeting their REDCAPE. The first was the Department of the Army Staff Readiness Visit program. Teams from the Army Staff would visit units to determine which readiness problem facing them required action at the HQDA level to remedy. The second was the Secretary of the Army's Program for Command Supervision of Readiness. The program was so named in order to emphasize the importance of readiness even though it actually was the idea of the vice chief of staff, General Abrams. Each major command was to send a team to Washington annually, and they would brief Abrams and the principals of the Army Staff on their readiness situation. By limiting the session to senior officers, Abrams also hoped to encourage frank discussions about readiness and how to improve it.⁵³ That same year, in order to improve their effectiveness as a

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. CSM 65-43, as quoted in ODCSOPS Annual Historical Summary Fiscal Year 1965, Historical Resources Div, CMH; Memo, SGS to Gen Abrams, 11 Jan 1965, sub: The Secretary of the Army's Program for Command Supervision of Readiness, Folder 322/Case 6 Jan-Feb, Box 268, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Gen Abrams for Ch of Staff, sub: USAREUR Readiness Presentation, Folder 322/Case 6 March 17-31, Box 269, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; memo, Brig Gen Tillson for Gen Palmer, 22 Mar 1965, sub: Trip Report, Folder 322/Case 6 March 17-31, Box 269, Entry 1689, RG

management tool, HQDA directed major commands to submit readiness reports via the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) instead of mailing punch cards to Washington.⁵⁴

Unintended side effects from the great emphasis placed on readiness and readiness reporting began to appear. Some company and battalion commanders perceived that commanders at the general officer level used readiness reports to evaluate their performance. This was of concern because many factors affecting unit readiness were beyond the control

of its commander, yet they perceived their careers might suffer because of how these factors affected the readiness rating. The corollary to this perception was a temptation for commanders to inflate their unit's ratings.

Senior leaders in HQDA were aware that AR 220-1 depended upon accurate reports. Secretary Ailes in June 1964 emphasized that "commanders at all echelons must take all necessary steps to protect the integrity of the system." If a unit did not reach its assigned readiness level and its commander had "exhausted the resources at his disposal," then "no element in the chain of command should consider this fact as reflecting unfavorably upon the commander." Otherwise, "if these reports are submitted in a manner which does not reflect the true state of conditions of units, there will be no possibility of relieving unsatisfactory conditions."⁵⁵ During a visit to Korea in December 1964, General Johnson discovered "some indications that REDCON ratings were being interpreted as command



General Creighton W. Abrams Jr. arrives in Vietnam, January 1966.

319, NACP; Memo, SGS to Gen Abrams, 24 May 1965, sub: DA Staff Supervision of Readiness, Folder 322/Case 6 May, Box 269, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP.

54. SS, DCSOPS to Ch of Staff, 28 Feb 1966, sub: Readiness Questions and Answers, Folder 322/16-22, Box 432, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP.

55. Memo, Sec of the Army for the Ch of Staff, U.S. Army, 22 Jun 1964, sub: The Army's Unit Readiness Reporting System, Folder 380/1964 5-10, Box 152, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP.

efficiency indicators.” He directed an article on this matter be included in the weekly summary distributed to commanding generals. The article reminded the generals they “should not discipline the unit commander for reporting a problem area” and that rating inflation must be prevented because if the system was to “serve a useful purpose, the accuracy and integrity of readiness reports must be preserved at all costs.”⁵⁶

Emphasizing the importance of readiness caught the eye of Senator John C. Stennis, chairman of the Armed Services Committee’s preparedness subcommittee. He dispatched members of his staff and Government Accounting Office (GAO) teams in early 1965 to gather data on units’ readiness and the readiness reporting system. These officials concluded that the units visited were not combat ready because their REDCON did not match their assigned REDCAPE. During its hearing in May, the subcommittee took a decidedly adversarial approach toward Army witnesses. The witnesses responded that the Regular Army was in the best peacetime condition of its history and that the subcommittee had misunderstood the design of AR 220–1, missing its primary purpose as a resource management tool. The subcommittee did not accept this rebuttal, but by the time it published its report in September 1965, the deployment of ground combat units to Vietnam overshadowed the controversy. Stennis, though, made it clear he would keep a close eye on the issue.⁵⁷

The Joint Staff’s appetite for readiness data had grown quickly. In December 1960, it had requested the services to each provide an officer with expertise in readiness reporting to assist in developing a new

56. Memo, SGS for General Abrams, 16 Feb 1965, sub: Unit Readiness Article for the Weekly Summary, Folder 333.1/1965 C/S Trips JAN & FEB, Box 295, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP.

57. Memo, Lt Gen L. J. Lincoln for Vice Ch of Staff, 7 Apr 1965, sub: Trip Report of Visit with Staff Members of the Senate Investigation Sub-Committee, 24 Feb-9 Mar 1965, Folder 322/6 April 1-15, Box 269, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Ch of Legislative Liaison for Deputy Ch of Staff for Opns, 15 Apr 1965, sub: Hearings on Army Readiness by Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, SASC, Folder 322/6 April 1-15, Box 269, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Sec of the Army for Gen Abrams, 24 May 1965, “Personal,” Folder 322/FW 11-11-65 (Army Readiness) (Part I), Box 63, Entry UDUP 48, RG 335, NACP; Memo, SGS for Gen Abrams, 3 Aug 1965, sub: Analysis of Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee Draft Report on Army Readiness, Folder 322/6 July, Box 270, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; Julius Duscha, “Stennis Fails to Convince Army of Lagging Combat Readiness,” *Washington Post*, 6 Sep 1965; Richard Eder, “Shortages in Army Supplies Indicated at Senate Hearing,” *New York Times*, 6 Sep 1965; Memo, Sec of the Army for Ch of Staff, U.S. Army, 8 Dec 1965, sub: Army Readiness, Folder 322/FW 11-11-65 (Army Readiness) (Part I), Box 63, Entry UDUP 48, RG 335, NACP.

“combat reporting system.” A new system was necessary because the “increase in scope of operational activities of the Joint Staff” required “statistics relating to forces, weapons and weapons systems upon which decisions can be made.” In July 1961, JCS Publication No. 6, *Joint Operational Reporting System (JOPREP)*, appeared as “the first step in establishing a truly effective reporting system.” In March 1962, JCS revised JOPREP to require “more specific information regarding the readiness of forces.” Later that year, McNamara directed the creation of a Worldwide Military Command and Control System and JOPREP’s products became part of that system.⁵⁸

There were significant differences between the new joint system and the Army system arising from their different purposes. The JCS designed their system around the establishment of a database on the readiness of each unit assigned to a unified command, whereas the Army one had the dual purposes of measuring readiness and providing a tool for managing resources. The joint one covered only combat units assigned to a joint command. Although both systems used a C-1 to C-4 rating scheme, the criteria used to evaluate readiness in the new joint system was generally less demanding than that used in AR 220-1. Initially, the joint report covered only combat essential equipment whereas the Army included all items in a unit’s table of equipment, but in June 1965 Abrams approved a change to AR 220-1 that adopted the combat essential standard for reporting equipment on hand. Because of these differences, Army units included in the joint system had to prepare one report for it as well as the one sent to HQDA.⁵⁹

In an October 1964 meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary McNamara said “that he saw no end of confusion through continued use of two systems which measured different levels of readiness.” His preference was to “junk” the joint system and have the JCS rely on the services’ readiness reporting systems for at least a year; after that, it could develop a new joint system “based upon and derived from the Service systems.” Although the chairman, who was now former Army Chief of Staff General Wheeler, agreed that this situation could create confusion, he did not agree that the joint system should be junked.

58. Memo SM-169-62, JCS for service chs, 7 Feb 1962, sub: Revision of JCS Publication No. 6 (Joint Operational Reporting System), Folder 3065 (9 Jun 1961), and Memo, Director of Opns for Director, Joint Staff, 15 Aug 1964, sub: Exercise Operational Readiness Report, Box 26, Entry A1-1 IG, RG 218, NACP.

59. Memo, SGS to Gen Johnson, 12 Aug 1964, sub: Unit Readiness Bfg for SECDEF; Memo, SGS to Gen Abrams, 12 Jul 1965, sub: Revision of AR 220-1, “Unit Readiness,” Folder 322/Case 1, Box 267, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP.

Rather, Wheeler argued that the Joint Staff should undertake a major review of its system with the aim of eliminating any confusion between the systems. McNamara did not press the matter further, and Wheeler's review soon commenced.⁶⁰

The deployment of units from XVIII Airborne Corps to the Dominican Republic in April 1965 illuminated the confusion produced between the Army and the joint systems. The quarterly schedule in AR 220-1 meant that data on units grew outdated between reports. Continental Army Command had a process for messages from units if their REDCON changed in these intervals, but these messages lacked the detail necessary for immediate remedial actions and, when alerted for an operation, CONARC did not always have an accurate picture of readiness on which to base its deployment decisions. Meanwhile, the several hundred CONARC units assigned to U.S. Strike Command's troop list had to submit a daily change in readiness report (designated REDOPS and sent in punch card format) of considerable detail, but not identical to that in AR 220-1. To relieve units of this administrative burden, CONARC headquarters compiled the necessary information from its files and submitted the REDOPS via AUTODIN in addition to the reports it submitted to the JCS in accordance with JOPREP. Therefore, during the Dominican intervention, when CONARC units passed to the operational control first of Strike Command and then of U.S. Atlantic Command, they lacked the capability to prepare a REDOPS. Unsurprisingly, these units initially did not submit REDOPS, and the computerized unit status databases at both CONARC and Atlantic Command quickly became outdated. Continental Army Command had to dispatch a member of its headquarters to the Dominican Republic, where he spent a week instructing XVIII Airborne Corps on the REDOPS.⁶¹

The last reporting quarter before the decision to deploy a field army to Vietnam found an active Army feeling significant strain. It supported units already in the country and it was activating new service and support units necessary to improve the logistical infrastructure there. Serious difficulties in meeting materiel readiness objectives continued, and these were the main reason for REDCONs not achieving units' REDCAPE (*Tables 13-15*). Every division had this issue except the 82d Airborne (deployed to the Dominican Republic and thus excused from reporting) and the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) (excused from reporting as it had just been organized). (The division was created by combining the

60. Memo, Izenour for Asst Deputy Ch of Staff for Personnel, 20 Oct 1964.

61. CONARC Annual Historical Summary Fiscal Year 1965, pp. 52-60, Historical Resources Div, CMH.

assets of the 11th Air Assault Division—which field-tested the airmobile concept—and the 2d Infantry Division into one division, then reflagging the 1st Cavalry Division in Korea as the 2d Infantry Division and transferring the former’s flag to the new division at Fort Benning, Georgia.) Personnel turbulence also remained a major obstacle, particularly in CONARC, which was now short 56,000 enlistees.⁶²

TABLE 13—DIVISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, READINESS RATINGS AS OF 30 JUNE 1965⁶³

<i>Unit</i>	<i>REDCAT</i>	<i>REDCAPE</i>	<i>REDCON</i>
82d Airborne	C-1	C-1	Not reported
101st Airborne	C-1	C-1	C-3
1st Infantry (-) ^a	C-1	C-1	C-4
4th Infantry	C-2	C-2	C-3
5th Infantry	C-2	C-2	C-4
1st Armored	C-2	C-2	C-3
2d Armored	C-2	C-2	C-3
1st Cavalry (Airmobile)	C-1	C-1	Not reported

^a One brigade had deployed to Vietnam earlier in the year

TABLE 14—DIVISIONS IN EUROPE, READINESS RATINGS AS OF 30 JUNE 1965⁶⁴

<i>Unit</i>	<i>REDCAT</i>	<i>REDCAPE</i>	<i>REDCON</i>
3d Armored	C-1	C-2	C-3
4th Armored	C-1	C-2	C-4
3d Infantry	C-1	C-2	C-3
8th Infantry	C-1	C-2	C-4
24th Infantry	C-1	C-2	C-4

62. Memo, SGS to Gen Johnson, 31 Aug 1965, sub: Summary Report, Operational Readiness of the Army, Folder 322/51-60, Box 275, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP.

63. Memo, SGS to Gen Johnson, 31 Aug 1965, Summary Rpt, Operational Readiness of the Army.

64. Ibid.

TABLE 15—DIVISIONS IN THE PACIFIC, READINESS RATINGS
AS OF 30 JUNE 1965⁶⁵

<i>Unit</i>	<i>REDCAT</i>	<i>REDCAPE</i>	<i>REDCON</i>
2d Infantry	C-1	C-2	C-4
7th Infantry	C-1	C-3	C-4
25th Infantry	C-1	C-1	C-2

TABLE 16—IMMEDIATE RESERVE NATIONAL GUARD DIVISIONS,
READINESS RATINGS AS OF 31 MARCH 1965⁶⁶

<i>Unit</i>	<i>REDCAT</i>	<i>REDCAPE</i>	<i>REDCON</i>
26th Infantry Division	DO-90	RC-4	RC-4
28th Infantry Division	DO-90	RC-4	RC-4
30th Infantry Division	DO-90+	RC-4	RC-4
38th Infantry Division	DO-30	RC-4	RC-4
42d Infantry Division	DO-90+	RC-4	RC-4
47th Infantry Division	DO-30	RC-4	RC-4
30th Armored Division	DO-90+	RC-4	RC-4
50th Armored Division	DO-90+	RC-4	RC-4

Matériel readiness also continued to be the key factor impeding reserve component readiness (*Table 16*). With the biannual reporting cycle, the as-of date for the last report on units' status before the field army's deployment to Vietnam was 30 March 1965. (Given the processing time required to move data up the chain of command, General Johnson did not receive a summary of these reports until 19 August.) Major commands had assigned most units a REDCAPE of RC-4 because AR 135-8 required rating equipment on hand against the amount required for wartime, not the authorized peacetime amount, a difference that usually guaranteed a RC-4 REDCON rating for this indicator. Most units also had a REDCON of RC-4 for equipment serviceability: much of their equipment continued to be obsolete, old, or high-mileage; the

65. *Ibid.*

66. Memo, Ch, Ofc of Reserve Components for Ch of Staff, United States Army, 19 Aug 1965, sub: Summary Report, Readiness of Reserve Component Units as of 31 Mar 1965, Folder 204-33/ARNG Readiness Report, Box 10, Entry A1-5, RG 168, NACP.

logistics system still did not supply enough spare parts; and the number of full-time technicians remained inadequate to maintain the equipment.

Now having more time to review unit reports and more experience with the system, the continental army headquarters noted a trend. Units often overrated themselves in the personnel area because they did not include the inadequate number of fillers allocated to them. These headquarters considered this sufficiently serious to downgrade these units' personnel REDCON. Although they did not downgrade training REDCONs, they did observe that many of these were optimistic given the impediments to effective training in the reserve components. In its summary, CONARC noted a shortfall in recruiting had produced shortfalls in personnel strength for many units, a development it argued was the result of uncertainty over the future of the reserve components.⁶⁷

The uncertainty had arisen in December 1964 when McNamara announced a plan to move all Army Reserve units into the Army National Guard, leaving the Reserve with only the Ready Reserve Mobilization Reinforcement Pool. The plan also cut the total reserve components strength by 150,000—most of which was to come from inactivating guard divisions not part of the Immediate Reserve force. The AR 135–8 reports highlighted the origins of this plan: the Army would never receive a big enough budget to bring all of its existing reserve force structures to an RC–1 level of readiness. Therefore, HQDA recommended the plan to McNamara, who announced it in December. The announcement produced fierce and swift opposition from Congress, which continued until McNamara withdrew the merger proposal in May 1967. The decision by President Lyndon B. Johnson in July 1965 to fight the Vietnam War with increased draft calls instead of a reserve mobilization, however, soon ended recruiting shortfalls.⁶⁸

Conclusion

Consigned to limbo during the New Look, the Army had responded with STRAC and the ultimately bankrupt pentomic concept. The emphasis on preparing units for no-notice operations—whether a World War III or lesser contingencies—temporarily ended the struggle between those (such as AFF/CONARC) who desired maximum quantification in readiness reporting and those (such as G–3/DCSOPS and Taylor) who only wanted the system to tell them whether units were ready or not. The

67. Ibid.

68. Crossland and Currie, *Twice the Citizen*, pp. 163–76.

perils of a nuclear age also prompted the first joint readiness reporting system, which initially was of little concern to the Army.

Flexible Response released the Army from limbo and installed McNamara's management by quantification at the Pentagon. In this environment, and following the Berlin crisis embarrassment, CONARC's moment had arrived. It offered HQDA a readiness reporting system of far greater detail than CSGPO-175, one that could also serve a crucial resource management function. By July 1965, HQDA had fielded such a system with AR 220-1 and AR 135-8 while at the same time the Joint Staff worked to build a similar system as McNamara's OSD demanded ever more data.

Some in the Army, though, grew concerned over the demands these systems placed on units' time and commanders' integrity, concerns that would escalate as the service and its readiness reporting system entered another major war in Asia.

CHAPTER 3

VIETNAM AND THE COLLAPSE OF READINESS, 1965–1972

Between 1965 and 1972 the Army, as it had during the final two years of the Korean War, had to sustain four major forces: those fighting the war; a field army in Europe; its contribution to air defense of the continental United States; and a general reserve in the United States. And like the Korean War, the Army did not receive sufficient personnel resources to meet all readiness objectives it set for each mission. The service once again prioritized the forces in combat with the same result: steep declines in the other three forces' readiness. Army strength in Vietnam peaked during early 1969. Thereafter HQDA's work in supporting the war effort focused on "Vietnamization"—the withdrawal of units combined with a campaign to strengthen the South Vietnamese military—while trying to rebuild readiness.

There were several differences between the Korean and Vietnam Wars. In Vietnam, the service had to support both conventional operations and counterinsurgency efforts. A huge expansion of aviation units added major challenges in personnel, training, and materiel. The Vietnam War would not see a major equipment modernization effort, a difference that became increasingly worrisome as the Soviet Army acquired newer and more capable weapons. Opposition to the war interacted with the tumult in American society to create serious discipline problems within the active force after the Tet Offensive in 1968. By 1973, the war and changes in American society ended conscription. Both active and reserve components had to divert resources from sustaining combat readiness to improving their readiness for dealing with domestic civil unrest. The stress of the Vietnam War starkly revealed the career management system's corrosive effects on officer corps culture.¹

1. There remains no single work that effectively covers all the many effects of the Vietnam War on the Army as an organization. This paragraph and the preceding one are based on a review of Army Staff annual historical summaries and of Army major command historical summaries for these years in the Historical Support Branch, CMH; the files of the Office of the Secretary of the Army for these years in RG 335, NACP; and the files of the Chief of Staff, Army, for these years in RG 319, NACP.

From the moment they learned in July 1965 that there would be no reserve components mobilization, senior service leaders knew that supporting the field army in Vietnam would come at the expense of readiness in the rest of the active force. They also knew that without a mobilization, expanding the active force for the war would be a messy, sometimes chaotic experience that would not permit deploying units at peak readiness. As part of his efforts to counter the erosion, General Johnson in September 1965 directed the chief of information to initiate a program which would improve soldiers' understanding of their role in sustaining readiness and making the AR 220-1 system work properly.²

In December 1965, General Abrams decided to exempt units in Vietnam from the reporting requirements in AR 220-1 without first receiving approval either from the under secretary of the Army or the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The quarterly reporting cycle impeded Headquarters, Department of the Army's, (HQDA) responsiveness to units' needs and other reporting systems already provided more timely data from Vietnam. Reflecting the continuing interest of Senator Stennis, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (DCSOPS) warned that exempting units in Vietnam might be seen as an attempt by the Army to hide information from Congress. It raised the same concern in regards to OSD. Abrams, however, was not concerned; for him, burdening units in combat with a reporting requirement of little use to HQDA made no sense. The under secretary, Congress, and OSD did not challenge the vice chief of staff's decision.³

2. Walter G. Hermes, "Department of the Army: The Buildup, 1965-1967," chapter 3, pp. 56-69, Historians files, CMH; Memo, Col K. L. Johnson for Acting Deputy Ch of Staff for Personnel, 10 Aug 1965, sub: Report of Special Planning Committee, Folder 201-22 (RES MOB) GEN 65, Box 9, Entry A1-5, RG 168, NACP; Memo, Brig Gen Keith L. Ware for Ch of Staff, U.S. Army, 8 Oct 1965, sub: Army Readiness System, Folder 322/29-35, Box 434, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Lt Col C. S. Hamilton for Colonel Honea, 16 Dec 1965, sub: Notes Taken during the Vice Chief of Staff's Meeting on the Strength Reporting Portion of the Readiness System, Folder 322/18-22, Box 270, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP; John K. Singlaub, *Hazardous Duty: An American Soldier in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Summit Books, 1991), pp. 275-82. A case study of one soldier caught in this organizational tumult is William M. Donnelly, "This 'Horrible Example': An Extraordinary Case of Absent Without Leave during the Vietnam War," *Journal of Military History* 79, no. 2 (Apr 2015): 457-66.

3. Memo, SGS for Gen Abrams, 23 Dec 1965, sub: Readiness Reporting by Units in Vietnam, Folder 322/1 Only, Box 267, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Under Sec of the Army for the Vice Ch of Staff, 28 Dec 1965, sub: Readiness Reporting by Units in Vietnam, Folder 201-45/Vietnam 1966 #8, Box 211, Entry A1-77, RG 319, NACP.

As during the Korean War, the readiness reporting cycle was ill-suited for managing the readiness of units alerted for deployment. The continental army headquarters again became a key resource for tracking and rectifying problems affecting readiness. And CONARC headquarters played the same role AFF had—the node connecting HQDA to the field. The urgency of the situation in 1965 meant that HQDA could not give many units the time they needed to fully integrate the fillers, both in personnel and equipment, which brought them to full-strength. Even the most prominent unit deploying could not be shielded; reports from inspection teams and the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)’s commander prompted CONARC’s commander to alert General Johnson that there was “a considerable spread of operational proficiency among the various units of the division.” By the end of the year, over 850 units with 121,000 soldiers had shipped out to Vietnam.⁴

Analysis of readiness reports for the quarter ending 31 December 1965 (*Table 17*) confirmed that the expected erosion was well underway in the United States; every division in CONRAC failed to meet their readiness capability by large margins. Units provided soldiers to deploying units, to the expanding training base, and for the replacement stream in Vietnam. The higher priority of all these activities meant that the Army could never fully backfill units and the decision not to invoke stop-loss measures meant soldiers continued to leave when their active duty obligation expired. Units also had to give up equipment to deploying units. The personnel turbulence and equipment shortages impeded effective training. These obstacles to sustaining readiness would only grow worse over the next five years and soon would affect units in Europe and Korea.⁵

4. Ltr, Gen Paul L. Freeman Jr., to Gen Harold K. Johnson, 26 Jul 1965, Folder 101-100/Gen Ofcr Corresp, Box 2, Entry A1-86A, RG 546, NACP; Ltr, Lt Gen C. G. Dodge to Gen Paul L. Freeman Jr., Folder 101-100/Gen Ofcr Corresp, Box 2, Entry A1-86A, RG 546, NACP; Hermes, “The Buildup,” ch. 4, 5, and ch. 7, p. 23.

5. Ltr, CONARC to DCSOPS, 11 Feb 1966, sub: Summary Evaluation of Unit Readiness as of 31 Dec 1965, RCS CSGPO-265(R1), Folder 320.2/Case 1 Incl, Box 428, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP.

TABLE 17—DIVISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, READINESS RATINGS
AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1965⁶

<i>Unit</i>	<i>REDCAT</i> ^a	<i>REDCAPE</i>	<i>REDCON</i> ^b
82d Airborne	C-1	C-1	C-4
101st Airborne(-) ^c	C-1	C-1	C-3
4th Infantry	C-1	C-1	C-4
5th Infantry	C-2	C-2	C-4
1st Armored	C-2	C-2	C-4
2d Armored	C-2	C-2	C-4

^a Readiness category

^b Readiness condition

^c One brigade deployed to Vietnam

AR 220-1

Headquarters, Department of the Army, issued three further revisions of AR 220-1 during the 1960s. It published the first in July 1965. This revision, underway since late 1964, focused on logistics matters. There were three major changes. First, the equipment on hand indicator would cover only “combat essential” items. Second, units would now evaluate two equipment serviceability indicators: one followed the stricter standards used for technical inspections and the other the looser standards for determining whether the item could be deployed. The third change was to the criteria for evaluating the repair parts indicator. Although Johnson and Abrams had become concerned over the detail and accuracy provided by training indicators, work on revising these had not yet progressed to the point where they could be added to the revision. This revision also created a new reporting chain for some units assigned to unified commands in order to improve HQDA’s ability to manage their readiness. Divisions, armored cavalry regiments, nondivisional combat arms units, combat engineer battalions, and aviation companies now had to mail a copy of their DA Form 2715 direct to DCSOPS, to arrive no later than ten days after the as-of date of the report, in addition to sending it to their higher headquarters.⁷

6. Memo, SGS to Gen Johnson, 8 Mar 1966, sub: Quarterly Readiness Briefing, Folder 322/Case 1 January-March, Box 431, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP.

7. SS, ACSFOR to Vice Ch of Staff, 2 Apr 1965, sub: Improvement of Training Readiness, Folder 1001-01 (1965) #5, Box 164, Entry A1-77, RG 319, NACP; Memo,

The second revision of AR 220-1, in 1967, sought to address complaints that the previous versions set an unrealistic standard by requiring that a unit's REDCON be no higher than its lowest-rated indicator. These complaints argued that this "weak link" concept led to units being portrayed as unready when an indicator was C-4, even if the unit could otherwise still deploy and fight. In this revision, DCSOPS moved to an averaging formula for calculating ratings in order to produce a more realistic assessment of a unit's readiness. In presenting this concept to Johnson and Abrams, DCSOPS pointedly refuted the idea that this new concept was a way to inflate ratings and thereby fend off attacks from Congress on the service's management of readiness.

The revision placed additional emphasis on the report's role in resource management while also making REDCON level definitions consistent with those used by the joint reporting system. It also abandoned references to the number of days required to achieve a higher REDCON level. This revision incorporated AR 750-10, Materiel Readiness (Serviceability of Unit Equipment) as an appendix. It provided much more detail on how to determine the status of each readiness indicator. It also reformatted this information; instead of one chart in small type covering all indicators, each of the three resource areas (personnel, training, and logistics) had a separate appendix discussing its indicators. The 1963 version of AR 220-1 had been eight pages long. In four years, the regulation had grown to forty-four pages.

Abrams' 1965 directive to develop better training indicators bore fruit in this revision over CONARC's strong objections. That command believed the new indicators offered no advantages over the existing ones. Furthermore, it argued that maintaining the necessary records for the new ones imposed a significant administrative burden on units. The U.S. Army, Europe, disagreed and recommended the adoption of the training indicators.

The new indicators sought to cover the readiness of individuals, the smallest elements of a unit, and overall unit training. Units now reported on the execution of universal mandatory training such as character guidance, physical fitness testing, and individual weapons

SGS for General Abrams, 12 Jul 1965, sub: Revision of AR 220-1, "Unit Readiness," Folder 322/1 Only, Box 267, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP; *Army Regulation 220-1: Unit Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 28 Jul 1965).

qualification. The proficiency of squads and crews had to be computed. In addition to the previously required performance on the Army Training Test (ATT) for their type of unit, commanders had to include whether it had participated in a field training exercise. The revision also added a new concept: mission training. This indicator measured the percentage of soldiers participating in training that advanced the unit's readiness to perform its operational mission.

The increasing disconnect between the assigned readiness objective and the provided resources proved corrosive to the integrity of the reporting system. Commanders feared that their efficiency reports would suffer because, for reasons outside of their control, they could not achieve their assigned objective. This created a powerful incentive to inflate readiness ratings. During the process of revising AR 220-1 in 1966, U.S. Army, Europe, suggested and DCSOPS accepted the following addition to the regulation:

It is important that unit readiness reports reflect the true condition of a unit. Corrective action should be directed if a unit commander has not complied with applicable regulations and has not made full use of resources available to him. However, if the unit commander has complied with regulations and has exhausted the resources at his disposal and the objective factors on which the readiness report is based indicate that his unit readiness condition (REDCON) is below its assigned readiness capability (REDCAPE), no higher commander in the chain of command will consider this fact as reflecting unfavorably on the unit commander.⁸

The month before the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, the DA Form 2715 highlighted the continuing effects of the war on readiness elsewhere in the Regular Army (*Tables 18-20*). Units remained short in total number of soldiers and junior officers, noncommissioned officers, and many specialties. These shortages, together with continued high personnel turbulence, significantly impeded training readiness and maintenance efforts. Equipment shortages also continued, with more items reported as old or high mileage.⁹

8. SS, ACSFOR to Vice Ch of Staff, 27 Oct 1966, sub: Training Readiness Indicators, Folder 322/Case 1 October-December, Box 431, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP; SS, DCSOPS to Ch of Staff, 9 Dec 1966, sub: Revision of AR 220-1, Unit Readiness, Folder 322/112-118, Box 438, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; *Army Regulation 220-1: Unit Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 20 Feb 1967).

9. Memo, Lt Gen Harry J. Lemley Jr. for Vice Ch of Staff, 2 Mar 1968, sub: Summary Report, Unit Readiness of the Army, Folder 322/18 (Jan-Apr), Box 840, Entry

TABLE 18—DIVISIONS^a IN THE UNITED STATES, READINESS RATINGS AS OF 21 DECEMBER 1967¹⁰

<i>Unit</i>	<i>REDCAT</i>	<i>REDCAPE</i>	<i>REDCON</i>
82d Airborne	C-1	C-1	C-3
5th Infantry	C-2	C-2	C-4
1st Armored	C-2	C-2	C-4
2d Armored	C-2	C-2	C-4

^a The 4th Infantry Division had deployed to Vietnam in 1966; the 101st Airborne Division (-) had deployed there in 1967.

TABLE 19—DIVISIONS IN EUROPE, READINESS RATINGS AS OF 21 DECEMBER 1967¹¹

<i>Unit</i>	<i>REDCAT</i>	<i>REDCAPE</i>	<i>REDCON</i>
3d Armored	C-1	C-2	C-4
4th Armored	C-1	C-2	C-4
3d Infantry	C-1	C-2	C-3
8th Infantry	C-1	C-2	C-3
24th Infantry	C-1	C-2	C-4

TABLE 20—DIVISIONS^a IN KOREA, READINESS RATINGS AS OF 21 DECEMBER 1967¹²

<i>Unit</i>	<i>REDCAT</i>	<i>REDCAPE</i>	<i>REDCON</i>
2d Infantry	C-1	C-3	C-4
7th Infantry	C-1	C-3	C-4

^a The 25th Infantry Division had deployed from Hawaii to Vietnam in 1966.

A1-1689, RG 319, NACP.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

Secretary McNamara's faith that more and better data was the answer to all managerial problems, together with the demands placed on HQDA by the war, led General Johnson to initiate the Program to Improve Management of Army Resources (PRIMAR) in January 1967. The program's purpose was the establishment of an integrated resource management system within two years that would improve the Army Staff's ability to plan, program, and manage the service's resources. After a problem definition phase, twenty-three studies began to examine how to create such a system. For a number of reasons, the program never produced the integrated system Johnson had sought, but the studies did identify many shortcomings with how the staff attempted to accomplish its functions. The study on readiness measurement, PRIMAR Project 1-1, defined readiness as the ability of the Army to deploy and sustain a ready force. The key factors in measuring readiness in this way were units' status, the service's supply and ammunition holdings, and installations' capabilities. The measurements on these factors would be used to build a database, stored on the Army Operations Center's computer system. The database would permit creation of integrated displays providing a mechanism for assessing current readiness, projecting future readiness, and considering the effects on readiness of resource allocation decisions. The displays also would permit the evaluation of force packages for different contingencies. The project recommended that units and major commands continue to use the criteria and reporting formats in AR 220-1 and AR 135-8. In January 1969, the vice chief of staff approved the project's recommendations.¹³

The McNamara management concept affected the joint reporting system as well. In September 1966, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a review of readiness reporting with the aim of establishing a new JCS Combat Readiness Reporting System. The Joint Staff and the services developed criteria for use in the system, designated the Force Status Report (FORSTAT). This system would be a database of all units, active and reserve, to be created by an initial report submission by each unit. The database would then be updated by requiring active units to report whenever there was a change in one of their readiness

13. "After-Action Report of PRIMAR [Program to Improve Management of Army Resources]: A Case Study" (Washington, D.C.: Director of Studies, Office, Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Army, May 1969), Folder HRC 300.8 (Program Management), Historical Resources Div, CMH; "Program to Improve Management of Army Resources: Final Summary Report" (Washington, D.C.: Director of Studies, Office, Asst Vice Ch of Staff, Army, May 1969), Historians files, CMH.

indicators. (These changes would be forwarded to its major command or, if deployed, its service component command, for transfer to punch card format and transmission to Washington via the Automatic Digital Network.)

The services had rejected a joint set of readiness indicators; instead, units reported in FORSTAT using the criteria from their service's readiness reporting system. On the other hand, the Army Staff had argued that battalions organic to divisions, separate maneuver brigades, and regiments should be exempt from FORSTAT on the grounds that their formation headquarters could influence their readiness by reallocating resources within the formation. This capability meant that these battalions' readiness could fluctuate on a daily basis, making the change report of little use at the unified command and JCS levels, but the Joint Staff did not agree. To build the database, active units submitted their initial report by 1 January 1968 and reserve units by 31 August 1968. The FORSTAT went into effect in March 1968.¹⁴

The FORSTAT status change requirement, which for active units meant a daily report, included units in Vietnam even though the Army had exempted its units there from AR 220-1. Headquarters, U.S. Army, Vietnam, requested exemption from this requirement as an unreasonable burden for units in combat. It and U.S. Army, Pacific, also questioned whether the Joint Staff could effectively use the tremendous amount of data produced by the requirement, a question General Johnson seconded. Pacific Command and the Joint Staff at first refused. Continued pressure from HQDA, however, finally brought a compromise in December 1968. Units in a war zone still had to file status reports, but the Joint Staff changed the frequency of reports for all Army units on a unified command troop list from daily to monthly. Furthermore, all Army battalions organic to divisions, separate brigades, and regiments were now exempted from the status change reporting requirement, cutting the number of units reporting under FORSTAT by 55 percent Army-wide. To ease the administrative burden on commanders in Vietnam still required to submit FORSTAT reports, HQDA authorized them to justify ratings for some indicators based on their military judgment instead of statistics. Although

14. JCS 2147/528, 8 Apr 1971, Rpt by the J-3 to the Joint Chs of Staff on JCS Policy for Combat Readiness Reporting, p. 2, Folder 374 (8 Apr 71), Box 13, Entry A1 1-IT, RG 218, NACP; Chg. 4, 27 Nov 1967, to *Army Regulations 525-10, Department of the Army Command and Control Reporting System (DAXREP)* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 21 Feb 1967).

General Johnson believed that OSD's hunger for data had transformed the joint system from its original operational reporting purpose into a resource management tool, he did not think the Army could convince OSD to change back.¹⁵

The continuing difference between the REDCAPE assigned to units and the resources provided to them—as shown in large and persistent gaps they reported between REDCAPE and REDCON—drove the next revision of AR 220–1. Some senior leaders argued for eliminating the REDCAT/REDCAPE concept because for the duration of the war the Army would not receive the resources necessary to align REDCAPE and REDCON. Lack of those resources compromised the usefulness of REDCAPE as a management tool and it only frustrated unit commanders who could never achieve it.

This critique, along with changes in the joint reporting system and increasing demands from the OSD for data on Army readiness prompted the start of another review of AR 220–1 in December 1967.¹⁶ The new version of the regulation in April 1969 eliminated REDCAT and REDCAPE. Authorized level of organization (ALO) replaced the latter, which differed from REDCAPE only in that HQDA now set a unit's ALO. In making this change, HQDA sought to make a more responsive management tool that could better align readiness goals to available resources.

The readiness goal HQDA expected a unit to attain was a REDCON that matched its ALO. This revision, however, did not

15. Ltr, Gen Dwight E. Beach to Gen Harold K. Johnson, 8 Apr 1968, and Ltr, 29 Apr 1968, Johnson to Beach, both in Folder 322/53-60, Box 843, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Asst Deputy Ch of Staff for Mil Opns for Vice Ch of Staff, 26 Dec 1968, sub: Interim Change to Force Status Reporting System, Folder 322/102-104, Box 846, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP.

16. Memo, Under Sec of the Army for Vice Ch of Staff, 23 Feb 1967, sub: Unit Readiness, Folder 322/19 only, Box 610, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP; Ltr, Gen J. K. Woolnough to Gen Ralph E. Haines Jr., 26 Aug 1967, Folder 322/19 only, Box 610, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; Chg. 4, 27 Nov 1967, to *Army Regulations 525–10, Department of the Army Command and Control Reporting System (DAXREP)* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 21 Feb 1967); SS, DCSOPS to Vice Ch of Staff, 8 Dec 1967, sub: Unit Readiness and the Establishment of REDCAPE, Folder 322/Case 19, Box 610, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Director, Force Projection Army (FPA), to Gen Johnson, 13 Dec 1967, sub: Analysis of the Army Readiness System, Folder 322/Case 19, Box 610, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP; Memo, ADofS to Gen Haines, 19 Apr 1968, sub: Field Test of Draft AR 220–1, Unit Readiness, Folder 322/Case 9 April, Box 838, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Under Sec of the Army for Ch of Staff, 6 Dec 1968, sub: Revised Readiness Reporting System, Folder 322/53-60, Box 843, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP.

change the requirement for units assigned a REDCAPE of C-2 or C-3. They still had to calculate personnel readiness status using the full table of organization strength instead of their authorized strength. Three years later, General Bruce Palmer Jr., the vice chief of staff, would justify this practice on the grounds that the most important purpose of AR 220-1 was measurement of unit status against wartime requirements. Given the personnel turbulence in the Army, this procedure could “cause many units to be reported as unready, but if Congress and OSD are not continuously apprised of our degraded situation, relief will never come.”¹⁷

Some in HQDA objected to the revision on the grounds that it did not ease the heavy administrative burden created by the Army and the joint readiness reporting systems on unit commanders. Assistant Vice Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. William E. DePuy defended the revision on the grounds that the Army Staff needed the data provided on DA Form 2715, both for its own uses and to meet the demands for data from the Secretariat and OSD. Furthermore, this revision had been designed to meet the requirements for the PRIMAR integrated readiness displays.¹⁸

Early reports under the new AR 220-1 produced results similar to those under the previous edition (*Tables 21-23*). Equipment on hand had improved, but personnel readiness remained weak for the same reasons: high turnover rates; insufficient captains, majors, and senior noncommissioned officers; shortages in combat arms; and insufficient numbers of some technical specialists. These personnel problems continued to negatively affect training and maintenance.¹⁹

17. *Army Regulations 220-1: Unit Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 28 Apr 1969); Memo, DD, FPA, to Gen Palmer, 24 Dec 1968, sub: Revision of AR 220-1, Unit Readiness, and Memo, Under Sec of the Army for Vice Ch of Staff, 5 Feb 1969, sub: Revision of Unit Readiness Reports, both in Folder 322/Case 20, Box 1031, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Asst Vice Ch of Staff for Asst Ch of Staff for Force Development, 12 Mar 1969, sub: Revision of Readiness Reporting System, Folder 322/Case 20, Box 1031, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; Ltr, Gen Bruce Palmer Jr., to Lt Gen William R. Peers, 5 Feb 1972, Folder 322/1-9, Box 1354, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP.

18. Memo, Asst Vice Ch of Staff for Asst Ch of Staff for Force Development, 12 Mar 1969, sub: Revision of Readiness Reporting System, Folder 322/Case 20, Box 1031, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP.

19. Memo, SGS for General Palmer, 17 Mar 1970, sub: Summary Report, Unit Readiness of the Army, Folder 322/Case 16, Box 1199, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP.

TABLE 21—DIVISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, READINESS RATINGS AS OF 20 DECEMBER 1969²⁰

<i>Unit</i>	<i>ALO</i>	<i>REDCON</i>
82d Airborne	1	C-1
5th Infantry	1	C-2
24th Infantry (-) ^a	1	C-2
1st Armored	2	C-3
2d Armored	1	C-2

^a One brigade stationed in Germany

TABLE 22—DIVISIONS IN EUROPE, READINESS RATINGS AS OF 20 DECEMBER 1969²¹

<i>Unit</i>	<i>ALO</i>	<i>REDCON</i>
3d Armored	2	C-3
4th Armored	2	C-3
3d Infantry	2	C-3
8th Infantry	2	C-3

TABLE 23—DIVISIONS IN KOREA, READINESS RATINGS AS OF 20 DECEMBER 1969²²

<i>Unit</i>	<i>ALO</i>	<i>REDCON</i>
2d Infantry	3	C-3
7th Infantry	3	C-3

In approving the 1969 revision of AR 220-1, Under Secretary David E. McGiffert had directed the Army Staff to study aligning the service's readiness reporting system with the joint readiness reporting system. The study concluded in June 1969 that doing so was both feasible and desirable. Feasible, in that the two systems already used the same

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.



Under Secretary of the Army David E. McGiffert visits Fort Knox, Kentucky, October 1966.

criteria, only small changes in punch cards would be necessary, and it would not increase the administrative burden on units already required to submit FORSTAT reports. Desirable, in that it would provide HQDA more timely data by shifting from a quarterly to a monthly interval for all units, ensure that the Joint Staff and HQDA would have a common set of data on Army readiness, and support the PRIMAR readiness indicator display concept. Major commands would still have to submit quarterly narrative readiness reports to HQDA. Approved in July 1969, the Automated Army Unit Readiness Reporting System (AAURRS) was field-tested with Regular Army units during the final three months of 1969. (It exempted the reserve components as there was no demand for more frequent reporting from them and including them would disrupt implementation of the recently published revision of AR 135-8.)²³

During field-testing, units complained that preparing a complete readiness report was a heavy administrative burden and major commands

23. SS, DCSOPS to Ch of Staff, 6 Jun 1969, sub: Automated Unit Readiness Reporting System, Folder 322/Case 20, Box 1031, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; Memo Dir of Opns, ODCSOPS, for Vice Ch of Staff, 12 Jan 1970, sub: Readiness Staff Visit to Fort Riley, Fort Hood, and Fort Bliss, Folder 209-03-70, Box 2, Entry UDWW 7I, RG 319, NACP; ODCSOPS, "A Study to Determine Army Staff Actions and Responsibilities Necessary for a Time-Phased Implementation of Decentralized Reporting and Processing of Army Unit Readiness Data, Making Optimum Use of Existing or Planned Automated Data Processing Capabilities of the Army in the Field," 1 Feb 1973, incl to SS, DCSOPS to Ch of Staff, 7 Feb 1973, sub: Merger of the Automated Army Unit Readiness Reporting System with the JCS Force Status and Identity Reporting System, Folder 322/6-12, Box 11, Entry UDWW F-2, RG 319, NACP.

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CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In)		AS OF (Report Date)	REPORTS CONTROL SYMBOL (DD-Form 286 (R))																																											
UNIT READINESS REPORT <small>For use of this form, see AR 220-1, the appropriate agency or Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations.</small>		20 June 1969																																												
TO (From: ZIP Code)	FROM (Include ZIP Code)																																													
Commanding General U.S. Army, Alaska ATTN: ADACT-O & R APO 98745	Commanding Officer 331st Inf Bde (M) APO 98731	Commanding Officer 7th Bn (M) 74th Inf APO 98731																																												
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<p>COMMENTS ON PROBLEMS WHICH AFFECTED MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT OR WHICH ARE NOT PROPERLY SHOWN BY REDCON. (Attach continuation sheets, if necessary.)</p> <p>Supplies: Classes I, III, V, and VIII --- no problem areas. Class IX: See Inclosure 1, list of critical shortages of repair parts. List of RICC-1 line items that are short: See Inclosure 2. (* closures are omitted in this example.) The bn is short 70% of its Carriers, Peps, Pt. Amoved following the recent drawdown of equipment by HQ DA. Therefore, I recommend that this unit's Logistics REDCON be revised to C4 under the provisions of paragraph 2-2d, AR 220-1. The overall Unit REDCON C4, reflects this problem.</p>																																														
SAMPLE																																														
DATE		SIGNATURE OF UNIT COMMANDER																																												
20 June 1969		<i>John Doe, LTC, Commanding</i>																																												
SECTION B - HIGHER COMMANDER'S EVALUATION AND COMMENTS																																														
<p>Because of scheduled heavy personnel levies in USARAL during the next two months, this battalion will fall below its authorized strength level (90%). I expect the bn to fall to 70% by the end of the quarter. I have adjusted the REDCON to C4 in Logistics and EOM because of the shortage of Carriers, Peps, Pt.</p>																																														
DATE		SIGNATURE																																												
23 June 1969		<i>Ralph O. Higgins, COL, INF, Commanding</i>																																												
SECTION C - MAJOR COMMANDER'S EVALUATION AND COMMENTS																																														
DATE		SIGNATURE FOR THE COMMANDER																																												
1 July 1969		<i>James O. Jones, CPT, AG, ASST AG</i>																																												

DA FORM 2715

USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM AS AN OBSOLETE, EFFECTIVE 15 JUNE 1969 (When Filled In)

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTAINS A SECRET SYSTEM
 AND/OR CODE

Figure 2-1.

2-6

Example of DA Form 2715 from the 1969 edition of AR 220-1

believed that the existing quarterly schedule more easily identified trends. As a result of the field-testing, HQDA modified the reporting cycle so that once a quarter units submitted a complete DA Form 2715 and the other two months in the quarter they just reported their overall REDCON and only added supporting data if the REDCON was below their ALO. With this change and some modifications to punch card formats, the Secretariat approved fielding of AAURRS in August 1970.²⁴

24. Memo, SGS to Gen Palmer, 25 Jun 1970, sub: Revision of AR 220-1, Unit Readiness and Proposed Chapter 9, AR 525-10, Automated Army Unit Readiness Re-

The classification CONFIDENTIAL is only for illustration. This page is NOT classified. 7th Bn (M) 74th Inf

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

SECTION D - PERSONNEL

STRENGTH SUMMARY

FULL TUE	OFF	NO	ENL	AGGR (0000)	DEPLOYABLE	AGGR (0000)
	37	2	860	00899 (22-23)	a. WITHIN 3 MONTHS OF ETS	0090 (26-49)
AUTHORIZED	35	2	772	00899 (26-28)	b. OVER 3 MONTHS TO ETS	0111 (29-32)
ACCOUNTABLE	25	2	737	00764 (29-33)	c. OVER 6 MONTHS TO ETS (One/two/3 - 4)	0030 (34-37)
OPERATING	23	2	684	00709 (26-40)	d. OVER 6 MONTHS TO ETS (One/two/3 - 4)	0105 (38-41)
PRESENT FOR DUTY	21	2	598	00621	e. OVER 6 MONTHS TO ETS (One/two/3 - 4)	0160 (42-45)
LOSSES FOR QUARTER	7	1	172	00180 (40-43)	f. OTHERS	0219 (46-49)

Card B Blocks Begin.

UNIT IDENTIFICATION CODE	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0
	M	A	S	J	A	A									

LEADERSHIP BALANCE DATA

OFF	24	22	16	27	NCO	28	29
	5	4	9	9	8	8	0

STRENGTH

22	22			
3	79 %	NOB	3	72 %

S A M P L E

SECTION E - TRAINING

REFRESHER TRAINING	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33
	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

UNIT PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE

20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

TECHNICAL PROFICIENCY INSPECTION

20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33
N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N

TRAINING WHO REGISTERED

20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33
D	8												

SECTION F - LOGISTICS

EQUIPMENT DEPLOYABILITY

RED	GREEN	AMBER	RED	RED
33	34	35	36	37
3	5	6	1	4

MISLE SYSTEMS AVAILABILITY

63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82
N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N

95 / 50/11 / 31 / 3

PRESCRIBED LOAD LIT. BALANCE

63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82
1	0	298																	

AUTHORIZED STOCKAGE LIT. BALANCE

63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82
N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N

COMMAND MAIN STATUS

63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82
1	1	Nat	69																

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

RECLASSIFIED AT 1 YEAR INTERVALS UNLESS INDICATED OTHERWISE

★ Figure 2-1—Continued.

Example of DA Form 2715 from the 1969 edition of AR 220-1 (continued)

Although labelled an automated system, AAURRS was fully automated only at the major command echelon. Battalions and separate companies filled out paper DA Form 2715s. Staff transferred the data in these forms to punch cards at the division or installation level. That level, however, did not have computers which could print out the data

porting System (AAURRS), Folder 322/Case 49, Box 1201, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP.

in formats useful for their own management purposes. Additionally, without such computers that level had to forward punch cards to the major command headquarters by mail or courier. There, after being reviewed, a computer capable of transmitting the data via the AUTODIN to HQDA and the Joint Staff read the cards and created printouts useful for analyzing the data.²⁵

As DCSOPS worked on revising AR 220–1, two studies appeared questioning the system’s objectivity. In June 1970, an Army War College study of professionalism in the officer corps found that readiness was one of many areas where a dysfunctional organizational climate encouraged inaccurate reporting. Although there had been indications before the war that the incentives created by the career management system could tempt some officers to rate their unit higher than its actual condition, concern over the veracity of reports increased during the war. The terrific challenges commanders faced in meeting their assigned readiness objectives produced equally terrific temptations. The chief of staff, General William C. Westmoreland, believed that changing the career management system would improve professionalism and thereby encourage accurate reporting, so the service took no specific measures to ensure the integrity of the readiness reporting system at that time.²⁶

Then in October 1970, an OSD study criticized the regulation’s training indicators and commanders’ interpretation of them. Focusing on how the severe personnel problems created by the war affected both individual and collective training, this study concluded that criteria for training indicators did not produce a sufficiently objective evaluation. Rather, they depended too much on the subjective judgment of commanders, who in OSD’s opinion tended to underestimate the effects of personnel problems on training readiness. The study recommended HQDA provide commanders with more objective, quantifiable criteria for training indicators in order to produce more realistic evaluations of their unit’s readiness. Overall, HQDA agreed with the findings but not with the recommendations. It argued that “to require a commander to adhere to strict objective standards may restrict his initiative to train to the maximum possible level with the available resources.” Instead, the revision of AR 220–1 already

25. Ibid.

26. *Study on Military Professionalism* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 30 Jun 1970); William M. Donnelly, “Professionalism and the Officer Personnel Management System,” *Military Review* (May-June 2013): 16–23.



General William C. Westmoreland, far right, in October 1970; fourth from right is General (retired) Harold K. Johnson

underway would direct commanders to consider these personnel issues when developing their training rating.²⁷

The challenges to achieving assigned objectives could create tensions between senior officers and their subordinate commanders over readiness assessment. Maj. Gen. John R. Deane recalled that, while commanding the 82d Airborne Division from 1968 to 1970, a battalion commander's first readiness report put his unit at C-4. Deane, however, believed that the 82d was "as well trained as any unit I've ever seen." Although not directing the colonel to change the rating, Deane cautioned him that this evaluation was "going to affect your efficiency report, because you're saying that the thing is no good and you're going to make it better. Well, you had better make it a hell of a lot better, or you're going to be a total failure as a battalion commander." He believed that the report was a "cover-your-ass operation" designed to gain an outstanding efficiency report when six months later the colonel would rate the battalion's readiness significantly higher. "He was a malcontent—not honest—and didn't have gumption," and

27. Memo, Director of Opns, ODSOCPS for Asst Sec of the Army, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 21 Nov 1970, sub: Interservice Audit of the Deployability and Readiness Posture of Selected Army Units, Folder 322/59-, Box 1201, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP.

Deane was not surprised that the man's brigade commander relieved him a few months later.²⁸

As chief of staff in the 2d Armored Division, Colonel Clay T. Buckingham observed another example of this tension when Westmoreland visited his division. Buckingham's commander, Maj. Gen. Wendell J. Coats, rejected other staffers' advice to ensure impressive performance on the tank gunnery range during the visit. They recommended replacing regular tank crews with veteran sergeants, but Coats believed that Westmoreland needed to see how personnel shortfalls negatively affected armor units. The gunnery of the unit on the range during the visit was "atrocious." In full view of the troops Westmoreland proceeded "to tear the division commander apart." The visit derailed Coats' career. Previously considered a rising star, he retired several years later after only one further assignment as chief of staff for a joint command.²⁹

While working on the revision of AR 220-1, DCSOPS had to incorporate provisions of a revised joint reporting system promulgated by the JCS in April 1971. It tightened the definitions for C-levels to the mission for which a unit had been designed. Although all the unified commands desired readiness reports from the subordinate elements of divisions, separate brigades, and regiments, the Joint Staff did not and so did not override the Army's continued objection to this requirement. The exemption from FORSTAT reports granted these units in 1968 was now made permanent. The revision introduced "readiness rating limitation," based on the Army's ALO concept, for identifying when a service's allocation of resources precluded a unit from achieving a C-1 rating. A method for permitting commanders to provide details on why they did not rate a resource area as C-1 would be developed. Army units would report monthly, but submit change reports only when moving to or from C-3 or C-4.³⁰

28. *An Oral History of General John R. Deane, Jr., USA Retired* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1985), 302-05.

29. Clay T. Buckingham, "Ethics and the Senior Officer: Institutional Tensions," *Parameters* 15 (Autumn 1985): 23-32. Buckingham does not name Coats and Westmoreland in the article; that these were the men involved was ascertained from general officer resumes in the Historical Reference Br, CMH. On Coats' career, see John Dalton Byrne, Wendell J. Coats 1940, accessed 16 Apr 2018, <https://www.westpointaog.org/memorial-article?id=c5a9169d-4531-4c45-967c-c27140bc9c73>.

30. Rpt by the J-3 to the Joint Chs of Staff on JCS Policy for Combat Readiness Reporting, pp. 12-14; Joint Chs of Staff, Memo of Policy No. 172, 20 Apr 1971, sub: Combat Readiness Reporting, Folder 374 (8 APR 71), Box 13, Entry A1-IT, RG 218, NACP.

The revision of AR 220-1 published in September 1971 (but not effective until January 1972) instructed commanders to consider personnel problems in evaluating readiness, but it also removed the training indicators introduced in 1969. The change was in response to complaints from the field that AR 220-1 had become more a resource management tool than a readiness report, with a corresponding increase in the workload of units. This revision took advantage of improved personnel and logistics management systems to eliminate additional data elements as well because these other systems could now provide that information to HQDA. In line with the revised FORSTAT, HQDA gave commanders a set of codes to explain why they rated any of their four resource areas less than C-1. For example, code T11 meant that the training REDCON had been affected by "Insufficient-crews combat-ready." The revision added an appendix with guidance for completing punch cards under AAURRS and FORSTAT. Only the readiness detail card and the remarks card were required for both reports. Major commands would duplicate these cards for transmission to the Joint Staff and the appropriate unified command.³¹

The revision became effective as units and major command headquarters continued to express their dissatisfaction with a system they saw as too complex and difficult to use. In January 1972, Lt. Gen. W. R. Peers wrote General Palmer concerning the issue. Peers, who had been the Chief, Office of Reserve Components and currently was deputy commander of Eighth Army, urged a "drastic overhaul" of the active and reserve components systems. Palmer annotated the letter with "I'm in complete agreement with General Peers. We simply cannot let this 'tail' wag the dog any longer."³² He directed DCSOPS to lead another review of AR 220-1, with input from the

31. *Army Regulations 220-1: Unit Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 15 Sep 1971); ODCSOPS, "A Study to Determine Army Staff Actions and Responsibilities Necessary for a Time-Phased Implementation of Decentralized Reporting and Processing of Army Unit Readiness Data, Making Optimum Use of Existing or Planned Automated Data Processing Capabilities of The Army In The Field," 1 Feb 1973, incl to SS, DCSOPS to Ch of Staff, 7 Feb 1973, sub: Merger of the Automated Army Unit Readiness Reporting System with the JCS Force Status and Identity Reporting System, Folder 322/6-12, Box 11, Entry UDWW F-2, RG 319, NACP.

32. Ltr, Lt Gen W. R. Peers to Gen Bruce Palmer Jr., 6 Jan 1972, Folder 322/1-9, Box 1354, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP. Emphasis in original.

Army Staff and “a worldwide readiness conference” to be held at HQDA in September 1972.³³

A month before Peers’ letter, the GAO had asked for comments on its draft report regarding readiness in CONARC units, which it found were not combat ready because of equipment serviceability. Among the study’s findings was that units reported many items of mission essential equipment as meeting the highest serviceability criteria even though they knew the items were actually unserviceable. They also gamed the system by taking advantage of differences between AR 220–1 and the Army’s maintenance management system manual on defining how equipment systems (such as a vehicle and its radio) should be reported. Headquarters, Department of the Army, did not dispute this finding, but stated that the recent revision of AR 220–1 and a forthcoming revision of the maintenance management manual would help preclude recurrence of the finding, as would instructions to adhere to proper procedures for determining serviceability.³⁴

Commanders portraying their unit’s readiness in overly optimistic terms partly motivated another review of the joint reporting system that began in late 1972. In the Joint Staff there was concern that “a system as cumbersome, costly, and complex” as FORSTAT “does not give us a clear picture of our readiness to cope with a wide variety of contingencies.” The magnitude of the task meant that the Army did not expect completion of the study until sometime in 1974.³⁵

Wartime Reporting Mechanisms

The war, and the readiness crisis it created, prompted HQDA to implement new readiness reporting methods and several new mechanisms for using this data. The Army Build-up Progress Report began in August 1965. An internal HQDA product produced by the Office of the Secretary

33. SS, DCSOPS to Ch of Staff, 17 Feb 1972, sub: Review of Unit Readiness Reporting System and AR 220–1, Folder 322/10-15, Box 1354, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP.

34. Memo, D,PPA to Gen Palmer, 24 Jan 1972, sub: General Accounting Office (GAO) Draft Report: Need for Improvement in the Readiness of Strategic Army Forces, Folder 322/63-, Box 29, Entry UDWW 25-F, RG 319, NACP; Memo, D,PPA to Gen Palmer, 15 Jun 1972, sub: GAO Final Report, dated 8 May 1972, “Need for Improvement in the Readiness of Strategic Army Forces,” Folder 322/36-42, Box 1355, RG 319, NACP.


35. Memo, Director for Opns for Director, Joint Staff, 14 Mar 1973, sub: Readiness Reporting System, Folder 374 (28 AUG 72), Box 17, Entry A1-1BB, RG 218, NACP.

of the General Staff, it brought together the latest data on the active force expansion, including its readiness, for use by action officers and senior leaders. As the war continued, its content and format would be modified to make it more useful. As during the Korean War, the readiness of units deploying to the combat zone received special attention. The Army Staff established an ad hoc committee, chaired by DCSOPS, to uncover units' readiness problems early enough to ensure that the units would ship on schedule and mission ready. The committee was later elevated to a formal status and its responsibilities extended to monitoring the readiness of units returning from Vietnam.³⁶

The deployments to Vietnam intensified the concern of Senator Stennis and other powerful members of Congress about Army readiness. In March 1966, Stennis leaked that CONARC rated two infantry and two armored divisions as not ready for combat, then he charged that this would not have occurred if there had been a reserve components mobilization in 1965. In June 1966, HQDA formed a task group with representatives from both the Army Staff and the Secretariat to coordinate its responses to congressional actions and to serve as its point of contact with OSD in these matters. For the next several years Stennis continued to publicly criticize McNamara and the Army over the erosion of readiness outside of Vietnam.³⁷

36. ODCSOPS Historical Summary Fiscal Year 1966, Historical Resources Div, CMH; Memo, DSGS (CAR) to SGS, 30 Jun 1966, sub: Response to ABPR (Army Buildup Progress Report) Questionnaire, Folder 320.2/92-106, Box 428, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; Memo, DSGS (CAR) to SGS, 6 Jun 1967, sub: Distribution of the Army Buildup Progress Report, Folder 319.1/7-22, Box 593, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; CSM 68-478, 23 Dec 1968, sub: Committee to Monitor Unit Activations/Deployments/Redeployments, Folder 322/1-6, Box 837, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; Memo, DSGS to Asst Ch of Staff for Communications-Electronics, 22 Nov 1972, sub: Termination of the Army Activities Report: SE Asia, Folder 319.1/21-32, Box 1344, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP.

37. Memo, Sec of the Army for Ch of Staff, U.S. Army, 8 Dec 1965, sub: Army Readiness, Folder 322/FW 11-11-65 (Army Readiness) (Part I), Box 63, Entry UDUP 48, RG 335, NACP; SS, DCSOPS for Ch of Staff, 28 Feb 1966, sub: Readiness Questions and Answers, Folder 322/16-22, Box 432, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP; Memo, SGS for Gen Johnson, 28 Apr 1966, sub: Stennis Subcommittee Investigation of Army Readiness-Briefing on Army Buildup Plan, Folder 322/2-8, Box 432, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP; Ch of Staff Memo 66-265, 9 Jun 1966, sub: Congressional Investigations of Army Readiness and Subjects Related Thereto, Folder 322/61-68, Box 435, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP; Benjamin Welles, "Combat Division Held Unprepared," *New York Times*, 30 Mar 1966; Benjamin Welles, "M'Namara Denies Army Weakness," *New York Times*, 31 Mar 1966; Benjamin Welles, "Training Lag Laid to Army Reserve," *New York Times*, 1 May 1966; Memo, Director, Force Planning and Analysis Office (FPAO) for



Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor and Maj. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong, commander of the 1st Division, Army of the Republic of Vietnam, 1968

The readiness problem worsened during 1966 as existing units and those activated for the war deployed. Between December 1965 and January 1967, the number of maneuver battalions in Vietnam increased from twenty-two to sixty. In September 1966, Abrams asked DCSOPS to predict the readiness of divisions and brigades outside Vietnam for June 1967, December 1967, and June 1968. The report, delivered the next month, concluded that if current resource allocation priorities remained in effect, CONARC's five-division force would not be deployable until the last quarter of 1968. Readiness in Europe and Korea would also decline significantly.³⁸

In December 1967 the crisis, particularly in U.S. Army, Europe, brought about a new way to use the data from AR 220-1 reports and other sources flowing into HQDA. Previously, deficiencies identified by the reports received in HQDA in accordance with AR 220-1 had been listed, along with any actions in response, as part of DCSOPS' quarterly readiness progress summary. General Johnson, however, had come to see this method for tracking readiness problems as lacking timeliness and analytical support. Under DCSOPS, the Operational Readiness Monitoring System (ORMONS) would be a rapid and

Gen. Johnson, 15 Feb 1967, sub: Readiness of Army Division, Folder 322/20-26, Box 610, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP; Ch of Staff Memo 67-238, 9 Jun 1967, sub: Congressional Investigations of Army Readiness, Folder 322/86-88, Box 613, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP; "Only 2 of 6 U.S. Divisions Ready for Duty in Crises," *Washington Post*, 6 May 1968.

38. Hermes, *The Buildup*, chapter 13; Memo, Maj Gen F. J. Sackton for Vice Ch of Staff, U.S. Army, 1 Oct 1966, sub: Predicted Effectiveness of Army Divisions and Separate Brigades, Folder 201-45 D/A 1966 #7, Box 196, Entry A1-77, RG 319, NACP.

continuous means for collecting, collating, and analyzing deficiencies, and would monitor the actions taken to improve readiness. The ORMONS would not supersede regular staff actions. Rather, Army Staff agencies would refer to it only those issues that fundamentally threatened the ability of a major command to accomplish its missions. An ORMONS committee drawn from those Army Staff elements most involved in readiness matters would perform this work, whereas the ORMONS steering group of general officers from the same staff agencies would handle problems requiring exceptional management methods. The order of priority of work for ORMONS would be Europe, Korea, and CONARC.³⁹

The increasing use of Regular Army units on civil disturbance operations in the United States prompted HQDA to initiate a status reporting system for this contingency in March 1968. All battalions and separate companies reported on equipment useful for these operations, such as radios, wheeled vehicles, riot-control agent dispersers, protective masks, body armor, and loud speakers. They had to indicate the extent of training for this type of mission and the commander's overall estimate of readiness for these kind of operations. After an initial submission, they would make subsequent reports monthly only if one of the readiness indicators changed.⁴⁰

Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor was very much a hands-on manager and also a key connection between HQDA and the data-hungry OSD. Since the start of the AR 220-1 system, it had been the practice to brief the Secretariat on readiness about sixty days after the end of the reporting quarter. This interval permitted major commands to prepare their summaries and the Army Staff to analyze the quarter's data. Well aware of the effects on readiness created by the July 1965 decision to deploy a field army to Vietnam without a reserve components mobilization, Resor soon had DCSOPS start briefing him on the DA Form 2715s combat arms units submitted directly to HQDA. His concern over the erosion of readiness, and the constant pressure for more details from OSD, led him in early 1967 to request more details and information on what actions were being taken in response to problems identified by these DA Form 2715s. The Army

39. Case 119, Folder 322/111-119, Box 614, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; Memo, DCSOPS for Ch of Staff, 13 Apr 1968, sub: Operational Readiness Monitoring System, Folder 322/34 & 35, Box 842, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP.

40. Chg. 5, 5 Mar 1968, to *Army Regulations 525-10, Department of the Army Command and Control Reporting System (DAXREP)* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 21 Feb 1967).

Staff objected on the grounds that this information was only available from the major command summaries and the Staff's analysis of them. Speeding up the reporting and analysis cycle would impose a heavy burden and create a "crash action" mentality not conducive to effective management. General Johnson agreed and convinced Resor to withdraw the request. Later that year, DCSOPS added Resor's office to the distribution list for the complete quarterly report on readiness, so that he would have easy access to the Army Staff's full analysis. In January 1968, Abrams's successor as vice chief of staff, General Ralph E. Haines Jr., directed the DCSOPS to provide him with the data from the direct-reporting units, as well as copies of the submitted DA Form 2715s. He found that waiting for the full report caused the data to lose its "edge" for him.⁴¹

In June 1968 Resor became concerned that the erosion of readiness in CONARC had left the United States without a credible force for contingencies outside of Vietnam. He therefore directed that its maneuver units submit a monthly report directly to HQDA, using a modified version of DA Form 2715. That way, HQDA could have the timely and detailed data necessary for intensive management of these units' readiness. A year later Resor had this special report requirement extended to the two divisions in Korea and the separate brigades in Alaska and Panama. These reports were in addition to the regular quarterly reports and the requirement (in effect since 1964) for combat arms units to send a copy of their DA Form 2715s directly to DCSOPS within ten days after the quarter ended. In March 1970 General Palmer approved ending the direct dispatch of DA Form 2715s to DCSOPS. Some on the Army Staff objected to Resor's intensive management of resources based on these reports. They argued it diverted attention from the issue of inadequate resources provided to the Army, created a short-lived, improved REDCON given the intense personnel turbulence in the active force, and adversely affected many soldiers transferred at short notice. In May 1970, Resor accepted

41. Memo, SGS for Gen Johnson, 31 Jan 1967, sub: Readiness Briefings for the Secretary of the Army, Folder 322/19 only, Box 610, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP; SS, DCSOP to Ch of Staff, 22 Jun 1967, sub: Distribution of Summary Report, Unit Readiness of the Army to the Secretary of the Army, Folder 322/111-119, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP; Note, Haines for DCSOPS, 12 Jan 1968, attached to Memo, Deputy Ch of Staff for Mil Opns for Vice Ch of Staff, 19 Jan 1968, sub: Readiness Reports of Selected Units, Folder 322/Case 62, Box 844, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP.

DCSOPS's argument that the AAURRS now provided the same data and he canceled these special reports.⁴²

Reserve Components

With CONARC soon to be gutted by the war, in August 1965 McNamara authorized the Army to establish a Strategic Reserve Force (SRF) of three divisions and six separate maneuver brigades from the Guard, and requisite support and service units from both components. These units would receive additional resources in order to raise their readiness for mobilization. McNamara envisioned that over the next several years the program would reduce the time between mobilization and deployment to eight weeks for the divisions and six weeks for the brigades.

To achieve these goals, he authorized full wartime personnel strength for SRF units. Headquarters, Department of the Army, tried to bring their equipment on hand to full wartime strength, but units in Vietnam had first priority and so shortages in many items continued. The Army increased the number of training assemblies, with an emphasis on weekend sessions to maximize unit training, and soldiers in the SRF had first priority for active duty school slots. However, the tremendous burden on the training base created by the active Army's expansion made it difficult for reserve units to obtain slots for active-duty training. Both SRF and other reserve component units soon had serious backlogs of soldiers awaiting school slots and recruits awaiting their initial entry training. Another reason for this backlog was that after July 1965 these units had few difficulties in filling vacancies; many men eligible for the draft instead joined the reserve components to avoid service in Vietnam. These factors left many

42. ODCSOPS Historical Summary fiscal year 1968, Historical Resources Div, CMH; Memo, DCSOPS for SGS, 30 Oct 1968, sub: STRAF Equipment Readiness, Folder 322/Case 13, Box 839, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; Memo, D, FPA, to Gen Palmer, 26 Dec 1968, sub: Special STRAF and REFORGER Readiness Report No. 6, Folder 322/Case 13, Box 839, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; ODCSOPS Annual Historical Summary Fiscal Year 1969, Historical Resources Div, CMH; Memo, Asst Ch of Staff for Force Development to Vice Ch of Staff, 14 Jan 1970, sub: Abuse of Unit Readiness Reporting System, Folder 322/59-, Box 1201, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP; SS, DCSOPS to Ch of Staff, 27 Feb 1970, sub: Termination of the Quarterly Report, Readiness Condition of Selected Units, Folder 209-03-70, Box 2, Entry UDWW 7I, RG 319, NACP; Memo, D, PPA, to Gen Palmer, 11 Apr 1970, sub: Special Unit Readiness Report, Folder 322/Case 9 Apr-Jun, Box 1198, Entry 1689, RG 319, NACP.

at HQDA and within the reserve components doubtful that McNamara's ambitious readiness objectives could be met.⁴³

For the SRF, CONARC established an additional readiness assessment. During annual summer training, each battalion and separate company would undergo a modified version of its ATT. During the summer of 1966, 423 units took their test; 86 percent of them achieved at least the rating of satisfactory, although some units had been allowed to take a modified test because they were short equipment or key specialists. Training tests at this echelon continued for the remainder of the SRF program. However, they consumed too many resources to continue at this scale with reserve component reorganizations, lessened Regular Army support because of the war, and competition for training time from directives on improving readiness for civil disturbance operations. By the summer of 1968, only twelve SRF units took the test and the Chief, Office of Reserve Components (CORC) canceled the testing requirement in January 1969.⁴⁴

Beginning with the first reports submitted in 1964, AR 135-8 had been criticized for being too complex and for setting unrealistic personnel and equipment criteria for reserve units. Early in 1966, CORC field-tested a revision with the divisions and separate brigades of the SRF. Units found it an easier system to use. This revision changed the standard for evaluating personnel from full wartime strength to peacetime authorized strength. It continued to assess training against time required for postmobilization training and equipment against full wartime strength. Keeping the latter standard ensured that all units reported an overall REDCAT of RC-4. This result reinforced dissatisfaction with this standard and led CORC to recommend changing it to measuring against the unit's authorized peacetime equipment strength.⁴⁵

43. This and the preceding paragraph are based on Edward J. Drea, *McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, 1965-1969* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2011), pp. 262-64; CONARC Annual Historical Summary Fiscal Year 1966, pp. 312-31, Historical Resources Div, CMH; DF, CGNB to CORC, 26 Oct 1966, sub: CSM 66-395, Folder 210-22/GEN 66, Box 18, Entry A1-5, RG 168, NACP; Memo, Director FPA for Gen Johnson, 11 Oct 1967, sub: U.S. CONARC Study Regarding Reserve Component Readiness Objectives, Folder 326/25 & 26, Box 628, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP.

44. Memo, Lt Gen C. W. G. Rich for Ch of Staff, U.S. Army, 3 Oct 1966, sub: CONARC Analysis of SRF Unit Progress Reports as of 10 Jul 1966, Folder 326/24-31, Box 445, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP; CONARC Annual Historical Summary Fiscal Year 1968, pp. 192-93, Historical Resources Div, CMH.

45. DF, CORC to CNGB, 20 Sep 1965, sub: Summary Report, Readiness of Reserve Component Units as of 31 Mar 1965, Folder 204-33/ARNG Readiness Report,

Dissatisfaction with AR 135–8 intersected with growing concern within HQDA that McNamara's readiness objectives for the reserve components were unrealistic, both for the SRF and those units not in that force. In May 1966, Under Secretary of the Army McGiffert, ordered the suspension of reserve component readiness reporting as he did not think the effort was worth the data produced. In August, Secretary Resor requested the Army Staff reexamine current reserve component readiness goals as to whether they were attainable. In early September, General Abrams decided to continue the suspension of readiness reporting while the Army Staff worked on this study. After its completion, AR 135–8 would be revised to bring it into alignment with any changes in readiness goals. Revision of the regulation, however, became caught up in the dispute between OSD, which refused to modify McNamara's readiness objectives, and HQDA, which continued to insist these were unrealistic. Only after McNamara had left office in 1968 did OSD accept HQDA's assessment that his readiness objectives were unworkable given the reserve components' inherent characteristics and the resources provided to the Army. The Army disestablished the SRF the next year.⁴⁶

The revision of AR 135–8 sparked a dispute between DCSOPS and CORC over responsibility for reserve readiness reporting. The DCSOPS argued on the grounds of efficiency that it should supervise readiness reporting for all three components, while CORC argued that its responsibility for overseeing all reserve matters included readiness reporting. The DCSOPS was also concerned that the indicators and criteria in a CORC-prepared draft revision of AR 135–8 diverged too far from those in AR 220–1. In January 1968, the chief of staff decided DCSOPS would have primary responsibility for both reporting systems, but that it would

Box 10, Entry A1-5, RG 168, NACP; Memo, SGS for Gen Johnson, 24 May 1966, sub: Readiness Reporting for the Reserve Components, Folder 322/28-May, Box 433, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP.

46. Memo, SGS for Gen Johnson, 24 May 1966, sub: Readiness Reporting for the Reserve Components; Memo, SGS for Gen Abrams, 2 Sep 1966, sub: AR 135–8, Reserve Component Readiness Reporting System, Folder 326/50-56, Box 446, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP; Memo, SGS for Gen. Abrams, 19 Sep 1966, sub: Interpretation of Reserve Readiness, Folder 326/50-56, Box 446, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP; Memo, SGS for Gen Palmer, 30 Jul 1968, sub: Special Inquiry Into the Call to Active Duty, Reception, and Training of Reserve Component Units, Folder 322/61 (Apr-Sept), Box 843, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP; Memo, SGS for Gen Palmer, 2 Dec 1968, sub: Plan for Improving Readiness of Selected Reserve Units, Folder 322/61 only, Box 844, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP.

coordinate with CORC on the reserve one. The DCSOPS then began aligning a new AR 135–8 with revisions it was planning for AR 220–1.⁴⁷

As HQDA worked on its reserve readiness reporting system, OSD extended the joint system to reserve component units. In June 1967, OSD required all units, divisional and nondivisional, down to the company and separate detachment level, to report changes in their operational status. The indicators triggering such a report were assigned strength, percentage of personnel qualified in their specialty, and days needed for postmobilization training. The unit's major command would transfer this data to a punch card and transmit it via AUTODIN within forty-eight hours of receiving it from the unit. The requirement for submitting change reports continued under FORSTAT.⁴⁸

Although Congress had blocked McNamara from merging the two reserve components, he and HQDA remained convinced that both components were larger than either war plans required or budgets could support. In May 1967, Secretary Resor approved massive cuts to guard and reserve force structure in the expectation that the personnel and equipment made redundant could be used to raise the readiness of remaining units. Almost all remaining combat units were in the Guard. Its divisional strength fell from fifteen to eight but its maneuver brigade strength increased from seven to eighteen. Many service and support units were assigned to force packages, which in wartime would support Regular Army corps. All units would now be authorized 93 percent of their wartime personnel strength. This realignment took a year to complete and produced tremendous personnel turbulence in both components. At the same time, units converted to the new G-series tables of organization and equipment, a conversion which had been delayed by the uncertainty created by the struggle between McNamara and Congress over the merger plan.⁴⁹

47. Ch of Staff Memo 68-20, 16 Jan 1968, sub: Reserve Component Unit Readiness, Folder 322/9 only JAN_MAR, Box 838, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP; SS, DCSOPS to Ch of Staff, 15 Dec 1967, sub: Reserve Component Unit Readiness, Folder 322/9 only JAN_MAR, Box 838, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP; SS, DCSOPS to Ch of Staff, 16 Apr 1968, sub: Reserve Component Unit Readiness, Folder 322/9 only April, Box 838, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP.

48. Chg. 2, 9 Jun 1967, to *Army Regulations 525–10, Department of the Army Command and Control Reporting System (DAXREP)* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 21 Feb 1967); Chg. 4, 27 Nov 1967, to *Army Regulations 525–10, Department of the Army Command and Control Reporting System (DAXREP)* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 21 Feb 1967).

49. Crossland and Currie, *Twice the Citizen*, pp. 176–79; Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, pp. 338–41.

Field-tested in April 1968, the new AR 135–8 met with a positive reception from CONARC in general. It warned DCSOPS, however, that the amount of required statistical data created a significant work load “on an already understaffed Reserve Component unit technician structure.”⁵⁰ The field-test reports showed that guard and reserve readiness remained problematic. Of the SRF units reporting, only 18 percent had a REDCON equal to or better than their REDCAPE. Only 16 percent of non-SRF units reporting had a REDCON equal to or better than their REDCAPE. Although 42 percent of nondivisional SRF units met their training REDCAPE, none of the divisions and brigades met theirs. The key factors affecting this indicator were lack of mission essential equipment, requirements for extensive civil disturbance training, and shortages of local training areas large enough to support company-level training. There were serious shortages of qualified officers and noncommissioned officers and almost all units continued to have significant equipment shortages.⁵¹

The same month HQDA field-tested the new AR 135–8 it had to begin a token reserve components mobilization which would send reinforcements to Vietnam and CONARC.⁵² The Army alerted seventy-six guard and reserve units for active duty in May, with the largest units being two guard infantry brigades, totaling about 20,000 troops. An additional 3,600 soldiers from the Individual Ready Reserve would be used as either fillers in the mobilized units or in the replacement stream to Vietnam.⁵³

As during the 1961 mobilization, selection did not benefit from the readiness reporting system. The Office, Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development prepared the required force packages and forwarded them to CORC. That office, in coordination with the Chief, Army Reserve,

50. Ltr, HQ, U.S. Continental Army Cmd to Deputy Ch of Staff for Mil Opns, 7 Aug 1968, sub: Recommended Changes and Comments Concerning the Reserve Components Readiness Field Test, Folder 1001-03/GEN 68, Box 27, Entry A1-5, RG 168, NACP.

51. Ltr, HQ, U.S. Continental Army Cmd to Ch, Ofc of Reserve Components, 6 Aug 1968, sub: Major Command Summary Evaluation of Reserve Component Readiness, Folder 1001-03/GEN 68, Box 27, Entry A1-5, RG 168, NACP.

52. For the contentious and convoluted negotiations among the White House, OSD, the JCS, and Military Assistance Command Vietnam that produced this mobilization, and how they affected HQDA planning for mobilization, see Drea, *McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam*, pp. 181–90, and Colonel John D. Stuckey and Colonel Joseph H. Pistorius, *Mobilization of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve: Historical Perspective and the Vietnam War* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1984), pp. 63–66.

53. Stuckey and Pistorius, *Mobilization of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve*, p. 67.

and the Chief, National Guard Bureau, chose units to fill each package. The suspension of AR 135–8 in 1966 meant HQDA had no current data on units. The insistence of OSD on close-hold planning meant the Army Staff could not contact CONARC for its evaluation of units' readiness. Instead, its principal criteria for selecting units was ensuring a geographic spread across the nation and that each state had sufficient guard forces remaining for civil disturbance operations. The CONARC later commented that these criteria meant that "in many instances weaker units were selected when a more appropriate choice was available."⁵⁴ The mobilization highlighted the same readiness problems in both components as seen in 1961, but in 1968 there was a new friction: many junior soldiers, who had joined the reserve components to avoid service in Vietnam, were apathetic or even hostile about mobilization. This attitude, when coupled with inadequate leadership, created a serious obstacle to effective postmobilization training in some units.⁵⁵

The mobilization's political sensitivity prompted HQDA to pay close attention to progress during postmobilization training. It developed a "Mobilization Progress Report" which used a modified DA Form 2715 and the criteria in AR 220–1. Units initially had to submit reports weekly, then later, bimonthly. Like regular readiness reports, units forwarded it up to the major command headquarters for comments and transmittal to HQDA. This requirement created significant administrative confusion because of the high volume of message traffic it generated and because these units had no experience using AR 220–1.⁵⁶

The Army published the new AR 135–8 in March 1969, and as with AR 220–1, ALO replaced REDCAPE and it added instructions on submitting data into the joint reporting system. Reserve units continued to report on a semiannual cycle and to forward their reports to their major command headquarters for transfer to punch cards. Those headquarters still had to prepare a summary evaluation of their units' readiness. Formations (divisions, separate maneuver brigades, and armored cavalry regiments) now had to provide both their consolidated status and the status of their subordinate units. All units now listed the number of full-time technicians and Regular Army advisers authorized and assigned.

54. Stuckey and Pistorius, *Mobilization of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve*, pp. 63, 70; CONARC Annual Historical Summary, 1 Jul 1967–30 Jun 1968; CONARC Annual Historical Summary Fiscal Year 1968, pp. 196–97.

55. AAR, Ofc, Asst Ch of Staff for Force Development, n.d., sub: "Mobilization of Reserve Forces 1968," ch. 2 and 3, File HRC 326.02/Army Reserve 1968, Historical Resources Div, CMH.

56. "Mobilization of Reserve Forces 1968," pp. 2-23 to 2-25.

The AR 220–1 C-level rating designation replaced the RC-level system. The revision cut the reinforcements indicator, but it added an indicator to track the backlog of recruits awaiting their initial entry training. Also dropped was the deployment objectives concept for measuring training readiness. Instead, combat and support unit commanders had ambiguous instructions to rate their unit based on their “subjective evaluation” that considered “all factors affecting the ability of the unit to perform assigned missions.” Further, commanders were to use a new chart for estimating “the level of training completed by the unit in comparison with the skill level that would be achieved by successful completion of the appropriate ATP [Army Training Program].” Service units’ training readiness was entirely a matter of the commander’s “opinion.” As with regular units, commanders at less than C–1 in training had to estimate the number of weeks needed to reach that level. That figure did not include the time necessary to integrate personnel and equipment fillers received after mobilization. In the logistics area, the revision divided the equipment on hand indicator into two: one for the amount authorized for peacetime training and the other for the unit’s wartime authorization. As with AR 220–1, equipment serviceability was renamed equipment deployability. The revision eliminated the indicators for mobilization preparations.⁵⁷

The first reports under the new AR 135–8, as of 30 April 1969, were so full of errors that DCSOPS threw them out as too unreliable to provide a baseline for the new system. The DCSOPS had anticipated this given the short time between publication and the reporting date, and the lack of experience in preparing these reports as the regulation had been suspended since 1966. With more experience and additional guidance from CONARC, the next set, as of 31 October, DCSOPS judged reliable. Some reserve component commanders, however, viewed the new regulation as cumbersome, requiring an inordinate amount of effort, and providing a predictable result because equipment shortages meant units would always be C–4. Headquarters, Department of the Army, countered that the foregone conclusion would be eliminated as the end of the war freed up more equipment for a force structure made much smaller since the 1967–1968 reorganization. By early 1971, DCSOPS was working on a revision of the new AR 135–8.⁵⁸

57. *Army Regulations 135–8: Reserve Components Unit Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 10 Mar 1969).

58. Memo, D,PPA to Gen Palmer, 11 Mar 1970, sub: Summary and Analysis Report, Reserve Component Readiness, Folder 322/6, Box 1198, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP; Memo, DCSOPS for Ch of Staff, U.S. Army, 21 May 1971, sub: Reserve

The assessment of reserve component readiness assumed a much greater importance in 1970. That year Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird introduced the Total Force concept as part of his efforts to shift the military from a draft-based force to an all-volunteer force and to deal with declining military budgets. The concept required the services to increase the resources supplied to the reserve components. A more robust guard and reserve would then be capable of quickly augmenting the active forces in any contingency. This capability also would allow the United States to maintain a large total force on a smaller budget after the Vietnam War by replacing some active units, which an all-volunteer force would make more expensive to maintain, with cheaper reserve component units.⁵⁹

The presentation of reserve readiness data via the quarterly Force Deployability Memorandum created a serious misunderstanding between HQDA and OSD. The report measured reserve units by postmobilization weeks necessary before deploying. The report calculated this number by adding the standard four weeks scheduled for administrative matters and movement to the number of weeks required for training as estimated by the commander. The text and charts included footnotes indicating that the deployability number did not include the time necessary to bring the unit to its full table of organization and equipment strength because HQDA had no method for estimating it. During the autumn of 1970, it became clear to HQDA that OSD did not understand this caveat and did not consider it in planning the use of reserve units after mobilization. After bringing this to OSD's attention, Secretary Resor directed the Army Staff to develop methods for estimating postmobilization personnel and equipment fill times. An initial estimate in February 1971 showed that between 140 and 180 days after a full national mobilization, the battalions rounding out regular divisions, five guard maneuver brigades, and two of the support force packages could deploy.⁶⁰

Component Unit Readiness Reporting, Folder 322/30-36, Box 28, Entry UDWW 25-F, RG 319, NACP.

59. Richard A. Hunt, *Melvin Laird and the Foundation of the Post-Vietnam Military, 1969–1973* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2015), p. 292.

60. MFR, Lt Col Charles A Gillis, 2 Oct 1970, sub: "SEE ME": Reserve Readiness; Memo, Sec of the Army for Ch of Staff, U.S. Army, 30 Oct 1970, sub: Reserve Component Readiness; and Memo, D,PPA to Gen Palmer, 2 Feb 1971, sub: Quick Fix Reserve Component Fill-Time Estimates, all in Folder 326/23, Box 1213, Entry A1-1689, RG 319, NACP.

Conclusion

By the end of 1972, the war was almost over for the U.S. Army; the last units and advisers would be out of Vietnam by March 1973. The war had been a time of tremendous turmoil for the service. This turmoil had been both tracked by readiness reporting and had affected readiness reporting: four revisions of AR 220-1; the difficulties with AR 135-8; expansion of the joint reporting system; establishment of wartime reporting systems; and changes in how the service presented and used data. Additionally, the 1970 Army War College study had brought into the open concerns over integrity in readiness reporting.

Exiting the war without achieving the objectives for which it had been sent to Vietnam brought a dispirited Army to a difficult place. The war had ended conscription and 1973 would be the first year for an all-volunteer force since 1950. Coming out of the war, all three components had serious weaknesses and the service's standing among the American people had fallen dramatically. At HQDA, attention during 1972 had turned away from the war and back to the problems of defending Western Europe. Rebuilding the Regular Army's readiness, initiating a massive modernization of equipment, and reshaping the reserve components under the Total Force policy all would have to be accomplished during a postwar drawdown featuring steep cuts to the service's budget. Readiness and the methods for measuring it would face a challenging environment.

CHAPTER 4

REBUILDING AND SUSTAINING READINESS, 1973–1991

For nearly a decade after the end of the Vietnam War the Army struggled to rebuild its readiness despite tight budgets, an active force structure too large for its authorized strength, shortfalls in recruiting, a greatly diminished credibility, and signs that General William C. Westmoreland's efforts to revitalize professionalism had failed. With the end of the war the Army again made the defense of Europe its focus for doctrine and materiel. It published a radically revised operations doctrine in 1976 crafted for that focus and championed the acquisition of new equipment best-suited for battles in that theater. Although the retention of Special Forces groups and the establishment of ranger battalions and 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment D provided capabilities for other contingencies, being prepared to win the first battles against the Warsaw Pact countries dominated readiness concerns in this period.

During the early 1980s, large increases in funding permitted the Army to begin fielding the new generation of equipment it had developed during the 1970s. Just as important, these budgets also funded the personnel and training improvements vital to effectively using this equipment and the new AirLand Battle doctrine. The Army began to organize light divisions in response to the need for units which could quickly deploy, particularly to areas outside Europe. This renaissance, along with changes in American culture and a successful operation on Grenada in 1983, did much to improve the Army's image and its credibility with the public. When the Cold War ended seven years later, a field army deployed to the Persian Gulf for a combined arms campaign demonstrated the service's renewal; however, in the process it revealed shortcomings with both the Total Force policy and methods for measuring reserve component readiness.¹

1. Dwight E. Phillips Jr., "Reengineering Institutional Culture and the American Way of War in the Post-Vietnam U.S. Army, 1968–1989" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 2014); Memo, DAS to Gen Rogers, 10 Nov 1976, sub: Institutional Practices and Integrity, Folder Notes by Subject (Folder 3), Box 18, Walter T. Kerwin Papers, AHCC; Memo, Dir of Opns and Readiness to Ch of Staff, 28 Sep 1977, sub: First Thirty Days, Folder 208-01/First Thirty Days, Box 1, Entry UDWW 14L, RG 319, NACP.

Downward Spiral, 1973–1981

In March 1973, the Army completed its withdrawal from Vietnam (Tables 24 and 25).

TABLE 24—DIVISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, READINESS RATINGS
AS OF 20 MARCH 1973²

<i>Unit</i>	<i>ALO</i>	<i>REDCON</i>
1st Cavalry	2	C-2
1st Infantry (-) ^a	1	C-2
4th Infantry	1	C-4
25th Infantry (-) ^b	2	C-4
82d Airborne	1	C-1
101st Airborne (Air Assault) ^c	2	C-4

^a One brigade stationed in Germany

^b Still reorganizing after return from Vietnam—two brigades active, only one required to report readiness

^c Still reorganizing after return from Vietnam—three brigades active, only two required to report readiness

TABLE 25—DIVISIONS OVERSEAS, READINESS RATINGS
AS OF 20 MARCH 1973³

<i>Unit</i>	<i>ALO</i>	<i>REDCON</i>
2d Infantry (Korea)	3	C-3
3d Infantry (Germany)	2	C-3
8th Infantry (Germany)	2	C-4
1st Armored (Germany)	2	C-2
3d Armored (Germany)	2	C-4

The Army published a new version of AR 220-1 in May 1973. General Bruce Palmer Jr. had initiated this edition in December 1971 with his directive to improve the timeliness of data, reduce the workload on units,

2. Memo, DCSOPS for Ch of Staff, U.S. Army, 11 May 1973, sub: Force Deployability, Folder 209-03/Force Deployability Displays, Box 1, Entry UDWW 14-I, RG 319, NACP.

3. *Ibid.*

standardize the automated data processing of reports, and ensure that the Army system was in consonance with the joint system. The Army merged its readiness reporting system into the joint system, a change signified by assigning a Joint Chiefs of Staff reports control symbol to the report prepared by units. The monthly reporting cycle for active units, the C-1 to C-4 rating scale, the readiness condition (REDCON), and authorized level of organization (ALO) did not change. It did reduce the number of data elements in DA Form 2715, but some Army-specific elements that Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), needed remained.

With this revision, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (DCSOPS) rescinded AR 135-8 and implemented its preference for one regulation applicable to all three components. The reserve components continued to report twice a year in the Army system and submit change reports as necessary in the joint system. The readiness indicators and the criteria for rating them were now the same for all three components, although guard and reserve units still reported some unique items (such as number of recruits awaiting initial entry training) for HQDA's resource management purposes.

The channels the reports moved through was a major change. Units continued to prepare paper forms which they sent to their division or installation headquarters. Then headquarters would review the forms and transcribe the data onto punch cards, which it forwarded to its major Army command. This echelon could now no longer review the data and revise REDCONs; its sole function was entering the data into the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) for transmission to the Joint Staff and HQDA. Furthermore, major commands no longer submitted a quarterly narrative evaluation of their units' readiness.⁴

Tracking the progress of rebuilding readiness led the new Forces Command (FORSCOM) to initiate several methods to measure readiness.⁵ During the war, the many obstacles impeding effective training had led CONARC to often waive the requirement that units annually take an Army Training Test (ATT); by 1973, it had issued waivers to 40 percent of its units. General Walter T. Kerwin Jr., FORSCOM's first commander, decided that improved readiness required regular training assessment; by the end of fiscal year 1974, only 8 percent of its units had failed to take

4. SS, DCSOPS to Ch of Staff, 17 Oct 1972, sub: Merger of the Automated Army Unit Readiness Reporting System with the JCS Force Status and Identity Reporting System; *Army Regulations 220-1: Unit Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 20 May 1973).

5. In 1973, the Army divided CONARC's functions between two new organizations: Forces Command and Training and Doctrine Command.

an ATT. The command also dispatched observers from its headquarters to selected units to monitor the conduct of their tests. In August 1973, to better track readiness trends in major combat units, FORSCOM began requiring them to report the readiness status of their battalions, separate companies, and detachments monthly using the criteria and format from AR 220-1.⁶

The emphasis placed on reserve component readiness by the Total Force policy brought increased scrutiny to measuring these units. During the summer of 1974, Regular Army evaluators at annual training prepared a training REDCON as part of their report on units and included their estimate for the number of weeks required to bring the unit to a C-1 rating in training after mobilization. Analysis of these reports by FORSCOM headquarters showed “an unacceptably wide variance of evaluator standards,” a problem FORSCOM addressed with more specific guidance for the following summer. The annual training evaluations also suggested problems with reserve component reporting under AR 220-1. Of the eight guard divisions, five had reported themselves at C-3 overall and three at C-4 before annual training in 1974. Regular Army evaluation teams that summer rated only two divisions at C-3 and the rest at C-4. The same discrepancy occurred among guard and reserve maneuver brigades.⁷

By the third year of the all-volunteer force, personnel problems remained the major impediment to reaching C-1 for Regular Army units (*Tables 26 and 27*). Shortages continued among junior officers and junior noncommissioned officers, and in combat arms specialties and some technical specialties. Force structure changes created excessive personnel turbulence in some units. These problems, as during the war, were the main cause of inadequate training readiness. Although the new generation of equipment was still in development, most units now had a full set of the items fielded since 1960. The serviceability of these items, however, was another matter and investigations into this matter would soon expose serious problems with the integrity of readiness reporting.⁸

6. FORSCOM Annual Historical Review Fiscal Year 1974, pp. 750-54, Historical Resources Div, CMH; *FORSCOM Regulation No. 220-3: Readiness Status of Active Army Units Organic to Larger Units*, 1 Jun 1974, Folder 227/04: Regulations 55-2 through 230-1, Box 3, Entry UDWW 191-19, RG 555, NACP.

7. FORSCOM Annual Historical Review Fiscal Year 1974, pp. 576-79, 603-06. The quote is from page 579.

8. FORSCOM Annual Historical Review Fiscal Year 1976, pp. 497-502, Historical Resources Div, CMH; Memo, Acting Sec of the Army for Sec of Def, 8 Jun 1976,

TABLE 26—REGULAR ARMY DIVISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES,
 READINESS RATINGS AS OF 20 SEPTEMBER 1976⁹

<i>Unit</i>	<i>ALO</i>	<i>REDCON</i>
1st Cavalry ^a	1	C-2
1st Infantry (-) ^{b,c}	1	C-1
4th Infantry ^c	1	C-2
9th Infantry ^c	1	C-2
25th Infantry (-) ^d	1	C-1
82d Airborne	1	C-1
101st Airborne (Air Assault)	1	C-1
2d Armored ^a	1	C-2

^a Round-out Division—three maneuver battalions from reserve components; ratings only for Regular Army elements

^b One brigade of 1st Infantry Division stationed in Germany

^c Round-out Division—one maneuver battalion from reserve components; ratings only for Regular Army elements

^d Round-out Division—one brigade from reserve components; ratings only for Regular Army elements

TABLE 27—REGULAR ARMY DIVISIONS OVERSEAS, READINESS
 RATINGS AS OF 20 MARCH 1976¹⁰

<i>Unit</i>	<i>ALO</i>	<i>REDCON</i>
2d Infantry (Korea)	3	C-2
3d Infantry (Germany)	2	C-2
8th Infantry (Germany)	2	C-2
1st Armored (Germany)	2	C-2
3d Armored (Germany)	2	C-2

sub: European, Pacific and CONUS Based Force Readiness, Folder 381.4, Box 4, Entry UDWW 4-D, RG 335, NACP.

9. FORSCOM Annual Historical Review Fiscal Year 1976, p. 496.

10. Memo, Deputy Asst Sec of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) for Asst Sec of Def (Comptroller), 22 Apr 1976, sub: Force Readiness, Folder 381.4, Box 4, Entry UDWW 4-D, RG 335, NACP.

TABLE 28—NATIONAL GUARD DIVISIONS, READINESS RATINGS AS OF 20 OCTOBER 1975¹¹

<i>Unit</i>	<i>ALO</i>	<i>REDCON</i>
26th Infantry	3	C-3 ^a
28th Infantry	3	C-4
38th Infantry	3	C-3 ^a
42d Infantry	3	C-3 ^a
40th Infantry	3	C-3 ^a
47th Infantry	3	C-3 ^a
49th Armored	3	C-4
50th Armored	3	C-3 ^a

^a Rating subjectively upgraded by division commander

The end of conscription had produced the expected drop in reserve components accessions; six of the eight guard divisions were understrength. Personnel turbulence remained high as few soldiers who had joined during the war stayed on after their service obligation expired. Almost all units had equipment shortages and much of what they did have was old or obsolescent. During annual training in 1975, FORSCOM's evaluators had used the stricter and more uniform criteria, based on AR 220-1, refined over the previous two summers. The year before, 65 percent of all company-sized units had been rated as C-1 or C-2. In 1975, FORSCOM evaluators rated only 33 percent of company-sized units at these levels and they rated all eight divisions as C-4 overall by the end of annual training (*Table 28*). Six of the division commanders, however, exercised their prerogative under AR 220-1 to upgrade their unit to C-3 overall.¹²

The postwar focus on combined arms operations in Europe brought renewed attention to the readiness of nuclear-capable units. The wartime turmoil had produced a significant decline in this area; during fiscal year 1973, 24.2 percent of Continental Army Command (CONARC) units given a technical proficiency inspection (TPI) failed. In 1972, CONARC had recommended replacing the TPI and giving these units a new evaluation that combined the ATT for that unit with the TPI. This method, CONARC argued, would represent a more realistic assessment of the unit, and HQDA approved the proposal during fiscal year 1974. During

11. *Ibid.*

12. FORSCOM Annual Historical Review Fiscal Year 1976, pp. 720-44.

that year, FORSCOM instituted special management actions to improve nuclear readiness and the failure rate for FORSCOM units on the new evaluation dropped to 14.5 percent. Commanders of these units, however, soon recommended termination of the new policy. They complained that the evaluators gave nuclear tasks such intensive consideration that all other aspects of the unit's performance received insufficient attention. The FORSCOM canceled the policy on 30 June 1975; henceforth, the TPI and the ATT would again be administered separately.¹³

In 1977, Training and Doctrine Command proposed that its replacement for the ATTs, the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP), could be paired with the TPI (soon renamed Nuclear Surety Inspection and then Technical Validation Inspection) to provide a single assessment of nuclear units. The ARTEP would evaluate a unit's readiness for all tasks except for those directly related to handling nuclear weapons. Those tasks would be evaluated using the Technical Validation Inspection, done by inspector general teams either from HQDA or the unit's major command headquarters. The inspection would be conducted within ninety days of the unit's ARTEP. In 1978, HQDA approved the concept for field-testing. The Defense Nuclear Agency, however, did not accept this concept as a valid test of a unit's readiness for nuclear-specific tasks, and continued its schedule of inspecting nuclear-capable Army units. Despite that objection, by early 1980 DCSOPS decided that the field-testing had validated the concept and it became the Army's method for certifying noncustodial nuclear-capable units.¹⁴

Indications of problems with the integrity of the readiness reporting system multiplied in the years following the withdrawal from Vietnam. In June 1973 the 101st Airborne Division met its ALO, but only by excluding some on-hand equipment when calculating its REDCON. In his memoir, the division's commander, then-Maj. Gen. John H. Cushman, admitted that he also had gamed the personnel criteria in AR 220-1. The inspector general teams which visited FORSCOM units during 1974 found a widespread pattern of questionable or incorrect interpretations of the criteria in AR 220-1 that resulted in inflated ratings regarding personnel, training, and equipment. The inspector general teams reported the same deficiencies during their 1975 visits. General William E. DePuy, now head

13. FORSCOM Annual Historical Review Fiscal Year 1974, pp. 311-12, 743-44.

14. FORSCOM Annual Historical Review Fiscal Year 1978, pp. 300-07, Historical Resources Div, CMH; Memo, DCSOPS for Ch of Staff, 7 Feb 1980, sub: Training, Evaluation and Certification of Noncustodial Nuclear-Capable Units, Folder 5-7 February 1980, Box 1, Entry UDWW F-19, RG 319, NACP.

of Training and Doctrine Command, thought that readiness reporting had become “the focal point of the question of ethics and honesty.”¹⁵

Soon after taking command of V Corps in 1973, Lt. Gen. William R. Desobry concluded that “it was so obvious to me, it was pitiful, that readiness reports were pencil reports.” To “implement honesty in reporting,” he created special teams to spot-check the actual condition of units: “if a guy was at C-4 and he reported himself C-1 through this pencil business, boy, he was in a hell of a mess. If he reported himself at C-3 and in fact was at C-3 he got a pat on the back and then we went to work to bring him back up to C-2.” Under this approach, the corps’ readiness ratings initially collapsed. “But when we finally got to where we really were, we started climbing and that was painfully slow.” By the time Desobry left V Corps in 1975, “our readiness reports were actually higher than when we were a year and a half before inflating them and they were truthful with some exceptions obviously.”¹⁶

Robert M. Shoemaker, who commanded 1st Cavalry Division as a major general from 1973 to 1975 and then III Corps as a lieutenant general until 1977, “never used readiness reports, ever, in my entire career, as a management tool.” He “always drew a very great distinction between readiness and between scores on readiness reports. . . . No division or corps that I ever commanded was ever reported as a Readiness Condition 1. I would never let anyone be more than a ‘2’ at best, in training. Our training doesn’t begin to approach what it ought to be. How can we possibly call it ‘1’?” Although his units “were probably a great embarrassment to the FORSCOM staff,” his superiors never pressured him to change his approach. But Shoemaker lamented that there was so much pressure within the organizational culture for reporting a high REDCON no matter

15. Backchannel msg, Kerwin to Cushman, 19 Jul 1973, sub: Readiness of 101st Abn Div (Air Mobile), Folder Backchannel Messages Outgoing (Jun-Dec 73), Box 17, Kerwin Papers, AHEC; “Oral History: Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, U.S. Army, Retired,” Volume 4, 20-27-20-29, accessed 16 Apr 2018, <http://www.west-point.org/publications/cushman/4-VolumeFour.pdf>; Memo, DDAS (CAR) to Gen Foster, 12 Jun 1974, sub: Inspector General Vertical Inspections, Folder 333, Box 2, Entry UDWW 22-F, RG 319, NACP; Memo, the inspector general and auditor general to Ch of Staff, 24 Apr 1975, sub: FY 75 Inspection of the United States Army Forces Command by the inspector general and auditor general, Folder 333/A-Z, Box 11, Entry UDWW F-4, RG 319, NACP. DePuy quoted in Memo, Vice Ch of Staff for DCSOPS, 10 Jul 1975, sub: Readiness Reporting, Folder 322/1-13, Box 9, Entry UD06W-5, RG 319, NACP.

16. *Senior Officers Debriefing Program: Lieutenant General William R. Desobry, USA (Ret)* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1977), vol. II, sect. IX, 62-67.

a unit's actual condition. "One of my great frustrations, and I think real failures, was that I was never able to make them fully understand, at any level. When I tried to use these ideas, there was just so much pressure from other sources that I simply was not totally credible."¹⁷

In July 1975, the vice chief of staff, General Walter T. Kerwin Jr., decided that "we must meet this whole question of readiness reporting (its accuracy and its perception) head on and take some very positive action." He rejected the "normal reply" given by the Army Staff to this problem: emphasize the commander's responsibility "to indicate what he thinks the REDCON is as he sees it on the ground." Instead, Kerwin directed DCSOPS "to get a group together to resolve this." In turn, DCSOPS began a two-track effort. The first was to have the Army War College assess the readiness reporting system's validity and reliability in accurately portraying the readiness of units. The study was not to develop a new system, but rather identify areas for improvement of the present system. The second was to revise AR 220-1, incorporating the study's findings and input from the major commands.¹⁸

The War College study, published in June 1976, concluded that readiness reporting had serious flaws compounded by a continuing dysfunctional organizational culture. Overall, the system was in disrepute throughout the Army, with the disfavor intensifying as one moved down the chain of command. (Because guard and reserve units only reported readiness twice a year, the system and its flaws was of less concern in these components.) Only 30 percent of those responding to a survey done for the study agreed with the statement that readiness reports reflected the true readiness condition of their unit. A majority stated that pressure to inflate ratings so as to meet or exceed a unit's ALO was widespread. The survey agreed with the perception reported in the 1970 professionalism study that the career management system encouraged a climate where self-interest—mainly the fear of a career-killing command tenure evaluation—too often prevailed over the professional responsibility to render accurate reports.

17. *Oral History of General Robert M. Shoemaker, USA Retired* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1987), 163–65. See also *Senior Officer Oral History Program: General Edward C. Meyer, U.S. Army, Retired* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1988), 61–62, and Buckingham, "Senior Officer Ethics," 108–09.

18. Memo, Vice Ch of Staff for DCSOPS, 10 Jul 1975, sub: Readiness Reporting; Memo, DCSOPS to Commandant, Army War College, 17 Oct 1975, sub: Study Directive—Validity of Army Unit Readiness Reporting, in Appendix A, *U.S. Army Unit Readiness Reporting: Final Report* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1 Jun 1976).

The study found problems with the readiness system that contributed to inflated ratings. The organization and language of AR 220–1, combined with the requirement to collect many statistics and perform multiple numerical calculations, made it difficult to use. Commanders often exploited the regulation’s complexity to justify reporting a better rating than actual conditions in the unit. Survey respondents singled out the criteria for training readiness as particularly susceptible to such abuse. Respondents also noted that the provision permitting the next-higher headquarters to raise a REDCON based on its analysis and available resources was frequently abused. Since 1967, the regulation had contained language telling commanders that if they properly used the resources HQDA provided and still could not match REDCON to REDCAPE/ALO, this shortfall would not be held against them. The study, however, pointed out that no commander in the existing organizational climate could be sure that this promise would be kept, tempting them to use whatever means available to report a REDCON matching the ALO. The GAO reinforced the study’s findings with investigations of unit readiness in the Seventh Army and in FORSCOM which concluded that questionable or incorrect interpretations of AR 220–1 were widespread and made readiness reporting unreliable.¹⁹

The first response to the War College’s report was a message to major commands from the chief of staff, General Frederick C. Weyand, reiterating that the service “requires frank appraisals at every level and readiness ratings which reflect actual conditions.” His successor later in the year, General Bernard W. Rogers, incorporated the study into an ongoing review of “institutional practices that place undue stress on integrity.”²⁰ Meanwhile, DCSOPS set out to revise AR 220–1. It generally used the study’s recommendations as a guide despite concern that the resulting changes might precipitate a sudden and sharp drop in the REDCON reported by many units, opening the Army to criticism

19. *U.S. Army Unit Readiness Reporting: Final Report; Another Look at the Readiness of Strategic Army Forces* (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1977); Memo, the inspector general and auditor general for Sec of the Army, 20 Jul 1976, sub: U.S. General Accounting Office Exit Report, 4th Infantry Division Mech, Folder 322/Division, Box 10, Entry UD06W-5, RG 319, NACP; Ltr, Asst Sec of the Army (M&RA) for Director, Logistics/Communications Div, GAO, 15 Sep 1976, Folder GAO 381.4, Box 9, Entry UDWW 4-D, RG 335, NACP.

20. Msg, WEYAND SENDS, 21 Jul 1976, sub: Unit Readiness Reporting, Folder Gen Kerwin Messages 1976-1978, Box 13, Kerwin Papers, AHEC; Memo, DAS to General Rogers, 10 Nov 1976, sub: Institutional Practices and Integrity, Folder Notes By Subject (Folder 3), Box 18, Kerwin Papers, AHEC.



Lt. Gen. Robert M. Shoemaker, Fort Polk, Louisiana, 1977

from Congress and the media. In early January 1977, General Rogers approved the draft revision for field-testing.²¹

As DCSOPS worked on revising AR 220-1, in April 1977 it also began developing a new concept, “force readiness.” In a “zero based budgeting environment,” the Army needed a methodology by which it could establish the resources required for the current readiness level, for a minimum readiness level, and for a readiness level that fully supported all the service’s assigned tasks. If force readiness could be quantified, then HQDA could demonstrate to OSD and Congress how the resources provided to the service translated into a specific level of readiness. Army major commands also began working on defining force readiness for their missions by developing systems that could

21. Memo, Dir of Opns and Readiness for Vice Ch of Staff, 3 Nov 1976, sub: Status of New Readiness Reporting System (AR 220-1), Box 12, Kerwin Papers, AHEC; Memo, Dir of Opns and Readiness for Ch of Staff, 7 Dec 1976, sub: Revision of Readiness Reporting Procedures, Folder 322/1-13, Box 9, Entry UD06W-5, RG 319, NACP; Ltr, Gen Frederick J. Kroesen to Gen Bernard W. Rogers, 28 Nov 1977, Folder 322/Unit, Box 1, Entry UD06W-50, RG 319, NACP; Ltr, Gen Bernard W. Rogers to Gen Frederick J. Kroesen, 23 Feb 1978, Folder 322/Unit, Box 1, Entry UD06W-50, RG 319, NACP.

UNIT READINESS REPORT WORKSHEET - SECTION A - CARD TYPE K41

1. Card Sequence Number (entered by HQ transmitting reports on punch cards): 01

2. Classification (C, A, D): C Minimum CONFIDENTIAL (C) when completed.

3. Transaction Code (A, C, D): C

4. Card Type: K41

5. Unit Identification Code: W1A161A1A

6. Report Unit Identification (B or Blank): Blank

7. Training Weeks Required to Fully Trained Status: 01

8. OBTAINING READINESS DATA

9. Overall Chk REDCON (1, 2, 3, 4): 1

10. Reason not O-1 (P,R,N,K,M): Blank

11. Personnel REDCON (1, 2, 3, 4, 5): 1

12. Reason Personnel REDCON not O-1 (See Codes): Blank

13. Equipment on Hand REDCON (1, 2, 3, 4, 5): 1

14. Reason Equipment on Hand not O-1 (See Codes): Blank

15. Equipment Status REDCON (1, 2, 3, 4, 5): 1

16. Reason Equipment Status REDCON not O-1 (See Codes): Blank

17. Training REDCON (1, 2, 3, 4, 5): 1

18. Reason Training REDCON not O-1 (See Codes): Blank

19. Secondary Reason Overall REDCON not O-1 (See Codes). Add # to delete previous entry: Blank

20. Tertiary Reason Overall REDCON not O-1 (See Codes). Add # to delete previous entry: Blank

21. Preferred Overall REDCON (1, 2, 3, 4 or #): 1

22. Projected date of change. (Optional unless blank # of column 1-6): 01 01 75

23. Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) (1, 2, 3, 4): 1

24. Reason for Organization Less Than ALO 1 (P, R, N, K, M, T): Blank

25. Date of Report (YYMMDD): 03 01 75

26. Blank: Blank

27. Originator's DTC. TIO of Command Submitting Reports on punch cards: W1A161A1A

28. Report Type, FS (FORSTAT): S

29. Report Number (to be entered by HQ transmitting reports on punch cards): 01

UNIT READINESS REPORT WORKSHEET A. AS OF DATE: 20 MAR 75 REPORTS CONTROL SYMBOL: JCS 62-214

For use of this form, see AR 220-1; the proponent agency is ODCDPS.

TO: CDR, FT BLAND, ARMO AB&C UN FT BLAND, KS 0000 FROM: CDR, 21 B Co 194 FA FT BLAND, KS 0000

SECTION A - CARD TYPE K

1. Card Sequence Number (entered by HQ transmitting reports on punch cards): 01

2. Classification (C, A, D): C Minimum CONFIDENTIAL (C) when completed.

3. Transaction Code (A, C, D): C

4. Card Type: K

5. Unit Identification Code: W1A161A1A

6. Report Unit Identification (B or Blank): Blank

7. Overall Chk REDCON (1, 2, 3, 4): 1

8. Reason not O-1 (P,R,N,K,M): Blank

9. Personnel REDCON (1, 2, 3, 4, 5): 1

10. Reason Personnel REDCON not O-1 (See Codes): Blank

11. Equipment on Hand REDCON (1, 2, 3, 4, 5): 1

12. Reason Equipment on Hand not O-1 (See Codes): Blank

13. Equipment Status REDCON (1, 2, 3, 4, 5): 1

14. Reason Equipment Status REDCON not O-1 (See Codes): Blank

15. Training REDCON (1, 2, 3, 4, 5): 1

16. Reason Training REDCON not O-1 (See Codes): Blank

17. Secondary Reason Overall REDCON not O-1 (See Codes). Add # to delete previous entry: Blank

18. Tertiary Reason Overall REDCON not O-1 (See Codes). Add # to delete previous entry: Blank

19. Preferred Overall REDCON (1, 2, 3, 4 or #): 1

20. Projected date of change. (Optional unless blank # of column 1-6): 01 01 75

21. Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) (1, 2, 3, 4): 1

22. Reason for Organization Less Than ALO 1 (P, R, N, K, M, T): Blank

23. Date of Report (YYMMDD): 03 01 75

24. Blank: Blank

25. Originator's DTC. TIO of Command Submitting Reports on punch cards: W1A161A1A

26. Report Type, FS (FORSTAT): S

27. Report Number (to be entered by HQ transmitting reports on punch cards): 01

DA FORM 2715 JAN 73 PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE.

Figure 2-1

combine readiness reports from their units with information about the command's installations, facilities, and logistics.²²

A month after HQDA began working on the force readiness concept, it proposed that the JCS develop "total force readiness measurement." The initial work on its own total force concept had convinced the Army that unilateral service assessments of their units were no longer sufficient given that all major operational plans called for units from two or more services. Furthermore, a joint total force assessment would permit the JCS to speak with one voice on readiness in its dealings with the President, the Secretary of Defense, and Congress. The Army proposed each service provide data on the status of their units, which the Joint Staff would then analyze using various computer models to determine readiness capabilities. Constructing such a complex system was a formidable task, so the proposal recommended a phased process of implementation. The proposal met resistance from some in the Joint Staff, who worried that such a system would give a false picture of readiness, and be expensive to implement.²³

This proposal then became caught up in another force readiness initiative. Congressional concern over readiness had been increasing and the fiscal year 1978 Defense Appropriation Authorization Act required the Defense Department to report on materiel readiness in early 1978. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown responded in November 1977 by establishing a Readiness Management Steering Group with a charter beyond the congressional mandate. He directed the group to develop a methodology for measuring force readiness and relating resource inputs to readiness levels. In February 1978,

22. Ch of Staff Memo 77-5-19, 28 Apr 1977, sub: Quantification of Force Readiness, Folder 322/1-, Box 7, Entry UD06W-7, RG 319, NACP; "DCSOPS Presentation to Seventh Worldwide Force Structure and Manpower Management Conf, 13 Oct 1977," Folder 1, Box Collected Works 1977-78, Edward C. Meyer Papers, AHEC; "DCSOPS Presentation to Army Leadership Seminar, 17 Aug 1978," Folder 3, Box Collected Works 1977-78, Meyer Papers, AHEC; FORSCOM Annual Historical Review Fiscal Year 1980, pp. 535-537, Historical Resources Div, CMH; FORSCOM Annual Historical Review Fiscal Year 1981, pp. 541-44, Historical Resources Div, CMH.

23. Memo, Ch of Staff, U.S. Army for JCS, 6 May 1977, sub: Total Force Readiness Measurement, Folder 374 (06 MAY 77), Box 21, Entry A1-1PP, RG 218, NACP; Memo, JF for Admiral Hannifin, 16 Jan 1978, sub: Force Readiness, Folder 374 (2 NOVEMBER 1977), Entry A1-1PP, RG 218, NACP; DF, DAMO (Department of the Army, Military Operations)-OD to SEE DISTRIBUTION, 7 Mar 1978, sub: Total Force Readiness Measurement, Folder 207-01/MAR, Box 1, Entry UDWW A5, RG 319, NACP.



Army Commanders' Conference, 1974: General Frederick C. Weyand, left side front; General Walter T. Kerwin Jr., right side front; General William E. DePuy, left side, third from front; General Bernard W. Rogers, left side, fourth from front

the services' operations deputies supported the concept of an annual report to the secretary of Defense on total force readiness. The services would make a detailed analysis of their forces' readiness to execute unified command operations plans selected by the JCS. The unified commands would contribute their analysis as well. In addition to unit status, these analyses would include logistics, base requirements, and strategic mobility. Shortfalls in any area would be identified and the total dollar costs to remedy them estimated. The Joint Staff would consolidate these analyses into a report which would also include a summary by the JCS of critical readiness shortfalls. In August 1978, the JCS approved the terms of reference for the report, which would be prepared manually until the necessary automatic data processing support could be developed.²⁴

24. Memo, DCSOPS for Asst Sec of the Army (Installations, Logistics and Financial Management), 7 Nov 1977, sub: Readiness Measurement, Reporting, Analysis, and Management, Folder 322/1-, Box 7, Entry UD06W-7, RG 319, NACP; Rpt by the J-3 to the Joint Chs of Staff, 17 Jan 1978, sub: Readiness Measurement, Reporting, Analysis, and Management, Reference: JCS 1968/266-1, Folder 374 (2 NOVEMBER

The Army published the revision of AR 220-1 in June 1978 with a new title, "Unit Status Reporting." Replacing "readiness" with "status" in the title was expected to reduce expectations and pressures placed on commanders. The new title would also align the regulation's name with the joint system's title "Force Status and Identity." "Level of readiness" replaced the term REDCON, although it was still expressed using the same rating scale of one to four. The revision also prohibited the next-higher headquarters from modifying either a unit's reported status or the criteria used to determine its readiness. To get more detail on the situation within divisions, separate brigades, and armored cavalry regiments, unit status reports (USR) completed by their organic battalions and separate companies would be forwarded to the major command level. The responsibility of each echelon, from HQDA to units, was "to achieve maximum readiness with given resources and to accurately assess and report the actual status of units regardless of the resources allocated."²⁵

The admonition not to use the report as an evaluation of commanders was made more explicit. Because unit status is the end product of efforts at all levels of the Army, "attributing readiness conditions solely to the leadership and managerial efforts of reporting unit commanders ignores limitations which exist within the system. The report is designed as a status report and management tool and is not designed to provide an evaluation of commanders."²⁶ The revision included, for the first time since AR 220-1's inception, a reminder to commanders of their professional responsibilities in managing readiness: (1) Maintain the highest level of unit training proficiency and equipment serviceability consistent with resources; (2) Ensure that status report ratings show actual unit conditions; and (3) Redistribute resources to prevent or correct degradation in readiness within the command.

In making changes, DCSOPS tightened criteria for personnel and equipment indicators to prevent the abuses noted by the War College. Previously, commanders could count soldiers undergoing on-the-job training in a military occupational specialty as qualified in that specialty when computing the personnel REDCON. The revision

1977), Entry A1-1PP, RG 218, NACP; Rpt by the J-3 to the Joint Chs of Staff, 14 Aug 1978, sub: Terms of Reference for an Annual Report on the Status of Total Force Readiness, Reference: JCS 2147/607, Folder 374 (06 MAY 77), Box 21, Entry A1-1PP, RG 218, NACP.

25. *Army Regulations 220-1: Unit Status Reporting* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 15 Jun 1978), p. 1-2.

26. *Ibid.*

eliminated this provision. In December 1979, an interim change to AR 220-1 further tightened the personnel criteria by directing units to base personnel calculations only on those individuals assigned who met the criteria for immediate deployment, instead of using the total number of persons assigned.

Earlier versions of AR 220-1 had measured the status of on-hand equipment by whether items met their ready criteria on the “as-of” day for the report. This method had led to a cycle of boom and bust as units mounted unsustainable surges to maximize the number of items that met readiness criteria on that day. The revision adopted the operationally ready rate concept, long used in the logistics system, as a more accurate depiction of equipment serviceability. Another concept introduced was that of pacing items, defined as weapons systems “of such importance that they are subject to continuous monitoring and management at all levels of command.”²⁷ The regulation listed the systems considered to be pacing items and required that the number of items on hand and the operational readiness rate of each item be reported. The 1981 revision of AR 220-1 expanded this concept to include critical equipment other than weapons so that this measure of readiness could be used for service and support units.

In order to quickly reinforce the Seventh Army, the service had established equipment sets in Europe. Units from the United States would travel with just soldiers’ individual equipment and weapons to the sites, draw these sets, and move into battle. To ensure that the sets were ready, this revision now required the U.S. Army Combat Equipment Group, Europe, to submit a quarterly modified USR on each set. This report would consist of a list of equipment on hand, equipment status ratings, and remarks cards outlining equipment shortfalls that degrade the readiness status of a unit set. A copy of the report would go to FORSCOM, as its units would be the ones using the sets.

The one area in which DCSOPS did not use the War College’s recommendations was training. The study had found that the current criteria for training readiness were far too reliant on the subjective judgment of commanders and thus training REDCONS were far too susceptible to being inflated. It therefore recommended that either a fully objective training readiness evaluation system be fielded or else all consideration of training should be removed from readiness reporting. The study also had concluded that peacetime limitations prevented any unit from actually attaining a C-1 rating of “fully trained”—this

27. *Ibid.*, p. A-2.

status could only be reached if the Army gave units special priorities like those given to units alerted for combat deployment. The best a unit could achieve otherwise was C-2, “substantially trained,” and this rating should be set as the highest possible peacetime status for units at ALO 1 or ALO 2. The DCSOPS rejected this concept.²⁸

Another rejected concept came in 1978 from General George S. Blanchard, commander of U.S. Army, Europe. As a way for motivating soldiers to strive for a high level of individual and collective readiness in a peacetime environment, he proposed establishment of an Army Combat Readiness Medal. Eligibility would be limited to officers and enlisted personnel serving at the company echelon whose “sustained professional performance or achievement” had contributed significantly to a unit’s readiness. Criteria for the award would include becoming qualified in the specialty of the position assigned to in the unit, performance on the physical fitness test, qualification on assigned weapons, proficiency in certain common soldier skills, and exceeding the character of service requirements for the Good Conduct Medal. The other major Army commands differed over the desirability of such an award and its criteria, and the Military Personnel Center did not favor it. Given this reception, General Rogers did not approve Blanchard’s proposal.²⁹

Six months after publication of the new AR 220-1, the JCS revised its readiness reporting system. As with the total force readiness annual report, the Army initiated this revision. In a January 1978 memo to the JCS, it made several proposals. There should be standard procedures and criteria for reporting readiness of comparable units across the service. The joint system’s name should be changed from FORSTAT to the Unit Status and Identity Report (UNITREP) because the former was misleading. The FORSTAT system only provided a snapshot of units’ readiness on the as-of date for the report and therefore did not report on all the factors affecting readiness of either an entire service

28. Ltr, 24 Aug 1979, Gen John R. Guthrie to Gen Edward C. Meyer, Folder 12-16 October, Box 6, Entry UDWW F-18, RG 319, NACP; *Army Regulations 220-1: Unit Status Reporting* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1 Jun 1981). There are no documents in surviving HQDA files at the National Archives on why DCSOPS did not use the War College study’s recommendations on training indicators.

29. Ltr, Gen George S. Blanchard to Gen Bernard W. Rogers, 9 Nov 1978; Memo, Cdr U.S. Army Mil Personnel Center for Ch of Staff, Army, 7 May 1979, sub: Proposed Army Combat Readiness Medal; Ltr, Gen Bernard W. Rogers to Gen George S. Blanchard, 29 May 1979, all in Folder 25-29 May 1979, Box 4, Entry UDWW F-18, RG 319, NACP.

or a unified command. Readiness should be measured against wartime requirements, not peacetime authorizations.³⁰

In January 1979, the JCS accepted all these proposals. The revision retained the C-level rating scheme and the four resource areas: personnel, equipment on hand, equipment readiness, and training. In each area, units would measure their status on several indicators against their service's criteria. That measurement would then be applied to a joint scale to determine the C-level for that indicator. The revision added a new readiness level, C-5, for units which were not combat ready because their service had made resource allocation decisions which left the unit incapable of performing its designed wartime mission. (Headquarters, Department of the Army, implemented the C-5 provision by issuing a change to AR 220-1 in December 1979.) Active and reserve units would continue submitting change reports as had been done under FORSTAT. Battalions and companies organic to Army divisions, separate maneuver brigades, and armored cavalry regiments continued to be exempt from the joint system.³¹

The priority in resources given to U.S. Army, Europe, and the changes to AR 220-1 implemented in 1978 did cause readiness ratings for units in the United States to decline. The primary cause of the decline was the Regular Army's increasing recruiting and retention shortfalls interacting with the stricter personnel criteria of the report. The new AR 220-1 did not produce a similar change in reserve components ratings. The reserve components' existing personnel shortfalls continued, as did its continuing difficulties with old and obsolescent equipment. At the end of annual training in 1978, FORSCOM again rated all eight guard divisions as C-4; three of the division commanders subjectively upgraded their unit to C-3 overall on their USR.³²

By December 1979, six of the ten Regular Army divisions in the United States reported their overall rating as C-4, and the others reported as C-3. General Edward C. Meyer, the chief of staff, earlier in the year had begun his campaign to secure more resources for the service by arguing that it was now a "hollow Army." He used these reports within

30. Rpt by the J-3 to the JCS, 20 Oct 1978, sub: Revision of JCS Policy on Combat Readiness Reporting, Reference: JCS 2147/616, Folder 374 (30 JAN 78), Box 25, Entry UD05 D-2, RG 218, NACP.

31. JCS Policy Memo No. 172, 19 Jan 1979, sub: Combat Readiness Reporting, Folder 374 (30 JAN 78), Box 25, Entry UD05 D-2, RG 218, NACP; *Interim Change No. 101, AR 220-1: Unit Status Reporting* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 15 Dec 1979).

32. FORSCOM Annual Historical Review Fiscal Year 1978, pp. 156-59, 435-38, 475-500.

the Pentagon to support his case and, when the reports leaked, with the American people. The readiness of the Army soon became an important issue in the 1980 presidential election.³³

Although recent budgets had protected the modernization programs that promised a dramatic increase in capabilities for the 1980s, there had been insufficient funding for quality personnel and training to fully exploit those capabilities. Publicizing the implications these shortfalls had on current readiness also supported the efforts of Meyer and other officers to complete the transformation of the post-Vietnam Regular Army. Commissioned during the draft-based era, these men had been working to create a force since 1973 whose readiness would be based on motivated, disciplined volunteers formed into cohesive, highly trained units that used advanced technology and sophisticated doctrine to dominate any battlefield. Meyer's campaign achieved its objectives, setting the stage for a readiness renaissance during the following decade.

Readiness Renaissance, 1981–1991

The post-Vietnam War Army completed its transformation into a credible, combat-ready force during these years, culminating with its performance during the Persian Gulf War. However, both the Army and the joint readiness reporting systems did not share in that renewed credibility. During the Reagan administration's first term, some in Congress and the media argued that despite the massive increases in military spending overall, readiness had actually declined since 1980 or the services were ready only for operations of a brief duration. The UNITREP system became part of this controversy as critics argued that by focusing on the current status of units, it did not cover all the components (such as sustainability, force modernization, and force structure) of the nation's military capabilities.

In April 1984, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, concerned the system did not reflect the higher ratings expected from the Reagan administration's greatly increased military budgets, established a Readiness Analysis and Reporting Task Force to review the joint

33. Lenwood Y. Brown, ed., *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1980* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1983), p. 9; Frank L. Jones, *A "Hollow Army" Reappraised: President Carter, Defense Budgets, and the Politics of Military Readiness*, Letort Papers, no. 54 (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012); Phillips, "Reengineering Institutional Culture," pp. 259–72.

system and recommend improvements. Opposition from the Joint Staff and the Department of the Navy to interim recommendations ended the task force's review in early 1985 without any changes being made to the system. Instead, the following year the OSD renamed UNITREP to Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS). It intended the new name to highlight that the system measured the resources and training status of units, not their capability.³⁴

As the readiness renaissance took hold after 1981, senior Army leaders became concerned over critics using USRs to argue the service's readiness was actually not improving. In 1982, General Meyer suggested the USR could not show the great improvement in U.S. Army, Europe's, capabilities—capabilities produced by fielding new equipment such as the M1 tank and the UH-60 helicopter and modernizing other items such as the M60A3 tank and AH-1 helicopter. That same year, DCSOPS and the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency began developing methods to quantify the improved capabilities produced by new equipment. This effort would result in the Measuring Improved Capability of Army Forces report. First calculated in 1984, it would be revised every year for the remainder of the decade. The initial study concluded that the Army's twenty-four regular and guard divisions increased their war-fighting capability by 18 percent from fiscal year 1980 to fiscal year 1984 and by 6 percent in fiscal year 1984 alone.³⁵

By early 1984, General John A. Wickham Jr., Meyer's successor as chief of staff, feared these criticisms of Army equipment, personnel, and

34. John C. F. Tillson, Robert J. Atwell, John R. Brinkerhoff, William R. Burns Jr., Michael Burski, Jasen Castillo, Matthew Diascro, Robert Fabrie, Waldo D. Freeman, Mark R. Lewis, Charles Lyman, and Lawrence Morton, *Independent Review of DoD's Readiness Reporting System* (Alexandria, Va.: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2000), pp. G-33 to G-38; *The Unit Status And Identity Report (UNITREP) System—What It Does And Does Not Measure* (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, Mar 1984); Robert S. Greenberger, "Combat Readiness Has Declined Sharply In Reagan's Term, Pentagon Report Says," *Wall Street Journal*, 6 Mar 1984; Fred Hiatt, "Combat-Readiness Defended," *Washington Post*, 7 Mar 1984; Fred Hiatt, "The Pentagon Defends Reagan Arms Buildup," *Washington Post*, 16 May 1984; Richard Halloran, "Combat Readiness: Evidence of Deficiencies Growing," *New York Times*, 25 Jul 1984; Richard Halloran, "Combat Readiness Disputed in Memo," *New York Times*, 2 Aug 1984.

35. Memo, DCSOPS to Sec of the Army, 15 Jul 1982, sub: Improved Capabilities of Forces in Europe, Folder 14-19 July 1982, Box 4, Entry UD06W-19, RG 319, NACP; Dwight D. Oland, *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1984* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1995), p. 58; Vincent H. Demma, *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1989* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), p. 5.

training readiness would damage the service's credibility and undermine soldiers' morale. That March, he directed the leaders of the Army's major commands, "to seize every opportunity" for refuting these criticisms and spreading the message that the days of a "hollow Army" were over. Wickham considered publishing a white paper to highlight how much readiness had improved since 1980, but eventually decided that would be inappropriate. Instead, he published a pamphlet for internal Army distribution under his signature.³⁶

In the pamphlet, Wickham told soldiers that it "is paradoxical that unit status ratings do not fully reflect the many improvements in Army readiness." The reason for this paradox was that the USR is a "management tool" that provides "a snapshot of a unit's status at a specific time." For example, strict on-hand equipment criteria in AR 220-1 and fielding of new equipment could interact in ways that forced units to report being unready for combat. Changes in authorization documents preceded equipment deliveries in units scheduled for modernization. Units then had to report a C-4 rating for equipment, even though they actually still possessed their full authorization of older equipment. Additionally, units received major-end items, such as M1 tanks, before all their supporting items, such as new fuel tankers, could be produced. Furthermore, DA Form 2715 could not fully depict how new equipment, higher quality personnel, and better training methods combined to improve unit capabilities. Therefore, additional analyses were necessary to provide a complete portrayal of the Army's force readiness.³⁷

The force readiness concept was now the service's primary way of discussing and presenting readiness. A 1984 pamphlet from DCSOPS, *Managing Force Readiness*, defined the term as

36. Ch of Public Affairs for Ch of Staff, 21 Mar 1984, sub: Army Readiness Message, Folder 21&22 MAR 84, Box 2, Entry UD06W-30 RG 319, NACP; Memo, DCSOPS for Ch of Staff, 20 Mar 1984, sub: White Paper—Total Army Readiness, Folder 19&20 MAR 84, Box 2, Entry UD06W-30, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Acting DCSOPS for Ch of Staff, 9 May 1984, sub: Informational Booklet—Total Army Readiness, Folder 17-19 MAY 84, Box 3, Entry UD06W-30, RG 319, NACP.

37. Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, *Total Army Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1984), pp. 16–18. For similar arguments, see Memo, Director of Opns, Readiness and Mobilization for Sec of the Army, 24 Apr 1984, sub: The Readiness Standards the Army Employs, Folder 24&25 Apr 84, Box 2, Entry UD06W-30, RG 319, NACP, and Memo, Ch, Army Studies Gp for Ch of Staff, Army, 27 Mar 1985, sub: Readiness, Folder Readiness 85, Box 16, Carl E. Vuono Papers, AHFC.



General Edward C. Meyer visits the 101st Airborne Division, 1982.

the readiness of the Army, within the established force structure, as measured by its ability to station, command/control, man, equip, replenish, modernize, and train its forces in peacetime, while concurrently planning to call-up, mobilize, prepare, deploy, employ, and sustain them in war, to accomplish assigned missions.³⁸

Because force readiness was so dynamic and so many tangible and intangible factors affected it, the Army had yet to develop one single system to measure it. Instead, it compiled a number of indicators to analyze force readiness: the USR; the Measuring Improved Capability of Army Forces report; situation reports from unified commands; recurring DCSOPS operational readiness assessments; and the Army Logistics Assessment. The Army considered these indicators within the context of the Joint Strategic Planning Document, the Total Army Analysis program, and programming and budgeting processes. Headquarters, Department

38. *Managing Force Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, 5 Oct 1984), p. 2.

of the Army, was also working on several new tools to further improve force readiness measurement.³⁹

This controversy over readiness culminated for General Wickham as it had for Secretary Weinberger with a review of the readiness reporting system. There had been a minor revision of AR 220–1 in 1981, but at the October 1983 Army commanders' conference the consensus was the USR provided neither a reliable measure of readiness nor an effective management tool. Wickham directed DCSOPS to revise AR 220–1. The objectives for the new version were to make it more reflective of a unit's status; make the regulation easier to use; and develop greater automation of the process to improve the analysis of the collected data.⁴⁰

Published in September 1986, the revision's major changes addressed the distortions in USRs created by fielding new equipment. The revision expanded the use of the C–5 rating. It also modified procedures for calculating on-hand equipment ratings. The revision changed the method for determining the overall rating of divisions, separate maneuver brigades, armored cavalry regiments, and special forces groups. Instead of taking the lowest rating of its organic units in a resource area, these formations would now calculate the average C-rating of all its units in each area and use the result as the formation's C-rating for the area.

Regular Army divisions with a reserve component round-out brigade would include an assessment of the brigade in the remarks section of the DA Form 2715. The mission accomplishment estimate required of all units rated as C–4 or C–5 now included guidance so that commanders could provide a more definitive estimate of their unit's ability to perform its wartime mission. Additionally, the revision outlined how commanders of a C–4 unit could use the estimate as justification for subjectively upgrading the unit's overall rating. How many mission-essential tasks a unit could perform in full and how many it could perform in part now measured its training readiness. The Army completed the revision before UNITREP became SORTS, so a 1988 update of AR 220–1 incorporated the SORTS terminology.⁴¹

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 2–16.

40. *Army Regulation 220–1: Unit Status Reporting* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1 Jun 1981); “Wrap Up: Army Commanders' Conference, October 1983,” Folder Total Army Readiness/1983 Commanders' Conference Report, Box 70, ODCSOPS Collection, AHEC; “Total Army Readiness: Past . . . Present . . . Future—DCSOPS Readiness Presentation at 1984 Summer Commanders' Conference, 21 August 1984,” Box 70, ODCSOPS Collection, AHEC.

41. *Army Regulation 220–1: Unit Status Reporting* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 16 Sep 1986); *Army Regulation 220–1: Unit Status Reporting* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 30 Aug 1988).

Concern over the integrity of the readiness reporting system receded during the flush times of the 1980s as the Army completed its post-Vietnam rebuilding. Division commanders during this period reported few problems with the integrity of the system. The 1986 and 1988 revisions of AR 220-1 did not address inflated ratings. The revisions (as had the 1981 version) kept, in slightly rewritten form, the admonition introduced in 1978 that the USR was not designed to evaluate commanders.⁴² Surveys conducted for the Professional Development of Officers Study in 1984 suggested this admonition was still necessary. Sixty-seven percent of company and field grade officers agreed with the statement: “The officer corps today is focused toward personal gain as opposed to selflessness.” Among the same group, 64.3 percent agreed with the statement: “The promotion system does not reward those officers who have the seasoning and potential to be the best wartime leaders.” And 48.4 percent of these officers agreed that: “The bold, original, creative officer cannot survive in today’s Army.”⁴³

Since the first version of AR 220-1 in 1963, the training rating had always been the most subjective of the four resource areas. Despite the vast improvements in personnel, equipment, and doctrine since 1981, the performance of many units during their rotation at a combat training center fell short of expectations set by their USR training C-level or their home station training evaluation. A GAO investigation of the phenomena in 1989-1990 found that, for Regular Army units, there was a wide variation in the rigor of training and compliance with Army training doctrine and policies. Personnel turbulence in units and, on some posts, limited maneuver space affected home station training. Investigators found at several posts that evaluators’ desire not to damage a commander’s career by highlighting significant weaknesses influenced their assessments; these were often discussed informally rather than being made part of the formal report. The GAO also concluded the criteria in AR 220-1 used

42. Division Command Lessons Learned Program, *Experiences in Division Command* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1985); Division Command Lessons Learned Program, *Experiences in Division Command* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1987); Division Command Lessons Learned Program, *Experiences in Division Command* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1988); Division Command Lessons Learned Program, *Experiences in Division Command* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1990).

43. *Professional Development of Officers Study Final Report, Volume VI: Survey* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Office Chief of Staff, February 1985), JJ-2-A-27. Among general officers, agreement with these three statements was 33.3, 28.7, and 24.1 percent: pp. JJ-5-A-5 and JJ-5-A-6.



General John A. Wickham visits the 25th Infantry Division, 1986.

to determine proficiency in mission essential tasks were too general to ensure consistent assessments among units.⁴⁴

As the GAO worked on this investigation, the Army's inspector general completed a special inspection of the readiness reporting system in 1989. The inspection concluded that the system was "not broken, but needs improvements." One problem singled out was the complexity of AR 220-1. General Carl E. Vuono, the chief of staff, directed DCSOPS to begin revising the regulation in line with the inspection's recommendations. The DCSOPS expected to publish the revision in 1991, but the Persian Gulf War would delay that until the following year.⁴⁵

The Total Force policy instituted near the end of the Vietnam War ensured that reserve components' readiness, and the methods to

44. *Army Training: Evaluations of Units' Proficiency Are Not Always Reliable* (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, Feb 1991).

45. MFR, Lt. Col. Dorene J. Steklasa, 27 Jun 1989, sub: Readiness Reporting Systems Special Inspection, Folder General Office Files June 89 (3 of 3), Box 89-10, Vuono Papers, AHEC; FORSCOM Annual Historical Review Fiscal Year 1990, p. V-88, Historical Resources Div, CMH.

evaluate it, would attract considerable attention. For the first ten years after the war, these components faced the same personnel and funding difficulties as the Regular Army, as well as their long-standing problem of their equipment being one or two generations behind the active force. In accordance with the Total Force policy, both the National Guard and the Army Reserve received a significant share of the budget increases provided to the Army by the Reagan administration. The readiness of these units to deploy soon after mobilization, however, remained questionable. This doubt was most troublesome in regards to divisions and maneuver brigades, especially the seven brigades assigned as the round-out brigade in a Regular Army division.⁴⁶

The 1989–1990 GAO investigation of training evaluation included National Guard units' annual training periods. It found units often conducted training under unrealistic conditions and did not focus on mission essential tasks. The GAO concluded that the program to evaluate units during annual training with Regular Army personnel was deeply flawed. These teams were too small to thoroughly evaluate a unit's performance and some personnel did not have experience with the type of unit they were evaluating. Teams only had a few days to conduct their assessment and prepare a report. Oversight of the program by higher commands was inadequate. These findings led the GAO to conclude that these evaluations were not reliable.⁴⁷

Another factor not mentioned by the GAO was institutional pressure to demonstrate the Total Force policy was a success. Lt. Col. L. D. Holder Jr., while commanding a Regular Army cavalry squadron, had a counterpart guard squadron he evaluated during its summer training. He found that "almost every other Active Component Commander was going along with the proactive of rating their counterparts 'combat ready.'" Holder refused to go along. He evaluated the squadron as

46. *Improving the Army Reserves* (Washington, D.C.: The Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office, Nov 1985); Larry Carney, "Reserve Not Ready to Fight, General Says," *Army Times*, 29 Sep 1986; Rick Maze, "Growing Reliance on Reserve Raises Concerns," *Army Times*, 13 Apr 1987; Rick Maze, "Reserve Falling Short in Training, Study Says," *Army Times*, 21 Mar 1988; John Burlage, "Probers Hit 'Readiness Deficiencies' in Reserve Forces," *Army Times*, 6 Mar 1989; *Army Training: Management Initiatives Needed to Enhance Reservists' Training* (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, Jun 1989); William Robbins, "As Reliance on National Guard Grows, So Do Questions About Readiness," *New York Times*, 10 Sep 1989.

47. *Army Training: Evaluations of Units' Proficiency Are Not Always Reliable.*

C-3, upsetting the state's senior guard officers and embarrassing his counterpart squadron commander.⁴⁸

The experience of mobilizing the reserve components during the Persian Gulf War revealed that Colonel Holder's perception and the GAO's critique were correct. Mobilization also revealed problems with USRs for these units, especially guard ones. Forces Command found "a significant lack of consistency between premobilization and post-mobilization unit status reports." For the Persian Gulf War, the Army mobilized 60,427 soldiers from the National Guard and 79,118 soldiers from the Army Reserve. As in previous mobilizations, the Army used readiness reports to select which units to mobilize. Almost all mobilized units were support or service types. The Total Force policy had purchased a sixteen division Regular Army by moving most of these type units into the reserve components. Without their mobilization, the Third Army would never have had the infrastructure to support the two-corps Army force, as well as the Marine and coalition units deployed during the war. By February 1991, guard and reserve units comprised over 70 percent of the theater's logistical system. Unlike previous mobilizations since 1945, the difference between pre- and postmobilization USRs did not generally prevent these units from deploying in a reasonable period. They did not need much time for integrating personnel and equipment fillers, their peacetime training had been more effective than what units could conduct before the 1980s, and their mission essential tasks were less complex than those required of maneuver units.⁴⁹

The experience of the few maneuver units mobilized, however, was much different. Two regular divisions deployed during August–September 1990 without their guard round-out brigades, instead taking two regular brigades. The Army ordered these two round-out brigades, along with a third, into federal service in November, beginning a postmobilization training period which would generate much bitterness toward the Regular Army among guard personnel.⁵⁰ Upon their

48. *An Oral History of LTG Leonard Donald Holder, Jr., USA Retired* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 2015), pp. 56–57.

49. FORSCOM Annual Historical Review Fiscal Year 1991, p. VII-16, Historical Resources Div, CMH; John Sloan Brown, *Kevlar Legions: The Transformation of the U.S. Army, 1989–2005* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2011), p. 64; Brig Gen Robert H. Scales Jr., *Certain Victory: The United States Army in the Gulf War* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1993), pp. 378–79; Michael D. Doubler, *I Am the Guard: A History of the Army National Guard, 1636–2000* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2001), pp. 305–12, 317–26.

50. Doubler, *I Am the Guard*, pp. 312–317, 322, 339.



48th Infantry Brigade, Georgia Army National Guard, during annual training at Fort Stewart, Georgia, 1982

mobilization, General Vuono directed the inspector general to send teams to each brigade. The teams were to assess the efficiency of the processes for preparing these units to deploy.

All the teams concluded that expectations of readiness at mobilization for these units were too high because of inaccurate readiness reporting. The format of the report on annual training lacked sufficient specificity and thus did not provide a detailed examination of a unit's status. Furthermore, the teams seconded the GAO's critique of how Regular Army personnel conducted these evaluations. The teams added that postmobilization training highlighted an important deficiency in the program in that it did not identify the large number of leaders, officer and noncommissioned, who were not properly prepared for their duties. The inspectors concluded that the USR also did not provide an accurate assessment of these units' readiness. Few problems had been reported in personnel indicators, but mobilization revealed hundreds of soldiers who were nondeployable or not qualified in their specialty. All three brigades had serious shortages in communications and chemical defense equipment, items not part of their logistics indicators on the USR.⁵¹

51. Bfg, Department of the Army Inspector General, 2 May 1991, sub: Special Assessment of National Guard Brigades' Mobilization and Deployment, Folder Special Assessment of National Guard Brigades' Mobilization and Deployment, Box 91-17, Vuono Papers, AHEC; MFR, Lt Col F. David Coleman, 3 May 1991, sub: Special Assessment of

Conclusion

Although the round-out brigades' mobilization would sour relations between the Regular Army and the National Guard well into the 1990s, the Persian Gulf War demonstrated that all three components had achieved levels of peacetime readiness unprecedented in the Army's history. Questions remained, however, about the effectiveness of the service's system for measuring that readiness, particularly in areas such as training and leadership—areas that had proven resistant to quantification. The urgency of resolving these questions would increase during the next decade as the Army grappled with the problems of adjusting to a post-Cold War environment.

National Guard Brigades' Mobilization and Deployment Bfg-2 May 1991, Folder MFR Special Assessment of National Guard Brigades' Mobilization and Deployment-2 May 91, Box 91-1, Vuono Papers, AHEC; Memo, the inspector general for Ch of Staff, Army, 14 Jun 1991, sub: Special Assessment of the Mobilization of National Guard Combat Brigades, Folder 325.42, Box 23, Gulf War Collection, Historical Resources Div, CMH.

CHAPTER 5

READINESS IN A POST-COLD WAR WORLD, 1992-2003

An era of massive change for the Army commenced with the end of the Cold War and the first Iraq War. The size of all three components and the civilian workforce sharply decreased, as did the budget. The end of the Cold War ended the service's primary mission since 1951: the defense of Western Europe. In response, the Army sought improvement in its capabilities to project power from the United States. This effort at transforming the force ran concurrently with efforts to harness the possibilities of advances in computer technologies; advances that led some to argue that land power was of declining utility in national security. Between the first and second wars with Iraq, the Army did not fight a combined arms battle; rather its units deployed on a variety of missions: humanitarian, stabilization, sanctions enforcement, counterterrorism, and others. The largest missions occurred in Southwest Asia, the Caribbean, the Balkans, Somalia, and Afghanistan. The operational tempo generated by these missions led the service to increasingly call on reserve components and hire contractors to relieve the strain on the Regular Army.¹

Reduced force structure and budgets, major technological developments, increased operational tempo, and preparations for a possible war against a near-peer power during this period produced a heightened concern about readiness and the methods used to measure it. This concern manifested itself in a number of ways, both within the Army and with actions of others, especially the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Congress. Readiness issues once again became entangled in the contests between political parties and the executive and legislative branches. The urge to improve readiness measurement stimulated efforts to field measurement beyond individual units: their higher headquarters, joint operational headquarters, institutional organizations, and eventually formal, quantifiable assessment of the entire Army and the entire Department of Defense.

1. Brown, *Kevlar Legions*; Frank N. Schubert, *Other than War: The American Military Experience and Operations in the Post-Cold War Decade* (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, 2013).

The Erosion of Readiness

Two years after the end of the Persian Gulf War and with the post-Cold War reductions well underway, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), evaluated the service as still “ready to project into a crisis and achieve a decisive victory.” All Regular Army divisions were combat ready, reporting as C-1, C-2, or C-3. For the total force, 86 percent of the regular units, 85 percent of guard units, and 70 percent of reserve units reported as C-1, C-2, or C-3. Looking ahead, however, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (DCSOPS) warned that the personnel turbulence created during the drawdown, the smaller force structure, and recruiting and retention shortfalls could negatively affect readiness. Unfunded operations other than war already affected readiness. To pay for them, major commands had to divert funds from unit training and maintenance activities.²

In March 1994, laying out his priorities, Chief of Staff, Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan, stated that readiness was “third among equals,” but added that, “We will not be a ‘C1 Army’ (we never were) but we must be ‘ready enough.’”³ Later that year, the Army Research Institute’s annual assessment of the service found that for the last two years there had been a downtrend among leaders in all three components who said that their soldiers and their units were ready now to accomplish their wartime missions. At the same time many leaders said that their units were not ready for immediate deployment to operations other than war.⁴ Declining budgets were insufficient to keep the entire Regular Army force structure ready for immediate deployment. Forces Command (FORSCOM) instituted tiered readiness, organizing its units into a “Crisis Response Force” with the highest authorized level of organization (ALO) and an “Early Reinforcing Force” with lower ALO. The drain on readiness created by contingency operations near the close of 1994 left three regular divisions in the latter force unable to meet their ALO, a development

2. Point Paper, DAMOR-ODR, 10 Jun 1993, sub: Forces Ready to Fight, Folder OSD BUR SECDEF OVERVIEW-VCSA COPY (12 JUN 93), Box 17, Dennis J. Reimer Papers, AHEC.

3. Msg, 151335Z MAR 94, Sullivan for Gen Joulwan, et al., sub: Winter Senior Commanders’ Conference, Folder Messages 1994, Box 46, Gordon R. Sullivan Papers, AHEC.

4. U.S. Army Research Institute, “Overview of Army Assessment 1994 for GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff, Army, 1 Aug 1994,” slides 11–20, 26–28, 31–32, 65–66, 90–93, Folders Army Assessment 1994 (1 of 3) and Army Assessment 1994 (2 of 3), Box 72, Sullivan Papers, AHEC.

that Republican members of Congress quickly used to criticize President William J. Clinton's administration.⁵

General Dennis J. Reimer, FORSCOM's commander, recalled: "What I think was good about that is the system was such that the division commanders felt like they could make that call and do it honestly, and there was not a lot of undue pressure on them to report C2 when they were not C2."⁶ These division commanders, however, had made their reports before an important change to AR 220-1. The 1993 edition of the regulation continued the admonition inserted in 1978 that attributing a unit's readiness solely to the efforts of its commander "may disregard limitations, beyond unit influence, that exist within the system." The unit status report (USR) "is intended to serve as an operations and management tool; it is not designed to evaluate commanders. Its full purpose can only be realized when the status of a unit is accurately determined and reported." The next edition of AR 220-1, published in 1997, deleted these statements.⁷


By early 1997, concern over Army readiness had escalated. Sullivan's successor, General Reimer, sent memoranda to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) chairman and to the service's senior officers arguing that these concerns had been overstated. He discussed the various impediments to sustaining a high level of readiness, but thought these were not any greater than in the past and that talk of a return to the "hollow Army" of the 1970s was unfounded. Later that year, the annual assessment of the service by the Army Research Institute found that the percent of leaders in all components who said that their units were ready to perform their missions in future deployments appeared to have stabilized after dropping between 1992 and 1995.⁸

5. FORSCOM Annual Historical Summary Fiscal Year 1995, Historical Resources Div, CMH; Bradley Graham and John Harris, "Army's Combat Readiness Overstated, Perry Admits: Haiti Costs Underestimated, Republicans Say," *Washington Post*, 16 Nov 1994; Eric Schmitt, "Ready For Combat? The Situation Isn't So Simple," *New York Times*, 20 Dec 1994; Bradley Graham, "Army Clarifies Historical Context of Readiness Alarm," *Washington Post*, 13 Jan 1995.

6. *An Oral History of General Dennis J. Reimer, USA, Retired* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 2000), p. 185.

7. *Army Regulation 220-1: Unit Status Reporting* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 31 Jul 1993), p. 2; *Army Regulation 220-1: Unit Status Reporting* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1 Sep 1997). The reason for this change is lost in the large-scale destruction of HQDA records during 1985-2003.

8. Memo, Gen Dennis J. Reimer for Chairman, Joint Chs of Staff, 27 Jan 1997, Folder General Mgmt Corresp JAN 1997, Box 8, Reimer Papers, AHEC; Memo, Gen



General Dennis J. Reimer talks with Expert Infantry Badge instructors, 1998.

Readiness had not been stabilized. Recruiting and retention shortfalls and continued deployments for operations other than war exacerbated the mismatch between authorized strength and force structure in the Regular Army. Tiered readiness policies continued. During 1998, GAO studies, congressional hearings, and press reports depicted a military, and especially an Army, whose readiness was decaying. That February, Congressman Duncan Hunter demanded the Army pick one infantry platoon at random and test its physical fitness (to his standards, not the Army's) and marksmanship (to his standards, not the Army's). He also demanded the service provide him a roster of how the platoon members performed. In September, responding to an inquiry from Senator John S. McCain, Reimer wrote that years of declining budgets and increasing operational tempo had eroded readiness in later-deploying units to the point that if the Army had to fight two wars simultaneously (as called for in the national military strategy), it would pay "an extremely high cost in soldiers' lives."⁹

Dennis J. Reimer for See Distribution, 18 Feb 1997, sub: Army Readiness, Folder #30/Gen. Mn. Correspondence Files (97), Box 3, Reimer Papers, AHEC; Army Research Institute, Bfg for CSA, n.d., sub: Army Assessment 1997, Folder Army Assessment 1997—Data Charts, Box 15, Reimer Papers, AHEC.

9. Mark E. Gebicke, Testimony, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Readiness and Military Personnel, Committee on National Security, *Observations on Personnel Readiness in Later Deploying Army Divisions*, General

Worry about readiness continued into 1999. The bombing campaign in Kosovo and the subsequent deployment of Army units there for peace-keeping operations accentuated the worry. As had happened during the early 1980s, members of Congress used the issue against a president from the other political party. The criticism culminated in November when Senator James Inhofe, chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee's subcommittee on readiness, announced that in the latest USR cycle, two Regular Army divisions were rated as C-4 and none of the regular divisions were rated as C-1. Five days later, General Eric K. Shinseki, Reimer's successor, told reporters that the Army's ability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major wars was "at high risk."¹⁰

The Erosion of Trust in Readiness Reporting

With all the attention paid to readiness issues, questions began to be asked about the effectiveness of readiness reporting systems, particularly in Congress, where members requested GAO studies several times. In October 1994, the GAO concluded that the Status of Resources and

Accounting Office, 20 Mar 1998; Sean D. Naylor, "Army: Despite Concerns, We're Ready to Fight," *Army Times*, 18 May 1998; Sean D. Naylor, "Official Calls for More Money," *Army Times*, 27 Jul 1998; Bradley Graham and Eric Pianin, "Military Readiness, Morale Show Strain: Budgets Contract; Deployments Expand," *Washington Post*, 13 Aug 1998; Thomas E. Ricks, "Joint Chiefs Tell Senate Military Faces Readiness Crisis, Needs Bigger Budget," *Wall Street Journal*, 30 Sep 1998; William Matthews, "Second Simultaneous War Would Cost Many Lives," *Army Times*, 19 Oct 1998; Ltr, Rep. Duncan Hunter to Reimer, 6 Feb 1998, Folder Gen Mgmt Corr MAR 1998, Box 11, Reimer Papers, AHEC; Ltr, 2 Dec 1998, Reimer to McCain, Folder Gen and Org Func Corr Dec 1998, Box 15, Reimer Papers, AHEC.

10. *Report of the Activities of the Committee on Armed Services for the One Hundred Sixth Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2001), pp. 34, 61; Steven Lee Myers, "Clinton Proposes a Budget Increase for the Military," *New York Times*, 2 Jan 1999; Bradley Graham, "Military: Budget Will Meet Top Needs," *Washington Post*, 6 Jan 1999; Sean D. Naylor, "Straight Shooters," *Army Times*, 15 Mar 1999; Ltr, Walter F. Ulmer Jr., to Gen Dennis J. Reimer, 6 Apr 1999, Folder Gen Mgmt Corr File Apr-Jun 1999, Box 13, Reimer Papers, AHEC; Guy Gugliotta, "GOP Loads 'Emergency' Bill With Projects," *Washington Post*, 30 Apr 1999; *Military Readiness: Impact of Operations Other Than War on the Services Varies* (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, May 1999); Eric Schmitt, "Fighting in the Balkans Stretches the Pentagon's Resources Around the World," *New York Times*, 2 May 1999; Sean D. Naylor, "They Weren't Ready," *Army Times*, 5 Jul 1999; Jim Hoagland, "Bush's Big Ideas," *Washington Post*, 18 Nov 1999; Sean D. Naylor, "Not Ready for Combat," *Army Times*, 22 Nov 1999.

Training System (SORTS) and the services' input to it did not cover all the factors crucial to determining readiness: it could not predict changes and it did not provide data on the preparedness of joint commands to integrate units into an effective operational force. Additionally, GAO found assessments of training to be unreliable because SORTS did not use objective, quantifiable criteria. The GAO also noticed that commands in all four services monitored hundreds of other indicators that they generally did not report to higher levels. These indicators were essential to establishing a more comprehensive assessment of readiness and could be used to predict changes in readiness. The office recommended that the Secretary of Defense implement a system that used these other indicators and could predict changes in readiness.¹¹

In March 1997, the GAO found that while OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Army had made some progress in addressing its findings from 1994, "the formal reporting system is overly optimistic in its readiness assessments, and questions can be legitimately raised about its credibility." It remained concerned about the inadequate assessment of readiness indicators beyond those used in SORTS and the inability to measure the readiness of joint forces.¹² A year later, GAO examined the military's efforts to improve readiness reporting. It found that whereas there had been progress, limitations previously identified in SORTS remained. Furthermore, the Defense Department's quarterly reports to Congress provided "only a vague description of readiness problems and remedial actions; consequently, they are not effective as a congressional oversight tool."¹³

The GAO praised the Army in 1997 as the only service taking "significant actions on its own to identify and collect data to provide a more comprehensive assessment of readiness." It was referring to the Army Readiness Management System (ARMS), which HQDA began using in 1992. This system integrated various Army Staff databases, and together with the Status Projection System adopted in 1987, the service used it in making resource decisions. A year after its introduction, DCSOPS began using ARMS along with the Status Projection System

11. *Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Develop a More Comprehensive Measurement System* (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, Oct 1994).

12. Mark E. Gebicke, Testimony, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Readiness and Military Personnel, Committee on National Security, *Military Readiness: Improvements Still Needed in Assessing Military Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, Mar 1997), p. 2.

13. *Military Readiness: Reports to Congress Provide Few Details on Deficiencies and Solutions* (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, Mar 1998), p. 4.

in preparing the monthly readiness review for the chief of staff, Army. Major upgrades beginning in July 1995 led to ARMS absorbing the unit readiness projection function, and by 1999 it would become the primary method for accessing the Army SORTS database.¹⁴

The Installation Status Report was another expression of this desire to expand the scope of readiness reporting beyond the unit level. Developed and supervised by the assistant chief of staff for installation management, it consisted of three parts—infrastructure, environment, and services—and adopted the C-rating designations. Tests of the report began in 1993 and the first worldwide submission of Part I and Part II occurred during fiscal year 1996. These first reports found that 219 major facility types at 227 Army installations worldwide had a C–3 rating overall. These reports also rated the quality of twenty-five environmental programs at 144 Army installations in the United States, both active and reserve, as C–2 overall.¹⁵

Mounting congressional concern over whether SORTS accurately reported the military's readiness condition culminated in 1998 with a mandate in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1999. The mandate originated in the House's Committee on National Security, which over the past four years had "become increasingly frustrated by the contradictions between assessments of military unit readiness as reflected in official reports and the observations made by military personnel in the field." Testimony taken by the committee had convinced it "that the readiness reporting system is inaccurate, even corrupted." Because of the "lack of progress the Department of Defense has made to develop a more comprehensive readiness measurement system reflective of today's operational realities," the committee decided it must require the development of a new system and outline its characteristics and capabilities.¹⁶

The law directed the secretary of Defense to "establish a comprehensive readiness reporting system for the Department of Defense." This system would "measure in an objective, accurate, and timely manner" the capability of the military to carry out the national security strategy, the defense planning guidance, and the national military strategy. Information

14. Gebicke, *Military Readiness*, p. 7; Stephen E. Everett and L. Martin Kaplan, *Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1993* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2002), p. 15; Bfg Slides, "Army Readiness Management System (ARMS)," 24 Mar 1999, Box 2, Shinseki Papers, AHEC.

15. Connie L. Reeves, *Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1996* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2002), pp. 24–25.

16. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on National Security, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Report on H.R. 3616*, 105th Cong., 2d sess., 12 May 1998, pp. 281–282.

would be continually updated “with any change in the overall readiness status of a unit, an element of the training establishment, or an element of defense infrastructure, that is required to be reported as part of the readiness reporting system, being reported within 24 hours of the event necessitating the change.” The secretary would ensure that the department provided sufficient resources to establish and maintain the system. The new system was to be operational by 15 January 2000.

Congress set specific capabilities of the system:

1. Measure, on a monthly basis, the capability of units (both as elements of their respective armed force and as elements of joint forces) to conduct their assigned wartime missions.
2. Measure, on a quarterly basis, the capability of training establishments to provide trained and ready forces for wartime missions.
3. Measure, on a quarterly basis, the capability of defense installations and facilities and other elements of Department of Defense infrastructure, both in the United States and abroad, to provide appropriate support to forces in the conduct of their wartime missions.
4. Measure, on a monthly basis, critical warfighting deficiencies in unit capability.
5. Measure, on a quarterly basis, critical warfighting deficiencies in training establishments and defense infrastructure.
6. Measure, on a monthly basis, the level of current risk based upon the readiness reporting system relative to the capability of forces to carry out their wartime missions.¹⁷

Others also had doubts about readiness reporting. In 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, believing that OSD needed a focal point for readiness matters, had Congress establish the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, whose responsibilities included readiness reporting.¹⁸ That same year Aspin established the Defense Science Board Task Force on Readiness, comprised of retired flag officers and chaired by the former Chief of Staff, Army, Edward C. Meyer. The task force would assess the current state of readiness and provide Aspin with recommendations regarding key indicators for measuring readiness

17. PL 105–261, *Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999*, HR 3616, 105th Cong., Section 373.

18. Roger R. Trask and John P. Glennon, eds., *The Department of Defense: Documents on Organization and Mission, 1978–2008* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historical Office, 2008), pp. 151–52.

and methods for warning of potential readiness problems. The task force concluded that current readiness was acceptable in most areas, but that unless the department and Congress sustained focus on maintaining readiness, the armed forces could become hollow. The task force was generally satisfied with SORTS, but recommended developing methods for projecting future unit readiness and assessing joint readiness.¹⁹

Based on the task force findings, in late 1994 the Joint Staff established a Readiness Division and the JCS instituted the Joint Monthly Readiness Review. (With the increasing attention paid to joint readiness issues, the review became a component of the broader Chairman's Readiness System in 1997.) In this process, the combatant commands assessed joint operational readiness in eight functional areas. Defense support agencies discussed their status. The services reported on unit readiness using SORTS. All the participating organizations determined their ability to meet the demands of contingency scenarios set by the Joint Staff. Each cycle of the process produced a list of deficiencies in the functional areas which were then assigned to a Joint Staff directorate for coordination of corrective action.²⁰

These changes in the way OSD and the Joint Staff used readiness data did not address long-standing complaints about the reliability and usefulness of SORTS, which by 1996 had more than 9,500 units and organizations reporting regularly. A March 1996 Department of Defense Inspector General (IG) report noted that since 1984 there had been forty-one other reports that had, in whole or in part, discussed the effectiveness of SORTS and its predecessor. Almost all of those reports had identified the same systemic problems the IG found during its investigation.

The primary source of these problems, according to the IG, was the continued difference between the purposes of the joint and the individual services' readiness reporting systems. For the Joint Staff and unified commands, the most important function of the SORTS database—maintained at the National Military Command Center (NMCC)—was planning and decision making. For the services, the most important function of their SORTS database was in fulfilling their responsibilities to organize, train, and equip units. There were severe synchronization problems between

19. *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Readiness* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Jun 1994).

20. DCSOPS Bfg to Winter 1995 Senior Cdrs' Conf, Mar 1995, Folder Winter Senior Cdrs' Conf (1 of 2), Box 53, Sullivan papers, AHCC; Tillson, et al., *Independent Review of DoD's Readiness Reporting System*, pp. G-47 to G-57; CJCS Guide 3401A, *CJCS Guide to the Chairman's Readiness System*, 31 Jul 1997.

the joint and service databases; the NMCC database contained so much outdated material that the Joint Staff and the unified commands lacked confidence in it. The IG faulted the Joint Staff for not effectively managing SORTS, particularly for not enforcing compliance by the services to its directives.

Another example of this difference was readiness reporting by deployed units. The Joint Staff and the services had directives requiring units to submit readiness data while deployed so that the Joint Staff and unified commands could track their status. The services did not always enforce this provision, arguing that the daily situation report could meet the need for status information and a concurrent SORTS report was an unnecessary burden on units. The Army had waived the SORTS submissions for its units deployed to Haiti during 1994–1995 without first gaining the mandated Joint Staff approval for the waiver, although it did direct units deployed to Bosnia to make SORTS submissions.

The IG reviewed each service's readiness reporting systems. It concluded that Army policies and programs contributed significantly to problems with SORTS. In visits to Army major commands, the IG found dissatisfaction with AR 220–1. Criteria for personnel status could mask shortages in critical military occupational specialties. The training status remained dependent on subjective assessments instead of objective criteria, and actual status could be further masked by the tendency of commanders to optimistically rate this area. Equipment serviceability criteria could be manipulated to produce higher ratings. Despite problems with the production of USRs, the service made few inspections in this area and those who prepared the reports received only on-the-job training for the task.

The timelines set out in AR 220–1 for USRs handicapped the input of Army data to the NMCC database. Unified commands considered these to be too long, thereby producing outdated data in the NMCC for both active and reserve units. Although AR 220–1 included the joint system's requirements for submitting reports on changes in readiness between USRs, units infrequently complied, further undermining unified command's confidence in Army data. Army commands visited by the IG stated that the complexity of reporting and chain-of-command processing discouraged preparing change reports. No effective mechanisms ensured the accuracy of Army information in the NMCC SORTS database and DCSOPS saw that database as solely a Joint Staff responsibility.

DCSOPS responded to a draft of the IG's report by stressing that joint readiness assessment was the unified command's responsibility and that the Army met its responsibility to provide data on its units. It argued that the USR must provide both operational staffs and institutional managers

the information they needed, and that the USR was only one part of a larger Army readiness assessment system that included functionally oriented personnel, maintenance, and logistics reporting. This larger assessment system permitted HQDA to identify trends and plan and optimize management of its resources.²¹

Revising AR 220-1

The DCSOPS reply noted that since the end of the Cold War two revisions of AR 220-1 had been published and that it was currently preparing a third. What it did not point out was that whereas the first revision in 1992 had been only an update of the 1988 edition, the second in 1993 had largely been forced on the Army by Congress in Title XI of the Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1993. Congress designated this title as the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992. Although the act's principal motivation was concern over the problems encountered during the mobilization of three guard maneuver brigades during the Persian Gulf War, it applied to both reserve components. Among its provisions, it directed modifications to the readiness reporting system to provide an accurate assessment of guard and reserve units' readiness to deploy and of the resources units needed to eliminate shortfalls in readiness. It also mandated specific changes in how to measure personnel and equipment readiness.²²

Among the changes for personnel reporting, the 1993 edition replaced "trained" with "qualified" as the criteria for calculating aspects of strength and expanded the availability criteria. Reporting equipment on hand now required including all items which related indirectly to essential mission tasks (such as fuel trucks in an armor battalion), as well as items considered directly related to a unit's tasks (such as tanks in an armor battalion). Only the latter items, however, were used in computing the overall rating for equipment on hand. This edition renamed equipment readiness rating to equipment serviceability. It expanded the list of items

21. *Evaluation Report on the Status of Resources and Training System* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, 1996), pp. 5-21, 60-66, 111-16.

22. FORSCOM Annual Historical Summary Fiscal Year 1991, p. VII-18, Historical Resources Div, CMH; DAMO-ODR, Information Paper, 10 Mar 1992, sub: Unit Status Reporting and Revisions of AR 220-1, Folder 1992 Spring Cdrs Conf Info Papers (1 of 3), Box 13, Sullivan Papers, AHEC; *Army Regulation 220-1: Unit Status Reporting* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1 May 1992); Lt Col Thomas C. Stredwick, "Title XI: An Underfunded Mandate" (Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, 15 Apr 1996).

considered directly related to mission-essential tasks to all equipment required on which a Material Condition Status Report was required. It also required more data on readiness to defend against nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Added to the criteria for training was progress in executing the unit's Combined Arms Training Strategy. (This was a program that provided a collective-tasks training strategy for each type of unit in the Army.)

The 1993 revision moved readiness assessment of reserve components from a quarterly to a monthly cycle. Recognizing these units had less time and resources than active units for administration, the revision did not require them to prepare an entire USR every month. Instead, they would continue submitting a full report at the start of a quarter and then a validation report the other two months in the quarter if there were no changes in the overall C-level or in one of the four resource areas. As part of complying with the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act, the service expanded the operational readiness exercise program begun in 1992. Modeled on the Air Force's operational readiness inspections, it assessed a unit's ability to perform its wartime missions and the continental army headquarters managed it. A team drawn from both active and reserve components completed the evaluation in two phases. In the first, the team checked compliance with policy and guidance. In the second, it assessed premobilization and predeployment readiness by having soldiers perform selected individual tasks and the unit perform some tasks from its mission essential task listing. Decreasing funding and diminishing Regular Army strength together with increasing operational tempo soon made the program too expensive. In 1997, FORSCOM eliminated it.

The DCSOPS extensively reorganized the regulation in an attempt to make it easier to use. Previously, instructions for computing data and filling out DA Form 2715 were in one chapter of single-spaced small type without clear breaks between the sections on each data element. The revision separated this one chapter into four, one for each resource area, and with each data element getting its own paragraph with its title placed in bold type. Additionally, the regulation now permitted USRs to be transposed from DA Form 2715 to the U.S. Message Text Format, a change directed by the Joint Staff for inputting data into SORTS databases. The transposition into machine-readable format continued to take place at the installation/division level, major reserve command headquarters, or state adjutant general echelon.²³

23. *Army Regulation 220-1: Unit Status Reporting* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 31 Jul 1993); Dwight D. Oland and David W. Hogan

The Army had already set the transposition of data from printed forms to machine-readable format at this echelon for elimination. The Personal Computer-Army Status of Resources and Training System (PC/ASORTS) would permit units down to the company level to prepare a USR in their personal computer and then digitally transmit it to their higher headquarters. The PC/ASORTS menu screens replicated all pages of DA Form 2715. Based on a prototype created by FORSCOM, system testing occurred during autumn 1993; within a year it had been fielded to Regular Army units. Because companies, batteries, and troops did not have computer systems designed for classified information, the classification of USRs prepared at this echelon was changed from confidential to unclassified. When units deployed to Bosnia starting in 1995, they took the PC/ASORTS computers and software.²⁴

The in-process AR 220-1 revision which DCSOPS mentioned in its reply to the DoD IG's report appeared in 1997. Improving standardization on readiness reporting with Joint Staff directives; clarifying criteria; and culling unnecessary data elements were some of its objectives. It also reorganized the regulation along functional areas, expanded the definition of availability, and gave commanders more flexibility in determining individual personnel availability and equipment on-hand criteria. Responding to a GAO report on readiness for defense against nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons from the previous year, this edition updated and clarified instructions for reporting on equipment and training in this area. The edition added instructions on using PC/ASORTS and designated the PC/ASORTS system as the primary means for preparing and submitting readiness reports.

Since 1991, major combat formations had often deployed only some of their units on operations other than war and the revision recognized the effect this had on them. Guidance was added on computing readiness

Jr., *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1992* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2001), p. 63; L. Martin Kaplan, *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1994* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2000), pp. 75-76; U.S. Army Forces Command *Annual Command History, 1 January-31 December 1997* (Fort McPherson, Ga.: Military History Office, U.S. Army Forces Command, 1998), p. 28.

24. FORSCOM Annual Historical Summary Fiscal Year 1993, p. IX-25, Historical Resources Div, CMH; FORSCOM Annual Historical Summary Fiscal Year 1994, pp. VI-36-VI-37, Historical Resources Div, CMH; Msg, Commander, United States Army Special Operations Command (CDRUSASOC) to Commander, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (CDR160THSOAR), et al., 061747Z DEC 95, sub: SORTS REPORTING FOR OPERATION JOINT ENDEVOR, Folder Unclassified Messages, Box 21, Reimer Papers, AHFC.

ratings when some subordinate elements were deployed and they were not immediately available for wartime operations. Also added were instructions for the submission of USRs by deployed units. The revision rescinded the authority of an Army major command to exempt deployed units from reporting; such exemption now required approval from DCSOPS and concurrence from the Joint Staff. In an effort to measure how the post–Cold War operational tempo was affecting readiness, the revision required commanders to calculate their unit’s deployment tempo. This figure indicated the average number of days a month that an average unit member spent away from his or her quarters for tactical training or operational missions.²⁵

In an appendix, the 1997 edition alerted units to an “Emerging Concept” called operational readiness. An OSD Program Budget Decision had directed a better operational tempo measurement to use in preparing budgets. By April 1996, DCSOPS had developed the concept of operational readiness to show the link between resources provided and readiness attained. This concept would assemble indicators from the strategic level (looking at such matters as force structure and force modernization) to the individual soldier level (looking at such matters as skill qualification and quality of life). The DCSOPS determined that almost all data required for implementation were already being collected. Data for some new indicators would have to be collected, such as availability of training simulators; costs of running weapon ranges; personnel turbulence; activities that diverted soldiers from planned training; and quality-of-life factors. Headquarters, Department of the Army, planned to test a prototype USR based on this concept, then revise AR 220–1 starting in late 1998, ensuring that the draft remained in concurrence with a similar effort by OSD and the Joint Staff.²⁶

Work on revising AR 220–1 to incorporate the operational readiness concept—now designated Army Readiness Reporting System XXI—began in January 1998 with a contractor study. The core of this system would be a new method for evaluating training readiness that was more

25. *Army Regulation 220–1: Unit Status Reporting* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1 Sep 1997); Memo, Maj Gen Edward G. Anderson III, for Sec of the Army, 2 Mar 1996, sub: GAO Report on Chemical and Biological (CB) Defense Readiness of Ground Forces, Folder Gen Org & Func Files (96) March (2 of 2), Box 25, Reimer Papers, AHEC.

26. Memo, Gen Dennis J. Reimer for Deputy Sec of Def, 22 Apr 1996, sub: Operational Readiness (OPRED) In Response To Program Budget Decision 000, Folder Gen Org & Func Files (96) April (2 of 2), Box 25, Reimer Papers, AHEC; Information Paper, DAMO-ODR, 7 Oct 1997, sub: OPRED Readiness Reporting Methodology, Folder 4-Star Cdrs’ Conf 16-17 OCT 1997 (1 of 3), Box 37, Reimer Papers, AHEC.

objective, and thus more credible to OSD, unified commands, and Congress. This method would also provide a better understanding of the time and cost necessary for achieving and sustaining readiness in a unit. By September, the contractor and DCSOPS had developed a three-part measurement: training events essential to the unit's organizational mission, training resources availability, and a commander's assessment prepared in accordance with a specific set of considerations.²⁷

The Army's endeavors brought it favorable attention from the House Committee on National Security. In its report on the fiscal year 1999 Defense Authorization Act, the committee stated that "the key element" in the new readiness reporting system would be "a set of objective criteria for judging training readiness," and "an automated system for weighting warfighting training priorities." The committee "applauds the Army's attempt to develop a set of algorithms that will make training readiness calculations as simple as a computer-assisted tax preparation program. Despite the complexity of the task, the committee is encouraged by the Army's example," and it urged the Secretary of Defense "to make such efforts his highest priority in reforming the readiness reporting system."²⁸

The Joint Staff in 1997 renamed SORTS the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS), but major changes did not accompany the new name. Rather, the new name signified SORTS moving from the World Wide Military Command and Control System into its replacement, the Global Command and Control System. The new command and control system promised to make managing and accessing SORTS data easier for a larger group of users.²⁹

Between February and August 1999, DCSOPS dispatched teams to brief on the Army Readiness Reporting System XXI and to gather comments on the system from Regular Army division and corps headquarters. The teams also visited FORSCOM, the Combined Arms Center, the Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and the House Armed Services Committee. The concept was generally well

27. Larry Guderjohn, et al., "U.S. Army Readiness Reporting System XXI: Assessment and Proposed Concept" (SAIC, 24 Dec 1998), Box 2, Shinseki Papers, AHEC.

28. *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Report on H.R. 3616*, pp. 283–84.

29. Chairman of the Joint Chs of Staff Instruction 3401.02, 20 Oct 1997, Global Status of Resources and Training System, Historians files, CMH; Tillson, et al., *Independent Review of DoD's Readiness Reporting System*, Appendix C.

received, although there was much discussion on the specific mechanics of implementation.³⁰

In June, DCSOPS hosted a four-day Army-wide conference on revising AR 220-1. Forces Command suggested that over its last several versions the regulation had acquired too many of the data elements that HQDA desired for managing resources but which did not illuminate a unit's readiness. The command recommended focusing the regulation on "a snapshot of a unit's ability to accomplish the missions for which it was designed." The Army Staff did not agree and the additional data requirements remained. The conference concluded with the expectation that HQDA would circulate a final draft for comments in July, with a new AR 220-1 to be published by March 2000, thereby meeting the revised congressional deadline of April 2000. This timeline, however, would be overtaken by events later in the year.³¹

The Credibility Crisis

Meanwhile, OSD had been working on meeting the congressional mandate through a Readiness Reporting Steering Group. In September 1999, the group released a readiness reporting implementation plan. Although GSORTS was "fundamentally sound," several improvements would be made to bring it into compliance with the 1999 act. A new indicator would show the percentage of major items operationally ready versus the wartime requirement for the item. To avoid increasing units' workloads, the GSORTS software would be rewritten to automatically calculate this data. Unit training indicators would remain service-specific. For the Army, the indicators would be the ones developed under Army Readiness Reporting System XXI. Units on contingency operations would now assess their readiness for that operation as well as their readiness for major theater war. More detail would be reported on key crews within a unit and new software would be fielded to improve the ability to analyze readiness trends. Commanders would still be permitted to subjectively upgrade or downgrade their unit's C-level, however. The steering group concluded that commanders historically had been judicious in using this capability and it permitted inclusion of factors not quantifiable. The plan incorporated Joint Staff efforts to apply "emerging information technology" to GSORTS. The objective was a system capable of "near-real-time

30. Printout of DAMO-ODR data file, "L-DRIVE/ODR/READINESS REPORTING XXI/INFOR PAPERS/FLD TRIPS," Box 2, Shinseki Papers, AHEC.

31. MFR, Lt Col Roy L. Fishel, 13 Jun 1999, sub: AR 220-1 Rewrite Conference Trip Report, Box 2, Shinseki Papers, AHEC.

access and analysis of readiness data.” It would also allow units to directly submit readiness reports into the GSORTS database.³²

As OSD’s plan and the new AR 220–1 were being prepared, concern over readiness reporting both inside and outside the Army escalated. During a “field hearing” in February 1999, the House Armed Services Committee heard from soldiers who testified about serious readiness problems in their organizations, problems not reflected in the readiness reports Congress required from the Department of Defense.³³ The next month, General Reimer directed the inspector general “to assess the adequacy and accuracy” of the Army’s readiness reporting system. The IG was to look at current-status reporting, if the system assisted senior leaders in properly allocating resources, and if the system provided data on Army-wide trends in readiness. Reimer wanted a report on the assessment by the end of June 2000.³⁴

Three GAO studies added more fuel to the fire. A May 1999 report found important information about the effects of operations other than war on units’ readiness for war was “not readily apparent in GSORTS or reported at all.”³⁵ A report released the following month concluded that the Army’s system was not comprehensive enough to reveal all weaknesses in equipment readiness. Furthermore, it did not show the extraordinary investments of time and personnel necessary to produce high serviceability rates for aging equipment.³⁶ In a third study, “many units reported very high levels of readiness” months after a rotation at a combat training center “even though serious training shortcomings identified at the centers had not been corrected and the majority of senior unit leaders had been lost because of personnel turnover.”³⁷

32. “Department of Defense Readiness Reporting Implementation Plan, September 1999,” Box 2, Shinseki Papers, AHEC.

33. *Report of the Activities of the Committee on Armed Services for the One Hundred Sixth Congress*, p. 61; Naylor, “Straight Shooters.”

34. Memo, Ch of Staff for the inspector general, 17 Mar 1999, sub: Directive for Assessment of the Army Readiness Reporting System, Folder General Organization and Functions Correspondence, JAN-MAR 1999, Box 15, Reimer Papers, AHEC. There is no copy of the required report in the Reimer Papers. The large-scale destruction of HQDA records during 1985–2003 suggests that a copy of the report did not survive.

35. *Military Readiness: Impact of Operations Other Than War on the Services Varies*, p. 16.

36. *Military Readiness: Readiness Reports Do Not Provide a Clear Assessment of Army Equipment* (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, Jun 1999).

37. *Military Readiness: Full Training Benefits from Army’s Combat Training Centers Are Not Being Realized* (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, Sep 1999), p. 23.

The House Armed Services Committee's patience vanished. The committee was "discouraged to learn that bureaucratic intransigence, opposition to reform, and the persistence of outmoded practices are placing the prospects for improving the readiness reporting system in doubt."³⁸ Although the committee did not say so in writing, and despite its favorable comments over the service's work on new training indicators, it directed much of its anger at the Army. The gap between reports sent to Congress and the testimony given by soldiers about units' readiness dismayed committee members. Headquarters, Department of the Army, continuing inability to report changes in unit readiness levels within twenty-four hours of the change, as required by the 1999 Defense Authorization Act, frustrated them.³⁹ The committee placed a directive into the Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2000 instructing the Secretary of Defense to commission a study of requirements for the readiness reporting system mandated in the previous year's act. This study had to be conducted by an organization outside the federal government.⁴⁰

General Shinseki—who became Army chief of staff in June 1999—was dissatisfied as well. He had extensive experience with preparing USRs, having commanded at the squadron, brigade, and division levels. He also had extensive experience using the data provided by USRs, culminating in nearly a year as the DCSOPS and eight months as the Army's vice chief of staff.⁴¹ After being designated the next chief of staff, he assembled a group to assist him in preparing for his new assignment. The group provided Shinseki with several comments and recommendations regarding readiness reporting. The USR needed fewer subjective and more objective indicators, particularly in training readiness. The perception of the USR as a report card remained widespread, with the resulting pressure on commanders to inflate ratings. The system had lost creditability with Congress. Assessment of institutional Army readiness was inadequate. The group noted that DCSOPS was in the process of

38. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on National Security, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Report on H.R. 1401*, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 24 May 1999, pp. 334–35.

39. Memo, Col Richard Gibbs for Director, OD, n.d. [but sometime in Aug 1999], sub: Conference Report on S. 1059, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Folder Turbulence Study Book (3 of 3), Box Turbulence Study 1998-1999, Shinseki Papers, AHFC.

40. Section 361, PL 106–65, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000.

41. Service Resume: General Eric K. Shinseki, General Ofcr Management Ofc, 28 Aug 2008, Historians files, CMH.

revising AR 220-1 “to add objectivity and show effects of personnel shortages on training.”⁴²

Three months after taking office, Shinseki directed the Army War College to study personnel turbulence and well-being, and readiness reporting. These topics “have gained my attention during visits to units,” and “demand problem definition, short-term improvement and creative thinking about mid-term and longer-term approaches.” Committees of faculty and students would investigate each issue and report to Shinseki by 21 January 2000. The reports were to include both findings and specific recommendations for responding to the challenges facing the Army.⁴³

The chief of staff provided the parameters for each study. The readiness reporting committee would begin by providing the Army with a definition for readiness in a post-Cold War world. It would develop the concept for a reporting system “that is accurate, objective, and timely” and which included both units and the institutional Army. The concept would allow the chief of staff “to direct resources in order to influence readiness across the Army.” In its work, the team would consider a number of questions. Among them were how to measure readiness across the full spectrum of possible missions; whether the system had lost its integrity, and if so, how to put rigor back into it; and what other measurements the system needed to provide an assessment of the Army’s overall readiness.⁴⁴

To alert both internal and external audiences to the actions the Army was taking to deal with complaints about readiness reporting, Maj. Gen. David L. Grange published an article in December 1999 discussing the problem and outlining Shinseki’s guidance. The War College committee met with the chief of staff twice to brief him on their work and received additional guidance. Meanwhile, DCSOPS awaited the study’s recommendations before continuing its revision of AR 220-1, and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness selected the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to conduct the independent study mandated by Congress.⁴⁵

42. Tab 18, “Readiness,” to Tab A, “Assessment Team Report,” to Brig Gen John S. Brown, MFR, 17 Jun 1999, sub: CSA Special Study Group AAR, in Continuity Book, General Eric K. Shinseki, 34th Ch of Staff (Designate), U.S. Army, vol. I, Box “Transition,” Shinseki Papers, AHEC.

43. Memo, Gen Eric K. Shinseki for Maj Gen Robert H. Scales Jr., 16 Sep 1999, sub: Guidance for Research on Key Issues Facing the Army, Annex A to U.S. Army War College Readiness Committee, “Readiness Reporting in the U.S. Army,” Rpt to Ch of Staff, Army, 21 Jan 2000, Box 2, Shinseki Papers, AHEC.

44. Encl 1 to Memo, Shinseki for Scales, 16 Sep 1999.

45. E-mail, Lt Col J. D. Johnson, n.d. [but sometime in Oct 1999], sub: DC-SOPS Briefing, Box 2, Shinseki Papers, AHEC; Bfg, CSA Readiness Working Gp to

The Army War College committee's report opened with two definitions of readiness. For the service as a whole, it defined readiness as "the Army's ability to fight and win the nation's wars and to otherwise execute the National Military Strategy." For major commands to the lowest-level unit it defined readiness as "the organization's ability to accomplish assigned mission(s)."⁴⁶ The committee deemed the current system inadequate and stated that it

reflects major deficiencies in every analysis criteria. The system is not comprehensive due to: exclusion of portions of the operational and most of the functional Army; limitations in the types and categories of resources being reported; failure to capitalize on existing database information; failure to focus organizational reporting on the spectrum of mission requirements; and the lack of a link to resource decisions. The system is not accurate due to: cultural biases and pervasive subjective optimism; the absence of non-MTW [Major Theater War] related mission readiness reporting; the camouflaging of readiness deficiencies in aggregated data; and the non-representation of critical elements in readiness resource areas. The system is not timely due to: slow compilation and review required at each organizational level; the lack of automation of many reporting areas, and the current cycle of reporting. The system is not sufficiently objective: over-use of subjective upgrades and qualitative assessment of training-related readiness standards provides for broad differences in reporting. The system is not predictive: there is no mechanism to project operational requirements, forecast readiness, and allocate resources to preclude or prevent problems. Finally, the current system is not simple: it doesn't take advantage of currently available web-based information systems, it requires a deliberate review, compilation and qualitative assessment and requires manual manipulation.⁴⁷

Gen Abrams, 3 Nov 1999, Box 1/5, Shinseki Papers, AHEC; Executive Sum: USAWC Critical Area Studies IPR to CSA, 14 Dec 1999, Folder Critical Area Studies—Guidelines, Box 1/5, Shinseki Papers, AHEC; Maj Gen David L. Grange, "Ready for What?" *Armed Forces Journal International* 137 (Dec 1999): 42–45. Grange had recently given up command of 1st Infantry Division and had served as the Deputy Director, then Director, for Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization in DCSOPS. Service Resume: Brig Gen David Lawrence Grange, General Ofcr Management Ofc, 31 Jan 2000, Historians files, CMH.

46. "Readiness Reporting in the U.S. Army," pp. 4–5.

47. "Readiness Reporting in the U.S. Army," p. 22.

To remedy these deficiencies, the committee proposed moving from the current design-focused system to a mission-focused system.⁴⁸ Units should no longer solely measure their readiness against their organizational design. Rather, they should measure readiness for both their designed mission and any assigned missions, such as stabilization or humanitarian operations. Units should evaluate their capability to accomplish each essential task in an assigned mission. The committee extended this mission-focused concept from the unit level upward through various echelons to the service as whole, to include the functions performed by the institutional Army. Doing this would require developing mission-essential task lists for institutional Army organizations and an overarching list of essential tasks for the service as a whole.

The report took the doctrinal concept of “Commander’s Critical Information Requirements” and applied it to the Army chief of staff. Leading such a large organization, the chief of staff should decide what information was critical to addressing current and future readiness at the strategic level. These requirements would trigger a cascading process at each lower reporting echelon where commanders would develop information requirements regarding readiness. The result would be a nested set of information requirements from the highest to the lowest reporting levels, promoting a unity of effort focused only on essential data, thereby creating a common situational awareness on readiness issues.

Creating a common, accurate, and timely situational awareness would require the use of other reporting systems that contained relevant information. The committee proposed that this data be channeled, along with USRs, into a new Army readiness database. Acknowledging its creation would require considerable work, the committee argued it would be invaluable in answering questions generated by critical information requirements at all echelons. The system had to be accessible via the World Wide Web and be continually updated. Centralizing so much unit information would ease the readiness reporting burden on units, thereby allowing commanders to focus on presenting an assessment of their unit instead of updating numerous data elements. An Army readiness database would also facilitate task-organized reporting when units deployed only some of their elements for a mission.

The committee’s report highlighted the importance of the service’s culture to readiness reporting. Surveys by the committee revealed serious negative perceptions of the current system among many company- and field-grade officers—perceptions unchanged from the 1976 War College

48. Discussion of the report’s recommendations is based on “Readiness Reporting in the U.S. Army,” pp. 23–52.

readiness reporting study. Officers still felt pressured by superiors to minimize or conceal shortfalls. Submitting accurate USRs still could negatively affect a commander's efficiency report and thus imperil careers. The can-do mentality still led many to believe their unit could accomplish its mission despite shortfalls. The committee proposed several measures to address these perceptions. Senior officers should, by words and actions, show that they did not use the USR as a report card on commanders, and they should encourage honest and constructive dialogue about readiness. The training criteria under development would reduce much of the subjectivity in the USR. The establishment of a readiness database with real-time updating would introduce more objectivity and reduce the once-a-month pressure on commanders to portray their units in the best possible light.

What the committee's report did not discuss, however, was that this pressure did not exist in isolation. It was only one manifestation of a dysfunction many within and without the Army believed to be an affliction of the service's organizational culture. And as in 1976, attempts to address that culture's effects on readiness reporting would only succeed if efforts to address the root causes of the dysfunction succeeded.⁴⁹

The report recommended creating an Army Predictive Readiness System. Compatible with the Joint Monthly Readiness Review, it would provide leaders with a tool for examining the service's capability to respond in various scenarios and thereby identify readiness deficiencies. On a quarterly basis, HQDA would develop a scenario. Both operational and institutional major commands would assess their capability to accomplish their tasks in the scenario, which they would report using the Joint Monthly Readiness Review's C-level ratings. Upon receiving these assessments, the Army Staff could recommend actions necessary for remedying the deficiencies to the chief of staff.

Another recommendation was to include infrastructure to the existing three resource areas of personnel, equipment, and training. This new area would cover all installations or facilities such as ports of embarkation, weapons ranges, medical facilities, housing, and

49. The Army's organizational culture was a topic of intense discussion at this time. Sean D. Naylor, "Warrior Spirit," *Army Times*, 13 Dec 1999; Sean D. Naylor, "'High-Profile Warriors' Are Getting Out Before Their Time," *Army Times*, 13 Dec 1999; Sean D. Naylor, "Soldiers Blame Low Morale on Poor Leadership," *Army Times*, 17 Jan 2000; Thomas E. Ricks, "Younger Officers Quit Army at Fast Clip: Study Finds Little Trust in Senior Leadership," *Washington Post*, 17 Apr 2000; Sean D. Naylor, "Two New Panels to Study Officer Morale Problems," *Army Times*, 24 Apr 2000; Donnelly, "Professionalism and the Officer Personnel Management System," pp. 21–23.



General Eric K. Shinseki visits Fort Stewart, Georgia, 2002.

schools that supported military forces, in both the operational and institutional parts of the service. Also included in this resource area would be contractor support. Additionally, the committee recommended adding a number of indicators to the other three areas for a more detailed assessment of readiness in both operational and institutional organizations.

To make the most of these changes, the committee's study advanced the concept of a readiness decision support tool for senior Army leaders. This tool would assist the service in portraying its readiness to outside audiences such as OSD and Congress. It would have two components. First, the Army readiness database would allow leaders to see how their decisions regarding resources and other matters affected readiness in real time, instead of waiting for the next USR. Second, the chief of staff's monthly readiness review would be redesigned to focus on critical information requirements. The monthly review would then be presented with the data organized in ways that highlighted answers to the chief of staff's requirements, with the supporting data easily accessible. When HQDA combined these two components with the proposed predictive readiness system, it would possess an unprecedented capability for informed readiness decision-making.

The Army Staff began work on recasting the readiness reporting system in line with the study's recommendations. This would be a lengthy and complicated matter, so the revision of AR 220-1 already underway continued in order to make other changes already planned and to field the more objective metrics that had been developed. As the revision continued forward, Shinseki followed Reimer's example and directed the inspector general to make assessing the readiness reporting system one of the priorities for the next inspection plan. He also directed the IG to determine whether major commands and the state adjutants general ran effective organizational inspection programs. He instructed the IG to focus on whether these programs assisted commanders in identifying unit readiness deficiencies.⁵⁰

Readiness Reporting for a New Century

In November 2000, a year before the publication of the new edition of AR 220-1, IDA published its study of readiness reporting. The study found that whereas reporting and the use of data had improved in recent years, a review of modern management techniques revealed areas needing further improvements. These improvements would come by shifting to a systems-based reporting concept rather than the current functional-areas concept. The study criticized the current concept as a set of disconnected vertical structures built on narrow pieces of the readiness process. The focus of a systems-based assessment would be the readiness of combatant commands because they were responsible for the implementation of missions essential to the nation's strategy. Each command should report its performance readiness for its essential tasks based on the readiness of each entity within the operational systems that would perform the tasks.

50. FORSCOM Annual Command History 2000, pp. 72-74, Historical Resources Div, CMH; FORSCOM Annual Command History 2001, p. 310, Historical Resources Div, CMH; Memo, Shinseki for the inspector general, 17 May 2001, sub: Fiscal Year 2002-2003 DAIG Inspection Plan, Folder 8, Box 26, Shinseki Papers, AHEC; Memo, Shinseki for Cdr, U.S. Army Forces Cmd, 21 May 2001, sub: Readiness Reporting for Units Deployed In Support of Balkans Contingency Operations (CONOPS), Folder 9, Box 26, Shinseki Papers, AHEC. The IG found that the organizational inspection program was "not working well." Memo, the inspector general for Ch of Staff, Army, 14 Nov 2002, sub: Army Organizational Inspection Program (OIP) Assessment, Folder 1, Box 54, Shinseki Papers, AHEC. No collection reviewed for this monograph contained the IG's findings on the readiness reporting system.

These entities would include both units, such as an infantry battalion, and organizations, such as a depot.⁵¹

The study recommended applying a systems-based reporting concept to units and to the military services as well. It argued that because units had a mix of systems collectively engaged in the unit's mission essential tasks, its readiness should be reported in terms of those systems. For example, an infantry battalion contains a command and control system (headquarters and communication devices), an intelligence system (scout platoon), a maneuver system (rifle companies), a fires system (rifle companies and mortar platoon), and a logistics system (support platoon, maintenance platoon, and medical section). A readiness report from the battalion would rate the capability of these systems to perform the unit's essential tasks by comparing the required level of personnel, equipment, supplies, and training for each task with the actual level. For the services, the new concept would have them report the readiness of their various systems (training, supply, mobilization, manpower, deployment) for carrying out the functions assigned to them under Title 10 of the U.S. Code.⁵²

A review of GSORTS found that it fell far short both in the current functional areas concept and in a systems based concept. It did not include all units and organizations that influenced readiness, such as corps headquarters or inventory control points. Formats and evaluation criteria were not uniform across the services, and guidance was not clear and concise. There was no provision for reporting a unit's supply status. Unified commands and the Joint Staff found GSORTS of limited utility. The C-ratings did not provide sufficient information either about readiness deficiencies or units' readiness for missions other than their designed one. Some reports were inaccurate, for the reasons outlined in the Army War College study. Data on a unit was a snapshot taken on the day the unit tendered the report and was thus outdated as soon as the unit submitted it. The personnel and training indicators in GSORTS often masked underlying problems. The system was cumbersome and ran on inadequate software—the review described PC/ASORTS as “obsolete and unstable.” Finally, GSORTS did not provide data needed to accurately plan for the use of reserve component units.⁵³

The review recommended reworking GSORTS into an “Expanded-GSORTS” (E-GSORTS). Many of E-GSORTS' features were similar to those in the system proposed by the Army War College study: make

51. Tillson, et al., *Independent Review of DoD's Readiness Reporting System*, pp. S-1–S-9.

52. *Ibid.*, pp. 22–50.

53. *Ibid.*, pp. C-21 to C-29.

the reports mission-focused; include functional organizations as well as units; develop a predictive assessment tool; reduce subjectivity in training assessments; add indicators tracking personnel turbulence; and field a Web-based system that incorporates data from both GSORTS and other reports.⁵⁴

There were additional features in E-GSORTS. Reserve component units would report in the same manner as active units. Supply status would become a separate area of assessment. Unit missions would be based on both the Universal Joint Task List and service-linked task lists. Every unit would have a readiness matrix that provided the standard against which its readiness would be measured. Unit commanders would have to forecast changes in readiness level, but they would still be allowed to apply professional judgment when their estimate differed from the objectively derived ratings.⁵⁵

The IDA's recommendations decisively shifted control over readiness reporting from the services and the Joint Staff to OSD. The return of Donald H. Rumsfeld to the Pentagon as Secretary of Defense in January 2001 brought a leader receptive to such a shift.⁵⁶ His vision for transforming the military diminished conventional ground forces' role and dismissed the operations they had performed since 1991 as being of no real importance. Rumsfeld's vision partially overlapped with the Army transformation effort Shinseki had started. So OSD looked for reductions in what it considered as an overbuilt Army to help pay for a revolution in military affairs. The IDA's concept depended on using advanced information management technologies, which were also a part of Rumsfeld's vision for transformation. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness embraced this concept as another technology-based solution. Meanwhile, Shinseki sought to counter OSD's proposed cuts by stressing what would be the Army's importance in a major war.⁵⁷

54. *Ibid.*, pp. C-30, C-31.

55. *Ibid.*, pp. C-31 to C-60.

56. Rumsfeld had previously served as Secretary of Defense in the Ford administration.

57. Memo, Shinseki for the Chairman of the Joint Chs of Staff, 4 Jun 2001, sub: Secretary of Defense Questions (1 Jun 2001), Folder 1, Box 27, Shinseki Collection, AHEC; Memo, Shinseki for Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec of Def, 18 Aug 2001, sub: Army Comments on Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) Draft #4, Folder 5, Box 29, Shinseki Papers, AHEC; Ltr, Shinseki to The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, 23 Aug 2001, Folder 7, Box 29, Shinseki Papers, AHEC; Memo, David S. C. Chu for Secretaries of the Mil Departments, et al., 1 Feb 2002, sub: Operations Readiness Working Group (OWRG)—Quarterly Execution Data, Folder 7, Box 38, Shinseki Pa-

In November 2001, the Army published the long-ongoing revision of AR 220-1. It incorporated a few of the Army War College Study's recommendations and remained a tool both for measuring readiness and for providing the data HQDA desired for resource management. The most prominent influence of the War College's study was on page one: a new paragraph situated the USR within GSORTS, explained the importance of readiness reporting, and concluded with this statement in bolded type: "The USR is not a unit report card and should not be used to evaluate or compare the accomplishments of subordinate units or their commanders." The revision also added training programs on the USR and PC/ASORTS to DCSOPS' responsibilities. The revision added a small measure of readiness forecasting: major combat units⁵⁸ would provide a 90-day projected overall C-level based on the commander's assessment of subordinate units' projected levels.

Responding both to the War College's study and to congressional displeasure, the revision changed submission timelines. All USRs now had to arrive at HQDA within nine working days after the report's as-of date. (Previously, it had been nine days for active and deployed units and twenty-one days for reserve component units.) The suspense for change reports for both components (required when an overall level or resource area level change occurred) still had to arrive at HQDA within twenty-four hours of the change.

The revision acknowledged the wide variety of nonwartime missions the Army had undertaken since 1991 with an expanded chapter on reporting while deployed. The shift to a full mission-based reporting concept, however, did not occur. For USR purposes, status would be still be measured against wartime mission requirements and unit organization, and the revision provided more details for making that measurement while deployed. The revision made the Joint Staff's "percent effective" concept a formal reporting requirement for units preparing for and conducting nonwartime missions. (Previously, units reported readiness for these missions using the mission accomplishment estimate field in

pers, AHEC; Memo, Brig Gen David F. Melcher for Ch of Staff, Army, 28 Jun 2002, sub: Army Force Structure, Folder 8, Box 46, Shinseki Papers, AHEC; Peter Boyer, "A Different War: Is the Army Becoming Irrelevant?" *New Yorker*, 1 Jul 2002, 54-67; Timothy J. Cathcart, "Touching the Face of God: Religion, Technology, and the United States Air Force" (Ph.D. diss., Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 2008), pp. 204-06; Brown, *Kevlar Legions*, pp. 225-27.

58. Defined as divisions, regiments, separate brigades, special operations groups/regiments/commands, divisional brigades operating separately, armored cavalry regiments, and Army pre-positioned equipment sets.

DA Form 2715.)⁵⁹ Percent effective was a subjective assessment by the commander, not an objective rating of criteria against an essential task list for that mission.

The most extensively revised chapter was on training. It included a requirement to report the percentage of mission essential tasks the unit was qualified for as well as the number of training days required to reach full proficiency on all tasks. The overall training level reported would be the lower of these two results. Furthermore, the revision detailed instructions for calculating both figures. An added step was the training level review process, designed to add “doctrinal credibility” to the overall training level determination. The revision also included detailed guidance for reporting on the staffing and qualification of squads, crews, and teams. Instructions regarding calculation and projection of deployment tempo saw major changes. The new regulation gave units alerted for, conducting, and recovering from nonwartime missions special criteria for estimating their wartime mission training proficiency.⁶⁰

Implementing the Army War College study’s recommendations took a larger step forward with DCSOPS’ development of a Strategic Readiness System (SRS). The DCSOPS intended for the system to provide a common, accurate, and timely situational awareness on readiness across the service and also to serve as the decision support tool proposed in the study. A key part of the system would be the “balanced scorecard” concept used in businesses and adapted for Army use. The scorecard would be the mechanism for implementing nested Commander’s Critical Information Requirements. In SRS, the chief of staff would publish a scorecard setting out his vision, objectives, and initiatives for the service. Successive lower echelons, down to brigade and battalion levels, would create their own scorecard, tailored to their missions and linked to the objectives set by the chief of staff. Scores would be determined by the software that would create the readiness database proposed by the study. This software would eventually reach into approximately 5,800 separate databases for the information necessary to determine the scores. Measurement would be expressed as red, amber, or green, indicating the degree of success toward achieving or sustaining an objective. The scorecards also would facilitate the analysis necessary for a predictive readiness system.⁶¹

59. Juan Crayton, DAMO-ODR, Information Paper, 1 Nov 2010, sub: The History of Reporting Requirements for Assigned Mission Readiness, Historians files, CMH.

60. *Army Regulation 220-1: Unit Status Reporting* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 15 Nov 2001).

61. Information Paper, DAMO-ODR, 15 Mar 2002, sub: Strategic Readiness System, Historians files, CMH; Army Public Affairs, News release #R-02-44, 24 Jul

The SRS met with resistance both within HQDA and in some major commands. Although it did not create new reporting systems, design and fielding of scorecards was another task for organizations which already felt overworked, especially as the service participated in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and prepared for another war with Iraq. There also was skepticism that the system would provide the promised benefits. The program, though, had the strong backing of Shinseki and Secretary of the Army Thomas E. White. The chief of staff approved the overall Army scorecard (designated the Level 0 scorecard) in March 2002 and the next month an SRS prime contractor and information technology integrator was selected. Elements within HQDA and the major commands then began preparing their scorecards. At the same time, the SRS Operations Center in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 worked to overcome resistance. (As part of a reorganization of HQDA in July 2002, DCSOPS had been designated as the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7.) It established a web page, developed a portal library about the system, published articles about it, issued a bimonthly newsletter, began holding an annual conference, and conducted training on scorecards. By the end of 2002, Shinseki had approved all Level 1 scorecards (those for major command headquarters and HQDA elements), and G-3 projected that an Army regulation for the system would be published in July 2005.⁶²

The OSD had already begun the process of turning IDA's concept into a new Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). After circulating a draft to the services in April 2002, it issued a directive in June outlining the DRRS concept: "A capabilities-based, adaptive, near-real time readiness reporting system." All components of the

2002, "Army Announces Strategic Readiness System," Historians files, CMH; Dan Caterinicchia, "Army Keeps Score," *FCW*, 12 Aug 2002; Bfg Slides, James Coffey, Balanced Scorecard Collaborative, Inc., 6 Mar 2003, sub: SRS Overview Brief, Historians Files, CMH.

62. Lt Col Michael S. Galloucis, Paper for Core Course 5603, National War College, "The Army's Strategic Readiness System (SRS): The Road to Improved Readiness or Just Another Bright Idea?" Jan 2003, pp. 7-11; Memo, Maj Gen Peter W. Chiarelli for Ch of Staff, Army, 25 Jun 2002, sub: Strategic Readiness System (SRS) Scorecard Approval, Folder 1, Box 46, Shinseki Papers, AHEC; Memo, Maj Gen Peter W. Chiarelli for Sec of the Army, 5 Dec 2002, sub: The Strategic Readiness System, Folder 1, Box 54, Shinseki Papers, AHEC; Maj Gen Peter W. Chiarelli for Sec of the Army, 21 Mar 2003, sub: Strategic Readiness System (SRS) Scorecard Approval, Folder 5, Box 61, Shinseki Papers, AHEC; James L. Stevens, "The Balanced Scorecard and Army Strategic Readiness System," *Army AL&T* (March-April 2004): 40-45; Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, "Creating the Office of Strategy Management," Working Paper 05-071, Harvard Business School, Apr 2005: pp. 3-4.

Defense Department were to “develop and employ modern readiness assessment tools, software, and models to aid in readiness reporting and assessment.” Readiness data would be collected by a revision of GSORTS designated Enhanced SORTS (ESORTS). The OSD made the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness responsible for designing, fielding, and funding ESORTS.

Under DRRS, the combatant commands would develop joint mission essential tasks in support of missions as assigned by the Secretary of Defense. Within ESORTS, they would report their readiness to execute these tasks in the context of joint scenario assessments and include their joint operational and support organizations. The military services were to develop mission-essential tasks that supported their responsibilities to the combatant commands; report readiness for assigned tasks as described in joint scenario assessments; develop the resource and training standards for all their organizations and enter them in ESORTS; and collect and report readiness data on these organizations in accordance with OSD’s instructions for DRRS. Although the directive did not include a timeline for fielding the system, during congressional testimony earlier in the year OSD had scheduled the initial fielding for fiscal year 2004 and full operational capability by fiscal year 2007.⁶³

The project soon became a point of friction between the services and OSD. The officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness responsible for developing DRRS approached the task convinced the system would provide a quantum jump in capabilities. Their faith in the system brooked no opposition and created an adversarial relationship with the services. The close-hold management style also concerned the GAO, which in March 2003 warned that although “the new system may have the potential to improve readiness reporting, without an implementation plan little assurance exists that the new system will actually improve readiness assessments by the time full capability is planned in 2007.” The GAO recommended that OSD prepare such a plan, but when it again looked at the project in 2009 it found this advice had been ignored. Furthermore it found that “DRRS requirements have

63. Department of Def: Presentation to the Subcommittee on Mil Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Subject: Readiness of Our Armed Forces—Statement of Dr. Paul W. Mayberry, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness), 21 Mar 2002, Historians files CMH; Memo, David S. C. Chu for Secretaries of the Mil Departments, et al., 11 Apr 2002, sub: Improved DoD Readiness Reporting, Folder 5, Box 42, Shinseki Papers, AHEC; Department of Def Dir NUMBER 7730.65, 3 Jun 2002, “Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS),” Historians files, CMH.

not been effectively developed and managed, and DRRS testing has not been adequately performed and managed.” The GAO also noted that until recently “key users were not fully or effectively engaged in DRRS requirements development and management.”⁶⁴

As development of DRRS got under way, the Army once again examined its readiness reporting system. In May 2002, Shinseki for a second time made assessing this system a priority for the IG’s annual inspection plan. Less than a year after publishing a new edition of AR 220–1, DCSOPS was preparing another revision because “many of the old paradigms of readiness reporting may require adjustment in light of the Army’s changes.” The primary sources of these changes were Shinseki’s Army transformation campaign and the fielding the SRS. In October 2002, G–3 forecasted that this revision, expected in January 2003, would “provide at least the 90 percent solution for setting the policy framework for how we collect resource status in the transforming Army.” Starting that same month, G–3 began examining the mechanics of how to “capture resource data in the Transformed Army” and how the USR would be used as “a tool to complement the Strategic Readiness System.”⁶⁵

The revision of AR 220–1, which appeared six months later than forecasted, opened with a discussion of the relationship between the USR and GSORTS. It moved Army readiness reporting fully into the digital age by eliminating DA Form 2715; henceforth, all USRs would be prepared and submitted using PC/ASORTS. As part of that transition, the new AR 220–1 included screen shots from PC/ASORTS to illustrate data entry instructions. Previously, AR 220–1 had made HQDA the authority to which units sent USRs during peacetime; during wartime, a deployed unit’s USR went to the Army component command of the unified command to which it had deployed. The revision established that, unless specifically instructed otherwise, HQDA was always the SORTS reporting authority for Army units.

64. *Military Readiness: New Reporting System Is Intended to Address Long-Standing Problems, but Better Planning Is Needed* (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, Mar 2003), p. 21; *Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Strengthen Management and Oversight of the Defense Readiness Reporting System* (Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office, Sep 2009), pp. 10–11; Cathcart, “Touching the Face of God,” pp. 204–18.

65. Memo, the inspector general for the Sec of the Army, 16 May 2002, sub: Fiscal Year 2003–2004 DAIG Inspection Plan, Folder 5, Box 44, Shinseki Papers, AHCC; Col Robert Cox, ODCS, G–3, “Revision of Army Regulation 220–1 Unit Status Reporting,” in *Chief of Staff, Army, Weekly Summary, 18 Oct 02*, Box 1, Entry UD 15W-1, RG 319, NACP.

U N C L A S S I F I E D			
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PROFIS Set PROFREQ:[J] PROAVAL:[J]	ERC B & C LINS EHRDNBC: 10 EHRDBC1:[8] EHRDBC2:[2] EHRDBC3:[1] EHRDBC4:[1]	TMETL Data Task Trained [3] Needs Practice[3] Untrained [1]	
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ESC=Exit/NO Save F10=Save/Exit F8=ASPER F4=Remark Use ↑ ↓ F7=Input AUPER Rmks F9=SGPER Curr Field			

PC/ASORTS screenshot from the 2001 edition of AR 220-1

The other major changes were in the training section. A soldier now had to meet their military occupational specialty's qualification standards as part of determining squad/crew status. The revision also clarified qualification requirements for key personnel in squads and crews. The training events execution review replaced the training level review process. The reason for this change was that in some cases units had not executed all training events, yet the review still rated them as ready. This disconnect had raised questions regarding training strategies, resource requirements, and readiness reporting credibility. The new review specifically linked the training rating to the unit's training plan, as set out in its quarterly training brief. If a unit did not conduct all the necessary doctrinal training events for being proficient in all mission essential tasks, then the commander had to assess the effect of these missing events on unit proficiency.⁶⁶

Conclusion

Between 1991 and 2001 the service passed through an interwar period. That period saw the end of the mission to defend Western Europe, the commitment around which the Army had since 1951 structured its forces, designed its doctrine, and measured its readiness. With the end of this mission, the Army underwent a traumatic downsizing

66. *Army Regulation 220-1: Unit Status Reporting* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 10 Jun 2003).

accompanied by deployments for a variety of operations other than war while it attempted to maintain its capability for combined arms battle. In this environment, readiness—how to define it and how to measure it—became a contentious issue within the service and in politics. By 1999, dissatisfaction with readiness reporting reached a culmination both within the Army, with Shinseki's directive for the War College study, and in Congress, with the mandate for what became the IDA study.

General Shinseki retired the day after the Army published the 2003 edition of AR 220–1. He departed amid uncertainty over how his efforts to transform the Army for a post–Cold War world, including its readiness reporting system, would play out. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld believed the Army was the service most resistant to his vision for transformation and allowed the pick for Shinseki's successor to be leaked over a year before his retirement. By June 2003, that officer had decided to retire as well and Secretary Rumsfeld still had not announced who would be the next chief of staff. A similar antagonistic relationship existed between the services and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness over the DRRS. The greatest uncertainty that June, though, resided outside the Pentagon. The latest AR 220–1 took effect with the Army at war in Iraq and Afghanistan. In both places, the outcome remained uncertain, as did the demands these wars would make on the Army and its readiness reporting system.

READINESS REPORTING IN PERSPECTIVE

Between the end of World War II and the start of the Kennedy administration, the U.S. Army adopted and discarded a variety of readiness reporting systems, and then from 1964 to 2003 it revised AR 220–1 sixteen times. Until 1961, these cycles generally had been driven by a tension between those who supported a system based on maximum possible quantification of readiness, such as AFF and CONARC, and those who advocated for a system based on the unit commander’s judgment, such as General Taylor. Those favoring the latter approach had been dominant, arguing against centralized systems with detailed directives on how to report readiness. The state of information technology in this period—expensive and unwieldy compared to its later evolutions—reinforced this disinclination, as did the numerous missteps made by the Army in developing its automatic data processing capabilities. Except during the first year of the Korean War, presidents, Congress, and the secretaries of defense had considered Army readiness secondary to the readiness of Strategic Air Command.

In 1961, the Kennedy administration elevated Army readiness to an issue of primary importance. The new management methods imposed on the services by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara decisively ended the tension between judgment-based evaluation and quantification by deciding in favor of the latter. Implementation of quantifiable readiness reporting in AR 220–1 soon provided far more data on units’ status than ever before. Many senior leaders, such as Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance, almost immediately saw this data as more than just an accurate picture of readiness; when coupled with the advances in information technology, it became a powerful new tool for managing resources. This concept was all the more attractive because at the time, HQDA was having great difficulty in designing and implementing other systems for managing resources. A new tension then emerged between those who favored limiting the system’s purpose to unit status updates and those who wanted to use it for broader purposes.

Secretary McNamara’s insistence on quantitative management also created another source of tension: between the Army’s system and an expanding joint readiness reporting system. Before 2000, however, the Joint Staff never

had the power to fully impose upon the Army its concepts for measuring readiness. During the 1960s and 1970s, Army concepts for readiness reporting shaped the joint system in significant ways. The quest for more and better data produced increasingly complicated criteria for readiness. This complexity raised doubts that units understood how to properly apply the criteria. Even more troubling was that this complexity interacted with dysfunctional aspects in officer corps culture to encourage inflation of readiness ratings.

The development of ever more complex methods to assess readiness had a dramatic effect on the reserve components. The two-track approach continued, with an evaluation done by regulars during annual training and a commander's readiness report. Units complained of the burden created by the AFF and CONARC systems, but eliminating these in favor of a modified CSGPO-175 led to serious problems during the Berlin crisis. Initial attempts to impose the AR 220-1 system on reserve components floundered, producing instead the AR 135-8 system that then quickly broke down. Fitting reserve component units into the AR 220-1 procedure after the Vietnam War appeared to be successful, but the Persian Gulf War revealed that it, and the annual training evaluation program, did not produce a completely accurate picture of reserve components readiness.

The AR 220-1 system, its counterpart in other services, and the joint system were used in unintended ways: as report cards on unit commanders, HQDA, OSD, and even the President. Even when they were not so used, the perception that they were—especially among field grade officers—quickly became part of the Army's organizational climate. Between the late 1950s and the end of the twentieth century, the assessment of unit readiness existed within an Army organizational culture in which “we have people who are deviating from what they know to be appropriate, professional behavior.”¹ Although readiness assessment was never as thoroughly compromised as the evaluation of officers, this environment proved corrosive to the integrity of readiness reporting.² Signs of this corrosion increasingly appeared in the years immediately before the withdrawal from Vietnam. It was only during the Army's initial efforts to recover from the war, however, that the decay in the system became so obvious that it prompted senior leaders to act. The 1976 War College report provided significant detail on what had gone wrong, findings repeated in the 2000 War College report. In both cases, senior leaders

1. *Senior Officer Oral History Program: Lieutenant General Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., USA, Retired* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1996), 208. Ulmer coauthored the 1970 Army War College professionalism study.

2. For the “tortuous and troubled history” of officer evaluation reporting, see Arthur T. Coumbe, *A History of the U.S. Army Officer Corps, 1900-1990* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2014), 181-194.

accepted some of the report's recommendations for revising AR 220-1, but neither time did they use these findings to mitigate or remove the incentives for officers to deviate from appropriate, professional behavior.³ Externally, this use of readiness reports entangled the service in conflict between the executive and legislative branches, conflict that during the 1980s and 1990s included a decided partisan political component.

The turmoil of the immediate post-Vietnam War period prompted the Army to begin expanding its definition of readiness. Although AR 220-1 remained the cornerstone of readiness reporting, the service sought other measurements beyond unit status and developed the concept of force readiness. The search then began for methods to quantify force readiness, an effort that would continue beyond 2003.

This search intersected with increasingly powerful computer-based tools for collecting and using information. Transferring data from paper forms to punch cards gave way to submitting USRs via personal computers. Databases expanded, but the validity of their data became an issue. By the end of the twentieth century, there were proposals to construct digital readiness reporting systems so comprehensive that they could not only track the readiness of units, major commands, and the entire military, they could *predict* it.

Between 1999 and 2003, this quest for ever more comprehensive assessments and congressional displeasure with the executive branch coalesced and created a major shift in readiness reporting. Armed with an abiding faith that a revolution in military affairs was at hand, Donald H. Rumsfeld returned to the Pentagon. His arrival coincided with the congressional mandate that resulted in the IDA study. From this emerged the Defense Readiness Reporting System concept, which, when fully implemented, would transfer control of readiness reporting from the uniformed military to OSD. General Shinseki sought to keep Army readiness reporting under the service's control with his Strategic Readiness System, but Rumsfeld's poor opinion of him and the Army left the issue still in doubt when Shinseki retired in 2003. By then, the Army was once again at war, and both the course of the war and its effects on readiness reporting remained uncertain.

3. These incentives remain a powerful part of the Army's organizational climate. See Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras, *Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2015).

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Unpublished Sources

The most important sources for all but the last chapter of this work were unclassified and declassified records at the National Archives, College Park, Maryland. Files from the Army Staff are in Record Group 319. Record Group 335 holds files from the Office of the Secretary of the Army. Record Group 337 covers Army Ground Forces and Army Field Forces. The most valuable entries in Record Group 338 were those from the headquarters of the continental armies. Files from Continental Army Command are in Record Group 546. Joint Staff material is in Record Group 218. These collections contain still-classified entries, but a check of them found no documents that would alter the narrative and conclusions in this monograph.

The collapse of Army records management after the Vietnam War prevented a reliance on the same sources for the final chapter.¹ The collapse affected both operational and organizational records. At the National Archives, the amount of material in entries from the Office of the Chief of Staff, Army, declines significantly after 1973. There are no entries for this office's correspondence files after 1984. Similarly, there are only a few entries from the DCSOPS created after 1974 and none after 1979.²

The most important sources for part of chapter four and all of chapter five are held at the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center (AHEC), Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. All but one of the men who served as the Army's chief of staff between 1975 and 2002 donated their papers to AHEC. (The papers of the exception, Bernard W. Rogers, are at the National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.)

1. For details on this collapse, see William Michael Yarborough, "Undocumented Triumph: Gulf War Operational Records Management" *Journal of Military History* 77 (October 2013): 1427–1435.

2. Inquiries made with HQDA records managers and with the U.S. Army Records Management and Declassification Agency produced no information on the disposition of these missing records. The responses suggest that during the last forty years HQDA offices routinely destroyed their records instead of transferring them to the National Archives; Historians files, CMH.

The material in these collections varies depending on what each officer decided to retain, but chapter five could not have been written without these papers. Additionally, some collections have items regarding readiness reporting from assignments earlier in the officer's career. Donations from other retired generals, most notably Walter T. Kerwin Jr., contain important items. Almost all these collections have a section that contains still-classified material. As with entries at the National Archives, a check of these sections found no documents that would alter the narrative and conclusions in this monograph.

Although archiving Army records is not AHEC's primary mission, some have found their way to Carlisle. The center holds a still-classified collection of DCSOPS records transferred near the end of the previous century. The approximately 100 linear feet of material is mostly from the 1980s and 1990s. A check of these boxes located several relevant unclassified documents.

There is other useful material at AHEC. The center has extensive collections of Army regulations, pamphlets, manuals, and professional journals. It preserves research papers prepared by Army War College students; these were often based on Headquarters, Department of the Army, documents and students' experience in previous assignments. (Some of these papers have been digitized and are available at the Defense Technical Information Center's website.)

An important supplement to official documents is AHEC's Senior Officer Oral History Program, established in 1970 by General Westmoreland. The value of these histories varies based on the skill of the interviewer and the frankness of the interviewee, but many contain details unavailable from any other source. Transcripts can be read at the center, which also has placed a number of them on its website.

The U.S. Army Center of Military History at Fort McNair maintains copies of reports prepared since the late 1940s under successive versions of regulations requiring annual historical summaries. These reports are from units (divisions, corps, and armies), major commands, and elements of the Army Staff. There are gaps in this coverage since regulatory requirements have changed over the decades, not all organizations have complied with regulations, and not all summaries have the comprehensiveness desired by historians. Nevertheless, this collection provides information not easily found in other sources and the organization's own perspective on various topics. Some summaries remain classified, but all material from summaries cited in this work are either from declassified ones or from unclassified sections of still-classified ones.

Searches of the Army Knowledge Online and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, Web sites found several unclassified documents

used in chapter five. These items were downloaded and are cited in the notes as “Historians files, CMH.”

Published Sources

The leading published primary source was reports from the General Accounting Office (GAO). Not all reports reviewed for this monograph focused on reporting systems, but even those that concerned issues affecting readiness provided information on how the Army assessed it. Additionally, the reports include a section in which the Army responded to the GAO’s findings.

The only previous history of the Army’s readiness reporting systems is Appendix G of the Institute for Defense Analyses’ congressionally mandated *Independent Review of DoD’s Readiness Reporting System*. The purpose of this appendix was to provide historical context for the review’s findings and recommendations. The appendix is based entirely on secondary sources instead of research in archival sources. This decision created a work with significant omissions and errors about both the Army and the Joint Staff systems.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAURRS	Automated Army Unit Readiness Reporting System
AFF	Army Field Forces
AGF	Army Ground Forces
AHEC	U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center
ALO	Authorized Level of Organization
AR	Army Regulation
ARADCOM	Army Air Defense Command
ARMS	Army Readiness Management System
ARTEP	Army Training and Evaluation Program
ATP	Army Training Program
ATT	Army Training Test
AUTODIN	Automatic Digital Network
CMH	Center of Military History
CONARC	Continental Army Command
CORC	Chief, Office of Reserve Components
DA	Department of the Army
DCSOPS	Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations
DO	Deployment Objective
DRRS	Defense Readiness Reporting System
E-GSORTS	Expanded-Global Status of Resources and Training System
ESORTS	Enhanced Status of Resources and Training System
FEC	Far East Command
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FORSTAT	Force Status Report
G-3	U.S. Army Operations
GAO	General Accounting Office
GSORTS	Global Status of Resources and Training System

HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
IDA	Institute for Defense Analyses
IG	Inspector General
IGD	Inspector General Department
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JOPREP	Joint Operational Reporting System
NACP	National Archives, College Park, Maryland
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NMCC	National Military Command Center
O&T	Organization and Training Division
OPD	Operations Division
ORC	Organized Reserve Corps
ORMONS	Operational Readiness Monitoring System
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
P&O	Plans and Operations Division
PC/ASORTS	Personal Computer-Army Status of Resources and Training System
PRIMAR	Program to Improve Management of Army Resources
REDCAPE	Readiness Capability
REDCAT	Readiness Category
REDCON	Readiness Condition
REDOPS	Daily Change in Readiness Report
SORTS	Status of Resources and Training System
SRF	Strategic Reserve Force
SRS	Strategic Readiness System
STRAC	Strategic Army Corps
STRAF	Strategic Army Force
TPI	Technical Proficiency Inspection
UNITREP	Unit Status and Identity Report

USAREUR
USR

U.S. Army, Europe
Unit Status Report

